Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—RELIGIOUS—N.D. Ill.: Religious objector to COVID-19 vaccination mandate proceeds with claims against City of Chicago, (Jul 22, 2026)

By Steven D. Cole, J.D.

The City’s form for employees seeking a religious exemption to the vaccine mandate, requiring a spiritual leader to affirm that the employee’s beliefs were in accord with the tenets of their faith, did not survive strict scrutiny.

A grant of summary judgment for either party was inappropriate in this case, as several issues required consideration before a jury, according to a federal district court in Illinois. The City of Chicago denied an employee’s request for a religious exemption from the COVID-19 vaccination requirement based on his failure to complete a section of the City form requiring certification from an employee’s spiritual or religious leader as to the consistency of the employee’s beliefs. Ultimately, the City failed to show that its compelling interest in suppressing the spread of COVID-19 was served by granting vaccination exemptions to employees with signed religious affirmations but denying such exemptions to those without a signature (Carrero v. City of Chicago, No. 23 CV 650 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2026)).

Vaccine mandate. In August 2021, the City mandated that all of its employees must be fully vaccinated against COVID. Employees could apply for a religious exemption to the mandate by submitting a form.

Religious beliefs, objections. Relevant here, Section II of the form asked questions regarding the employee’s religious beliefs and objections to the COVID-19 vaccination, and Section III required the employee’s religious or spiritual leader to affirm that they had met with and provided counsel to the employee, the employee was a member of their religious organization, and the employee’s beliefs regarding immunization were in line with the tenets of their faith, teachings, or practices.

Exemption request. The employee submitted his religious exemption request on September 30, 2021, consisting of a letter explaining that his Christian beliefs required him to exercise caution when receiving medicines, and specifically that receiving the COVID-19 vaccine would conflict with his religious objection to abortion because “some of the ingredients of the vaccine are derived from an aborted fetus.”

After several weeks of back-and-forth communications with his manager and the City, the employee submitted the form without a signature from his religious leader in Section III, explaining that he belonged to “a Mega Church with close to 15k members,” and that because of this, his church would only confirm his membership and was not equipped to “speak to my personal or moral issues as it relates to vaccines.”

The City ultimately placed the employee in a non-disciplinary, no-pay status until rescinding its vaccination policy in 2025, at which time the employee returned to work. The employee’s suit alleged claims against the City under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, Title VII, the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA), and the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA). Both parties moved for summary judgment.

Free exercise claim. The court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment on the free exercise claim because its policy did not overcome the strict scrutiny basis of review. Ultimately, the City did not persuasively demonstrate that its interest in quelling the spread of COVID-19 was served by granting vaccination exemptions to employees with signed religious affirmations but denying such exemptions to those, like the employee, who submitted the form without completing Section III in full.

Prior to making this determination, the court recognized that the question of whether the employee’s objection to receiving the vaccine was based on a sincerely held religious belief was one for a jury. The employee proffered sufficient evidence in his favor, as he explained his reasoning and cited Bible verses in support. The City, however, put forth evidence showing that the employee acted inconsistently with his professed beliefs by taking other medications and vaccinations that were developed with fetal cells. A jury could deduce from this that employee’s beliefs were newly adopted in response to the vaccine mandate.

Substantial burden? Next, the City argued that the employee did not show that the City’s policy substantially burdened his religious beliefs. According to the City, because the Novavax COVID-19 vaccine was not developed using fetal cell lines, the employee could have received it sometime after this vaccine received FDA Emergency Use Authorization in July 2022. Even so, this still would have left the employee on no-pay status for over six months. The policy’s potential internal conflict also created a factual dispute inappropriate for resolution at summary judgment, given that it listed the three initial vaccines by their manufacturers’ names but left open the possibility of employees qualifying for “fully vaccinated” status by receiving “a COVID-19 vaccine granted Emergency Use Authorization by the FDA.”

Rational basis? In addition, the City resisted the suggestion that its policy was subject to strict scrutiny, contending that rational basis review was appropriate. The employee argued, and the court agreed, that the policy was not “generally applicable” because it gave the City the authority to approve or deny a religious exemption request via a case-by-case review process. This discretionary nature of the government’s policy triggered strict scrutiny.

IRFRA claim. To support a claim under IRFRA, a plaintiff must show that a governmental action—even one of general applicability—substantially burdened one’s exercise of religion. The government may then defend its rule by showing that the application of the burden to the person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.

The City pointed out that, at the time it implemented its policy, vaccination was a critical predictor and preventer of COVID-19 diagnoses, hospitalizations, and deaths, further noting that, unlike masks or social distancing, vaccination protects individuals continuously, outside of work, and without further monitoring. While this might explain why vaccination was reasonably thought to be the most effective means of controlling the spread of COVID-19 generally, it did not explain why denying the employee’s exemption request due to his failure to receive a religious leader’s signature was the least restrictive means of achieving that goal.

Title VII and IHRA claims. Turning to the employee’s Title VII and IHRA claims, the City argued that granting the employee’s religious exemption request despite his failure to complete Section III of the form would have imposed an undue hardship due to the high volume of religious requests that the City received and its need to maintain consistency in its review of those requests. The court found this unpersuasive, as the City did not adequately explain how removing a section of the form would have imposed additional labor or inconsistency. The City also hypothesized that removing the signature requirement would have significantly reduced the number of employees willing to get vaccinated, but it did not support this supposition with any relevant citations to the record.

Nevertheless, the City did produce some evidence on its behalf in citing the burden that unvaccinated workers placed on it—namely, money spent on less effective virus control measures like testing, masking, and social distancing.

Immunity. Finally, the City argued that the Illinois Tort Immunity Act completely barred the employee’s claims. However, its argument based on Section 6-104’s grant of immunity for policy decisions affecting the public health was not significantly different than its previous argument, which an earlier-assigned district court had already rejected on the basis that further factual development was required. The City was also precluded from raising an affirmative defense based on Section 2-201 for the first time, after not doing so during the first 31 months of this litigation.

The case is No. 23 CV 650.

Attorneys: Julie Herrera (Law Office of Julie O. Herrera) for William Carrero. Michael A. Warner, Jr. (Franczek Radelet) for City of Chicago.

Companies: City of Chicago

Cases: ReligiousDiscrimination Discrimination CoverageLiability PublicEmployees StateLawClaims Covid19 IllinoisNews