Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—S.D. Ind.: Black automative worker with exacerbated anxiety following workplace incidents cannot advance claims, (Jul 24, 2026)

By Todd Harrison, J.D.

She had discovered a noose at her workstation and was temporarily locked in her die-caster machine when she had entered the machine to clean it.

Granting summary judgment against the disability and race discrimination claims asserted by a die-caster at an automotive manufacturer, a federal district court in Indiana determined that she could not show she was a qualified individual under the ADA and her termination, purportedly based on absenteeism, was sufficient to show that she was not meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations, thus dooming her prima facie case for discrimination. Over the course of this proceeding, the employee, proceeding pro se, never responded to the employer’s motion for summary judgment, despite being informed of the importance of doing so. Accordingly, the employer’s undisputed material facts were taken at face value (Stewart v. FCA US LLC, No. 1:24-cv-01553-JRO-MKK (S.D. Ind. July 23, 2026)).

The employee in this case is a Black woman who began working as a die-caster at the employer’s Kokomo Casting Plant (KCP) in 2013.

Noose. On October 15, 2021, the employee found a rope hanging on one of her machines. She described the rope as a “hanging noose.” When her supervisor saw the noose, he offered to allow her to go home for the day, but the employee refused. After this incident, she developed sleep terrors.

Locked in. Then, on August 11, 2022, the employee arrived at work to find one of her machines was shut down. She decided to clean it, which requires entering the machine’s production cell, an enclosed area containing a furnace and a robot. When the machine is running, it is dangerous to be in the cell.

While she was cleaning the cell, an unidentified person shut the door and locked it. According to the timestamps on the video she recorded with her phone, she was locked inside the cell for 76 seconds before a contractor let her out. She became overwhelmed once people came up to her to ask what had happened. She was taken to medical and then left work for the day.

Disability leave. After the machine incident, the employee experienced what she described as a “nervous breakdown.” The incident exacerbated her pre-existing anxiety, causing her to develop depression and PTSD. She applied for and received medical disability leave on August 14, 2022.

While on leave, the employee filed a complaint with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission, which issued a “no probable cause” finding. She also filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC, which deferred to the Indiana Civil Rights Commission’s determination. She also contacted the NAACP and the Indiana Department of Occupational Safety and Health. Neither entity took action to assist the employee.

Accommodation request. On January 16, 2024, the employee wrote to the employer requesting a transfer to one of two other plants in Kokomo as an accommodation under the ADA. She provided a doctor’s note stating that she “cannot function in current work environment due to traumatic event.” The employer noted that the transfer request presented “potential” issues under the labor union’s collective bargaining agreement. While the employer worked through these considerations, it expected the employee to return to work at KCP.

Termination. While the employer was still considering the accommodation request, it received the employee’s reinstatement paperwork wherein her doctor stated she could “return to work with no restrictions on March 4, 2024.” When the employee inquired whether she was expected to return to the KCP location, she was told that this was the case until a determination was made with regard to her transfer request.

On March 4 and each subsequent day that week, the employee called out absent for personal reasons. In accordance with workplace policy, she was informed that she would have to report to the employment office or provide evidence of the reason for her absence by March 20. She did neither and was terminated for failing to return to work.

Subsequently, the employee filed this lawsuit, asserting claims under the ADA for discrimination, failure to accommodate, interference, and retaliation, as well as a Section 1981 claim for racial discrimination. The employer moved for summary judgment and the employee did not respond to this motion.

Qualified individual. First, the court addressed the employee’s ADA discrimination and failure to accommodate claims. The employer contended that the employee could not show that she was a qualified individual for ADA purposes. The court agreed.

There was no indication that the employee could perform the essential functions of her position with or without a reasonable accommodation, observed the court. Per her own doctor’s note, “[s]he cannot function in current work environment due to traumatic event,” and she had testified more than once that she would not return to work at KCP. Her inability to work at KCP necessarily meant that she could not perform the essential functions of her die-caster position at KCP.

No vacant positions. Because the employee could not perform the essential functions of the job she held, she would be considered a qualified individual under the ADA only if she could perform the essential functions of a position she desired to hold. In other words, a vacant position at another plant. However, the employee did not designate any evidence for summary judgment, she had not put forth any evidence of a vacant position into which she could have transferred. Accordingly, summary judgment was granted in favor of the employer against these claims.

Discrimination. Turning to the employee’s discrimination claims, the court noted that she had shown she was a member of a protected racial class, but not a protected class under the ADA as she was not a qualified individual. Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework to these claims, the court pointed out that because she had not responded to the employer’s motion for summary judgment, she had not identified any similarly situated employees who received better treatment. Although she did manage to identify other employees who found nooses at their workstations or were briefly locked in their machine cells, she did not say they were treated any better than she.

In addition, the court found the undisputed facts showed that the employee was not meeting the employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of her termination. The employer expected her to return to work on March 4 and she did not return to work as expected. The court noted that the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that absenteeism can constitute a failure to meet the company’s legitimate expectations. Thus, the employee could not establish a prima facie case for discrimination.

Even if the employee could make out a prima facie case, the employer presented a non-discriminatory reason for its termination decision—absenteeism. Without a response to the employer’s motion for summary judgment, the court could find no evidence that this reason was pretextual.

Ortiz’s approach. The court reached the same conclusion even without framing the evidence under McDonnell Douglas. The two incidents identified by the employee could reasonably be seen as racially charged, observed the court. However, the employee could not identify who was responsible for either incident, and nothing in the record suggested that those responsible had any connection to the employer’s decision-making regarding the accommodation request or the termination.

Taking the undisputed facts as a whole, the point of contention in the weeks leading up to the employee’s termination was not her race but her potential accommodation for her disability, said the court. Thus, the employee had failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her race was the but-for cause of her termination, and summary judgment was granted against the racial discrimination claim.

Interference and retaliation. Finally, the court addressed the employee’s claims for interference and retaliation. Based on the facts before the court, only one suggested that the termination was tied to any protected activity—the timing of the termination.

An ADA accommodation was requested by the employee on January 16. Her employment was terminated on March 20, two months later. However, the court explained that no reasonable jury could find that this timing alone was enough to show that the termination was the result of her accommodation request.

Further, the employer clearly informed the employee that it was still reviewing her accommodation request at the time she was told to return to work. The employee also confirmed that she understood that returning to work at KCP was a precondition for remaining eligible to transfer to another facility. Yet, she refused to return to work in any case because she had decided long ago she was never going to return to KCP, said the court.

These facts were fundamentally incompatible with the employee’s theory that the timing of her termination proved that her accommodation request was the cause of her termination, explained the court. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment was granted against these claims.

The case is No. 1:24-cv-01553-JRO-MKK.

Judge: Olson, J.

Attorneys: Phyllis Stewart, pro se. John A. Drake (Ogletree Deakins) for FCA US LLC.

Companies: FCA US LLC

Cases: Discrimination DisabilityDiscrimination RaceDiscrimination Discharge Retaliation IndianaNews