Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—RACE—E.D. Pa.: Hospital administrator, subjected to microaggressions, other comments, partially advances claims, (Aug 11, 2025)

By Todd Harrison, J.D.

She identified more than 30 comments and actions referring explicitly and implicitly to her race.

A former director of behavioral health operations at Chi-St. Joseph’s Children’s Health can move forward with her Title VII hostile work environment, discrimination, and retaliation claims, ruled a federal district court in Pennsylvania. She had alleged that she was subjected to several race-related comments made by her coworkers, comments that she had characterized as microaggressions. She was ultimately fired, purportedly for repeatedly saying that she was going to quit, however the hospital never implemented its corrective discipline policy or attempted to repair the relationships that the employee had allegedly “irreparably” damaged when she threatened to quit ( Muhammed v. Chi-St. Joseph’s Children’s Health , No. 22-4363 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2025)).

The employee is a Black woman who was hired by the hospital as its director of behavioral health operations on July 6, 2021. She was responsible for supervising four other employees and reported to the hospital’s president, who was also her immediate supervisor. She was expected to work with three other managers, all of whom were at equal levels in the organizational hierarchy.

Microaggressions. According to the employee, her supervisor, two of the co-equal managers, and the hospital’s vice president of operations made several comments to her that she characterized as microaggressions, including referencing her race during various conversations, remarking that it was difficult for the hospital to hire Black therapists, and commenting on her hair texture, complexion, and personality traits. In addition, after informing her supervisor of her “dismay” with her office, her white counterpart was granted a full office suite.

When the employee confronted her supervisor about his comments, he responded that he was not racist, was married to a Mexican woman, and that he reported to a Black man, and she was just misunderstanding him.

Threats to quit. According to the employee’s supervisor, during her first week of work she told him she was reconsidering the job and was going to leave her position. He took her comments seriously. However, she later said she was joking, to which her supervisor responded that her comments were neither funny nor appropriate.

On September 13, 2021, the employee again made a comment about quitting, this time to her subordinates. She immediately followed up her comment by stating that she was joking. Nevertheless, word of her comment reached her supervisor, and he and the vice president of operations decided to investigate the employee’s conduct.

As part of the investigation, interviews were conducted with the employee’s subordinates and her co-equal managers. Several allegedly indicated that they were distressed by the employee’s “jokes.”

Termination. During the employee’s tenure, the hospital followed a corrective action policy, beginning with coaching and ending with a final written warning. It was the decision of the employee’s supervisor whether to implement the policy. Ultimately, the decision was made to fire the employee on September 14, 2021, effective immediately. She had never been disciplined or issued any type of warning prior to this point.

After she was terminated, her position was renamed and two white women were hired to fill the employee’s former role. Subsequently, the employee filed this lawsuit against the hospital and her supervisor, asserting claims for a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, and discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the PHRA.

Offensive utterances? First, the court addressed the employee’s hostile work environment claim. Here, the hospital cited to 10 cases it claimed stood for the proposition that “microaggressions are more similar to ‘mere offensive utterances’ than ‘physically threatening or humiliating statements’ and are insufficient to support a HWE claim.” The court was not persuaded.

None of the cited cases stood for such a proposition, explained the court, finding that the hospital had selectively-picked opinions that included the word “microaggression” in which the courts ruled that the plaintiff did not establish a hostile work environment. Each of those cases, continued the court, stated specific deficiencies in the record—a lack of severity, lack of frequency, lack of specificity of the conduct—that resulted in a ruling against the plaintiff.

Here, the employee identified more than 30 comments and actions that referred explicitly and implicitly to her race. “These comments and actions run the gamut from insensitive to distasteful to offensive and possibly discriminatory,” said the court. As such, the court found a dispute of fact as to whether the comments and actions were severe or pervasive, and given the objective offensiveness of the comments towards the employee, the court found a like person would be detrimentally affected under similar circumstances. Accordingly, the hospital’s motion for summary judgment against the hostile work environment claim was denied.

Discriminatory inference. Turning to the employee’s disparate treatment claims, the hospital contended the circumstances of her termination did not give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. It argued that the employee failed to identify a similarly situated non-Black employee who reported to her supervisor who received more favorable treatment.

Further, the hospital asserted that because the employee’s supervisor and vice president of operations were the same people who both hired and fired the employee, the “same actor” inference should apply. However, the court noted a split among circuits regarding this type of defense, and the Third Circuit has come down against it. Thus, the court opted not to give this any greater weight beyond what it would consider for any evidence.

In response to the hospital’s assertion that the employee could not identify a similarly situated comparator, she noted that the inference element of her prima facie case could be established in a number of ways. In this instance, two white employees were hired to fill her position. Further, she argued that the racial comments she had identified were evidence that the hospital was motivated by race and the fact that she was never given any type of warning prior to her termination was enough to show a discriminatory inference. The court agreed, finding that she had established a prima facie case of discrimination.

Pretext. Finding that the hospital had proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to terminate the employee, the court considered the issue of pretext. Here, to the extent that the comments made by the employee threatening to quit were enough to warrant termination at all, the hospital’s actions were undermined by the fact that they failed to take any corrective steps to discipline the employee or otherwise address her behavior. The hospital claimed that the employee’s relationships were “irreparably” harmed, “but made no effort at any repair,” observed the court.

The court noted that the hospital rightly pointed out that the failure to follow a non-mandatory employer disciplinary policy was not necessarily indicative of pretext. However, the court explained that it was not basing its determination solely on the failure to follow policy; rather it was that failure combined with an unconvincing reason for the termination decision and the barrage of racial comments the employee faced from her colleagues on a regular basis. Accordingly, the hospital’s motion for summary judgment against this claim was denied.

Retaliation. For similar reasons, the court denied the hospital’s motion for summary judgment against the employee’s retaliation claim, reiterating that there was a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the employee’s termination was pretextual.

Individual liability. Finally, the court addressed the question of individual liability concerning the employee’s supervisor as to her PHRA claims. The court found the supervisor was entitled to summary judgment against the discrimination and retaliation claims.

As to the employee’s claim against the supervisor for aiding and abetting, the only argument advanced by the supervisor was that if an employer is not liable for any discriminatory practice then an individual cannot be liable for aiding and abetting a discriminatory practice. Because the court denied summary judgment as to the discrimination claims against the hospital, it too denied summary judgment against the claim for aiding and abetting.

The case is No. 22-4363.

Judge: Hodge, K.

Attorneys: Catherine W. Lowry (Derek Smith Law Group) for Maryam Muhammad. Sidney R. Steinberg (Pierson Ferdinand) for Chi-St. Joseph Children's Health.

Companies: Chi-St. Joseph Children's Health

Cases: Discrimination RaceDiscrimination CoverageLiability Discharge Retaliation StateLawClaims PennsylvaniaNews