Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—RELIGIOUS—D. Minn.: 3M’s offer of comparable position that did not require COVID vax was reasonable accommodation, (Feb 24, 2026)

By Tulay Turan, J.D.

That the proposed accommodation was not her preferred option did not render it unreasonable.

Granting summary judgment to 3M Company on an employee’s Title VII religious accommodation claim, a federal district court in Minnesota found the company offered her a comparable position that would have eliminated the conflict between its COVID-19 vaccination requirement and her religious beliefs. The lateral transfer, which the employee dismissed as not a “good fit,” was a non-customer facing job that did not require vaccination and would have preserved her terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. The position was a reasonable accommodation, the court found (Thill v. 3M Company, No. 23-cv-3626 (LMP/JFD) (D. Minn. Feb. 23, 2026)).

3M Company hired the employee in August 2021 as an Activation Marketer, which was a customer-facing role that, at the time, was not subject to COVID-19 restrictions. In October 2021, the company announced it would require employees to receive a COVID-19 vaccine.

Exemption requested. About a month later, the employee submitted a religious exemption request. Because a federal court blocked the vaccination mandate for government contractors in December 2021, 3M did not initially decide her request. In January 2022, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services issued a rule requiring workers at Medicare and Medicaid-certified healthcare facilities to receive the vaccine. The employee was subject to the rule, and 3M notified her she needed to be vaccinated by late May or obtain an approved medical or religious exemption.

Request denied, termination. In April, 3M denied her previously submitted religious exemption request. 3M offered her the opportunity to apply for a medical exemption, but she did not do so.

In addition, her supervisor worked to find her a position that was not customer facing and would not require her to get vaccinated. He found her a position within 3M’s Purification division. The position had the same salary and job grade as her marketer role. She texted her supervisor that she did not think it would be a “good fit” for her. Because she did not receive a vaccine and did not have an approved exemption, 3M terminated her.

Complaint filed. Thereafter, after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, the employee filed suit against 3M, alleging it violated Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act by failing to accommodate her religious beliefs. 3M filed this motion for summary judgment.

MHRA claim forfeited. As a threshold matter, the court noted the employee had not objected to 3M’s treatment of her MHRA claim as derivative of her Title VII claim. She had agreed at oral argument that it should be analyzed under the same framework as the Title VII claim. Therefore, to the extent the MHRA claim was distinct from the Title VII claim, the court found she had forfeited any individualized consideration of it.

Comparable position. Granting 3M’s motion for summary judgment on the employee’s Title VII claim, the court found 3M’s offer of a reasonably comparable position satisfied its duty to provide a reasonable accommodation. There was no genuine dispute that 3M offered her a comparable position that would have eliminated the conflict between the company’s vaccination requirement and her religious beliefs and preserved her terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. After 3M denied her religious exemption request, her supervisor offered her a lateral transfer to a non-customer facing role with 3M’s Purification division. That position would have afforded her the same pay and job grade as her Activation Marketer position.

Also, because the position in the Purification division did not require her to receive a COVID-19 vaccine, it would have eliminated the conflict between the company’s vaccination requirement and her religious opposition to the vaccination.

Lateral transfer. The employee offered several opposing arguments, but the court rejected each of them. Citing her deposition testimony, she asserted that “the transfer may not have even been a lateral move, and that the pay grade could have been higher or lower.” However, during her deposition, she did not say that. She stated that she was unsure “one way or another” whether the transfer was lateral, but she accepted that it “could have been lateral.” Her supervisor had submitted a declaration confirming that the proposed transfer was indeed lateral with the same pay and job grade as her marketer position.

On this point, the court found those two statements did not conflict. She accepted that the transfer could have been lateral, and her supervisor confirmed that it was. Given the supervisor’s unequivocal declaration, the employee’s lack of certainty did not create a factual dispute as to whether the transfer reasonably preserved her terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, the court found.

Not a “good fit.” In addition, the court rejected her argument that the transfer was a “forced career change” that would send her to “an entirely different division and career path.” She cited no record evidence for this assertion, and the court found it was insufficient to avoid summary judgment.

The court noted the only record evidence reflecting her reason for turning down the lateral position was her text message to her supervisor in which she stated the position was not a “good fit” for her. Nevertheless, that 3M’s proposed accommodation was not her preferred option did not render it unreasonable, the court said. She pointed to no evidence disclosing why it was not a good fit. Having offered her a reasonable accommodation, 3M was under no duty to offer a position with a better fit for her.

Jury question? Next, the court addressed the employee’s argument that the reasonableness of an accommodation is a fact-intensive inquiry that usually belongs to the jury. The court acknowledged that was generally true, but her cited cases highlighted why that general rule did not apply here. In those cases, there were disputes as to whether the proposed accommodations would have “fully resolved” the plaintiffs’ religious conflicts. In at least one of the cases, the employee had presented two religious conflicts, but the employer had only attempted to accommodate one of them.

Here, there was no dispute that a transfer to the position in the Purification division would have accommodated her only religious conflict, which was opposition to receiving a COVID-19 vaccine. The proposed accommodation would have entirely resolved her religious conflict, so her reliance on those cases was unavailing.

Apply for the position. Finally, the employee argued that the position in the Purification division was not guaranteed to her, but rather, she was still required to apply for it. Although the court found it was unclear whether the position was guaranteed to her, it still concluded that 3M offered her a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law.

The court explained that courts have held that employers offer a reasonable accommodation when they provide employees with an opportunity to apply for internal positions where the religious conflict can be eliminated. One such case was Bruff v. Northern Mississippi Health Services, 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001), where a counselor’s employer offered her 30 days, and the assistance of its in-house employment counselor, to find another internal position where the likelihood of encountering further conflicts with her religious beliefs would be reduced. The Fifth Circuit emphasized the assistance the employer had given to the counselor in her job search and noted she had refused to apply for several open positions after learning of them. The Fifth Circuit also highlighted that an “employee has a duty to cooperate in achieving accommodation of his or her religious beliefs, and must be flexible in achieving that end.” The counselor did not display such cooperation or flexibility.

Nearly the same could be said here, according to the court. By her own admission, the employee’s supervisor assisted her by “trying to find ways to keep” her. To that end, her supervisor had lined up a lateral move to a non-customer facing job where she would not have to be vaccinated. Rather than even explore this option, she dismissed it as not a “good fit.” She, not 3M, was therefore responsible for the consequences of that decision, the court said.

Because 3M offered a reasonable accommodation to the employee, 3M was entitled to summary judgment, the court concluded.

The case is No. 23-cv-3626 (LMP/JFD).

Judge: Provinzino, L.

Attorneys: Lexis Anderson (Barnes Law) for Maryrose Thill. Jennifer L. Pacicco (Ogletree Deakins) for 3M Co.

Companies: 3M Co.

Cases: ReligiousDiscrimination Discrimination Covid19 Discharge MinnesotaNews