Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—SEX—6th Cir.: Professor who lived abroad could not pursue Title IX hiring bias claim against university, (Aug 7, 2026)

By Kathleen Kapusta, J.D.

After the professor, a white male, was chosen as the top candidate for an open position, the university canceled the search when faculty members expressed concern that he would not provide a needed increase in diversity.

Explaining, in a case of first impression, that Title IX protects only persons in the United States, the Sixth Circuit found the court below properly granted summary judgment against the Title IX claim of an American citizen who, while living in the United Kingdom, was the top choice for an assistant professor position at the University of Cincinnati until the university cancelled the search due to faculty concerns over his race and gender. The appeals court also found that sovereign and qualified immunity barred his equal protection claims. Judge Murphy, in a separate concurring opinion, flagged “an additional causation question” on the Title IX claim that the parties overlooked (Charlton-Perkins v. University of Cincinnati, No. 25-3693 (6th Cir. Aug. 5, 2026)).

Born in South Africa, the professor, a U.S. citizen, later resided in the United States where he received a PhD in molecular and developmental biology from the University of Cincinnati. In 2015, he moved to the United Kingdom to work as a research assistant at the University of Cambridge.

When the University of Cincinnati began a hiring search in 2017 for an assistant professor in the biology department, the professor applied for the position. Although the chair of the hiring committee had previously served on his doctoral thesis advisory committee and coauthored multiple scientific publications with him, a university administrator told her there was no conflict of interest.

Lack of diversity. After multiple rounds of interviewing, the committee narrowed its search to four candidates—two men and two women—including the professor, whom the search committee ultimately selected as its top choice. Around that same time, the head of the biology department received feedback from faculty members, including that a white male “would not provide a much needed increase in diversity,” that the professor “brings the opposite of diversity and... demographics,” as a candidate, and that his hiring frustrated the overall aim “of hiring women.”

Based on this, the department head and college dean put the hiring decision on hold. When the department head informed the search committee that he and the dean wanted to shift away from the professor and “focus on the women candidates,” the committee chair argued that this was “plain discrimination.” The dean, however, noted that the biology department “was short on women” and cited the chair’s perceived conflict of interest and the divided support of faculty.

Lower court proceedings. The dean ultimately cancelled the search altogether and the position was never reposted. The professor subsequently sued, asserting a Title IX claim against the university and claims against the department head and dean in their individual and official capacities under the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted summary judgment to the university on the Title IX claim and dismissed the equal protection claims.

Title IX. Title IX, the Sixth Circuit observed, states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance....” Noting that it had never addressed whether a U.S. citizen living abroad at the time of the alleged discrimination can claim the protection of Title IX, the appeals court turned to the statute’s text, and specifically, the phrase “in the United States.”

Geographical requirement. Observing that at the time of Title IX’s enactment, “in” was most commonly “used as a function word to indicate location or position in space or in some materially bounded object,” the court found this supported the interpretation that “in the United States” is a geographical requirement. Moreover, said the court, in its recent Trump v. Barbara decision, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the beginning of the Citizenship Clause, “born... in the United States,” to refer to “territory.” After reviewing another recent Supreme Court decision, the court observed that the high court, in its “most recent examinations of similar language to that found in Title IX,” has found that being “in the United States” referred to physical presence in U.S. territory.

Spending Clause. Further, said the court, not only was the usage of the phrase “person in the United States” in other statutes consistent with this interpretation, “the nature of Title IX counsels in favor of the plain-language interpretation.” Title IX was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause and because Congress can use the Spending Clause to pursue its priorities by attaching conditions to the funds it distributes, “Spending Clause legislation like Title IX,” the court observed, “creates a sort of contract where States receive federal funds in return for complying with federally imposed conditions.”

Because knowing acceptance of a putative contract requires awareness of its terms, Congress must speak with a clear voice when passing Spending Clause legislation so that a state is aware of the conditions it accedes to when it accepts federal funds. And here, said the court, “a prospective funding recipient reading a statute that prohibits discrimination against persons in the United States would not expect to face liability for discriminating against persons outside of the United States.”

While the district court pointed to dicta in the Supreme Court’s 1979 Cannon v. University of Chicago decision suggesting Title IX was intended to protect citizens regardless of location, dicta is not binding, said the court, finding “Cannon’s dicta is too thin a reed on which to rest an argument.”

Citizenship. Regarding the professor’s assertion he could be a “person in the United States” based on his citizenship, the court declined to define the relevant phrase to refer to both physical location and citizenship. “That Congress would use ‘in’ to simultaneously refer to physical presence in the United States, regardless of citizenship, and United States citizenship, despite physical presence outside of the United States, beggars belief.”

Presence. Nor was the court persuaded by his contention that his presence in the United States during the interview process was enough. The statutory language, the court explained, strongly suggests that the presence in the United States must be linked to being “subjected to discrimination” and the professor was not subjected to any gender discrimination at the time of the in-person interview. For these reasons, the court affirmed summary judgment against his Title IX claim.

Qualified immunity. After affirming that the professor’s official-capacity equal protection claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the court turned to the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the department head and dean on the individual-capacity equal protection claims. Rather than providing on-point caselaw clearly establishing the constitutional right at issue, the professor argued that this was “the rare ‘obvious case,’ where the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct is sufficiently clear even though existing precedent does not address similar circumstances.”

While, in support, he pointed to evidence showing the department head and dean were concerned about the potential legal consequences for their actions, if anything, said the court, the record suggested the dean thought cancelling the search was a way to avoid liability, which would suggest he thought this would not violate the professor’s constitutional rights. Given the lack of law on the point, said the court, a reasonable administrator could conclude that he would not violate any applicant’s rights if he simply declined to hire anyone at all. Accordingly, the court also affirmed dismissal of the personal-capacity equal protection claims.

The case is No. 25-3693.

Judge: Bush, J.

Attorneys: Marc D. Mezibov (Law Offices of Marc D. Mezibov) for Mark Charlton-Perkins. Evan T. Priestle (Taft, Stettinius & Hollister) for University of Cincinnati, Kenneth Petren, and George Uetz.

Companies: University of Cincinnati

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