Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—RELIGIOUS—E.D. Mich.: Fired Muslim teacher, who wore veil while teaching virtually, advances failure-to-accommodate claims, (Apr 1, 2025)

By Tulay Turan, J.D.

The employer’s hardship argument focused on noneconomic factors, specifically educational best practices.

A Muslim teacher, whose employer terminated her because she violated its face-covering policy by wearing a veil while teaching virtually, can proceed to trial with her state and federal failure-to-accommodate claims, a federal district court in Michigan ruled. There were questions of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the proposed accommodation—a no photo policy for students during online classes—and whether the employer would have suffered an undue hardship. The court, however, granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment on the teacher’s disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims (Hamood v. Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services, No. 23-cv-10270 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2025)).

The Muslim teacher worked at the Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services (ACCESS) during the COVID-19 pandemic. In March or April of 2020, she began wearing a head covering referred to as a “niqab” although she had not worn one prior to the pandemic. At the same time, COVID-19 mask mandates were in effect. ACCESS employees were under the impression that she wore a niqab in lieu of a face mask, and she confirmed that to some of her friends.

Virtual classes. In September 2021, ACCESS required all English teachers to keep their cameras on during virtual classes to “keep students engaged, and for students to be able to see how words are pronounced/articulated.” The teacher told her supervisor she would keep the camera on but would wear a mask because she did not want her students to screenshot her face. Her supervisor asked if the teacher could establish a policy with her students prohibiting screenshots, but the teacher did not trust they would comply.

Thereafter, the teacher began teaching with her camera on while wearing a niqab. ACCESS sent her an email confirming that she was required to teach with the camera on and her veil off or it would move forward with progressive discipline. She then raised a religious objection to teaching with her niqab off while online.

Reiterated objection. Subsequently, she discussed the policy and her objection with ACCESS’s HR director. She reiterated her religious objection and stated she was afraid men outside her family would see her if she was unveiled while on Zoom, but she was willing to teach with her veil off while in person.

Termination, lawsuit. In October 2021, ACCESS advised her that she had to remove her niqab while teaching virtually or she would be terminated. She refused and was terminated. Thereafter, she filed Title VII and Elliot-Larson Civil Rights Act religious discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims. She then filed a motion for partial summary judgment on her failure-to-accommodate claims. ACCESS filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims.

Sincerity of belief. Denying the teacher’s motion for partial summary judgment on her failure-to-accommodate claims, the court found the sincerity of the teacher’s religious belief was a question of credibility for the jury’s determination. The evidence was not so overwhelming as to justify summary judgment on this element in her favor.

The court noted, however, that for the remaining portions of the opinion, it would assume her religious belief was sincere. It was undisputed that she informed ACCESS of the conflict, and she was discharged due to her refusal to remove the niqab. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to her, the prima facie elements of a failure-to-accommodate claim were met.

Reasonableness of accommodation. Shifting the burden to ACCESS to show that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship, the court found there was a question of material fact as to the reasonableness of the proposed accommodation. ACCESS argued that it reasonably accommodated her religious practice by offering to prohibit students from taking screenshots of the class and men from viewing the class. She argued the proposed accommodation was insufficient because it was suggested before she informed ACCESS of her religious objection. However, she was willing to teach an in-person women-only class without her face covering.

In either a virtual or in-person setting, there was a possibility that a man would see a woman’s face when she was teaching without a face covering, the court found. It also noted that risk was higher in a virtual setting where a teacher may not be aware a student has taken a photo, or a man is present due to the nature of the technology used. As such, the court could not say as a matter of law the photo policy accommodation was reasonable.

Undue hardship. Likewise, the court could not say as a matter of law that ACCESS could not have accommodated the teacher without undue hardship, and, thus, it denied ACCESS’s motion for summary judgment on the failure-to-accommodate claims.

ACCESS’s argument largely focused on noneconomic factors, specifically educational best practices, safety, and lack of available space to comply with social distancing requirements. ACCESS alleged that seeing a teacher’s face was an essential component of teaching language, which the teacher disputed. She produced sufficient evidence in the form of an expert’s opinion to generate a genuine issue of material fact on this issue. The court could not find that “teaching online with a camera off or while masked would pose an undue hardship as a matter of law, particularly when schools across the country required teachers, including language teachers, to be masked.”

In-person classes. The court also could not find as a matter of law that it would have posed an undue hardship on ACCESS to require classes to be in person. It was unclear how many students were vaccinated at the time, the total cost to ACCESS of hosting multiple classes, and if that cost would have been substantial “in light of the nature, size, and operating cost” of ACCESS.

Although ACCESS had articulated legitimate concerns and identified specific reasons why the accommodation would have proposed an undue hardship, the court ruled it was the function of the jury to determine the weight to give to ACCESS’s assertion that it would have suffered such a hardship.

No harassment. Turning to the teacher’s hostile work environment claims, the court granted ACCESS’s motion for summary judgment, finding no jury could find she was subject to harassment or that the harassment interfered with her work.

Although she alleged that ACCESS employees’ statements doubting her sincerely held belief constituted harassment, she failed to identify specific instances of conduct in her complaint. The court found there was no evidence in the record that any ACCESS employee questioned her regarding the sincerity of her belief. The court inferred she was referring to the HR director’s statement during a meeting where he said the niqab was not required by Islam. He also briefly described his views on the niqab and hijab before stating he did not want to discuss religion. The teacher said she had “no problem” with him expressing his opinion on the niqab during that conversation.

In the process of obtaining a religious accommodation, some level of inquiry into the nature and sincerity of the employee’s belief is reasonably required, the court said. Here, the one discussion did not rise to the level of insult, intimidation, or ridicule sufficient to support a hostile work environment claim.

No similarly situated employees. Because the teacher failed to identify any comparator employees, the court also granted ACCESS’s motion for summary judgment on her disparate treatment claim.

No causal connection. Finally, addressing the teacher’s retaliation claim, the court found she failed to establish a causal connection between her protected activity and her termination. She opposed ACCESS’s face covering policy by complaining to her supervisors and seeking exemption from the policy. However, her termination was the result of her refusal to comply with the policy. No reasonable jury could find that her termination was the result of her complaint about the policy. Thus, the court granted ACCESS’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.

The case is No. 23-cv-10270.

Judge: Parker, L.

Attorneys: Matthew R. Gunter (Morgan & Morgan) for Sudoos Hamood. George B. Washington (Scheff and Washington) for Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services d/b/a Access.

Companies: Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services; Access

Cases: Discrimination ReligiousDiscrimination Discharge Retaliation Covid19 MichiganNews