Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—SEX —S.D.N.Y.: Terminated employee failed to raise inference of discriminatory intent where decisionmakers were unaware of pregnancy, (Aug 19, 2025)

By Tulay Turan, J.D.

The employee had no knowledge of her coworkers informing anyone about her pregnancy.

An employee who was terminated due to a reorganization cannot proceed to trial with her Title VII sex and pregnancy discrimination claims where she failed to show the decisionmakers were aware she was pregnant when they terminated her, a federal district court in New York ruled. Her pregnancy was not apparent, she did not disclose it to the decisionmakers, and three coworkers who were aware testified they did not inform anyone about it. Thus, she failed to show her termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent (LaPolice v. FAM, LLC, No. 23 Civ. 7091 (DEH) (S.D.N.Y. Aug.18, 2025)).

The employee was a senior merchandising manager at FAM, which is headquartered in California. She lived and worked in Connecticut, commuting to Fam’s New York City office about once a week.

Pregnancy. On October 23, 2022, the employee learned she was pregnant. About a week later, she told one coworker about her pregnancy and later told two others. The employee intended that her three coworkers would keep her pregnancy private, and the three women testified they did not tell anyone about it.

Reorganization. A few days after the employee discovered she was pregnant, FAM’s vice president of strategic accounts finalized a reorganizational spreadsheet with two merchandiser positions listed as open. FAM contends that in drafting the restructuring document, the strategic accounts VP and the design VP had determined that the employee’s position in New York should be eliminated and that two Los Angeles-based merchandisers should be hired for business and operational reasons.

Termination. In December 2022, the design VP terminated the employee via phone. The VP told her that “unless you move to LA, it just doesn’t work.” The employee responded that she could not move to California because she was pregnant. The VP testified she learned of the employee’s pregnancy in that moment. Following the phone call, the design VP texted the strategic accounts VP, which the strategic accounts VP asserted was how she was informed about the employee’s pregnancy.

Charges filed. Thereafter, the employee filed his action, alleging sex and pregnancy discrimination under Title VII and the New York City Human Rights Law. FAM moved for summary judgment on all claims.

Decisionmakers unaware of pregnancy. Granting FAM’s motion for summary judgment on the employee’s Title VII claims, the court found she failed to show her termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. There was no evidence the decisionmakers involved in her termination were aware of her pregnancy prior to the adverse action. The two VPs were the only two people involved in the decision to eliminate her position. They maintained they were unaware of her pregnancy when they made the decision and when they informed her of it.

In addition, the three coworkers who were aware declared under oath that they did not inform anyone of her pregnancy. They also were not involved in employment decisions pertaining to the employee. The employee testified she had no knowledge of the coworkers informing anyone else about her pregnancy. Moreover, it was clear the employee herself did not disclose her pregnancy to the VPs. She also did not assert that her pregnancy was apparent.

Thus, the court explained, if a pregnancy is not apparent and not disclosed by an employee to her employer, she must allege the decisionmakers’ knowledge and provide evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer her employer’s knowledge of her pregnancy to establish a prima facie case.

Text exchange. The court rejected the employee’s attempt to establish such knowledge via a text exchange between the two VPs that occurred directly after her termination call. In the text exchange, the strategic accounts VP questioned the design VP as to whether she informed the employee that her position was terminated first or whether the employee said she was pregnant first. The employee argued the question meant who brought up the pregnancy first, but the questioner testified she did not mean to suggest the other VP knew about the pregnancy. Rather, she was asking about the timing of the two revelations: the termination and the pregnancy. Based on both the VPs’ testimony about what the sender and receiver meant and heard, and the plain language of the text exchange, the court found the employee’s conclusory assertion that this exchange showed the design VP knew she was pregnant prior to their phone call was implausible.

The employee justified her interpretation by arguing the VPs must have learned of her pregnancy from the coworker who worked directly with the strategic accounts VP. However, the coworker testified she did not tell anyone about it. In addition, when the employee was questioned on whether she had any information or knowledge that the three coworkers had told anyone, she said she was unaware that they had. She failed, the court said, to offer evidence of her interpretation of the text exchange other than the insinuation that the three witnesses must have lied about it under oath. Thus, the text exchange did not raise a triable issue of fact as to FAM’s knowledge about her pregnancy.

Temporal proximity. The court also rejected the employee’s argument that the temporal proximity between the VPs’ discussion of her termination and her disclosure of her pregnancy to one of her coworkers raised an inference of discrimination as a matter of law. The employee had not disclosed her pregnancy to the individuals involved in the decision to terminate her employment. As such, there could be no inference of discrimination as a matter of law, the court said.

Moreover, even considering the close temporal proximity between the employee informing one coworker of her pregnancy on October 31 and a November 17 text exchange between the VPs in which they discussed the employee’s termination, more was required for the court to presume an inference of discrimination given that the coworker was not involved in the decision to terminate the employee’s position. Accordingly, the temporal proximity of the employee informing the coworker of her pregnancy and her termination was not sufficient to satisfy the fourth prong of her prima facie case.

NYCHRL claim. As with her Title VII claim, the employee’s NYCHRL claim required her to show that her termination was caused by FAM’s discriminatory motive. Given the evidence that the two individuals who participated in her termination decision were unaware of her pregnancy, she was unable to show that her termination was because of gender-motivated discriminatory intent. Thus, the court also dismissed her NYCHRL claim.

The case is No. 23 Civ. 7091 (DEH).

Judge: Ho, D.

Attorneys: Davida S. Perry (Schwartz Perry & Heller) for Lauren LaPolice. Jessica M. Baquet (Westerman Ball Ederer Miller Zucker & Sharfstein) for FAM, LLC.

Companies: FAM, LLC

Cases: Discrimination SexDiscrimination StateLawClaims Discharge NewYorkNews