Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—RACE—7th Cir.: White education worker, demoted after rejecting ‘equity mindset,’ cannot revive bias claims, (Jul 9, 2026)

By Todd Harrison, J.D.

There was no evidence her race led to her demotion, and she acknowledged her employer would likely have demoted a person of color for rejecting an “equity mindset” too.

Affirming a district court’s grant of summary judgment against the race discrimination and retaliation claims asserted by an educational services employee who was demoted after balking at calls to interrogate her implicit racial biases and privileges, the Seventh Circuit rejected her claim that a condition of her employment was to believe that all white people—and only white people—are naturally racist. Nothing in the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction’s coaching competency practice profile suggested that all white people are uniquely racist. Indeed, it described the “equity mindset” as applying to coaches of all races. However, the court did remand for further consideration the employee’s First Amendment retaliation claim based on what she believes and declines to believe (Spengler v. Cooperative Educational Service Agency 7, No. 25-2532 (7th Cir. July 8, 2026)).

The employee in this case is a white woman who was hired as an integration director in 2018 by a statutorily created state agency that helps serve the educational needs of the state of Wisconsin. She was hired to effectuate a contract with the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (DPI).

“Equity mindset.” According to the employee, after a couple of years, DPI began focusing on race by requiring coaches such as herself to adopt an “equity mindset.” According to DPI’s coaching competency practice profile, a coach with an equity mindset “cultivates … the willingness and ability to see and speak to how their power and privilege are at work to systematically advantage some while simultaneously disadvantag[ing] others,” helps others understand “how their thoughts and actions may negatively impact marginalized … communities,” and “surfaces the impact of white supremacy and the history of whiteness on systems” while working “to disrupt and dismantle its effects.”

In the employee’s view, the push to adopt such a mindset was itself racist and discriminatory against white people. When she voiced her disagreement, tension emerged between herself and her coworkers.

Demotion. Over time, DPI officials requested that the employee be replaced as integration director. When the employer realized that it would lose funding if the employee were to continue in that role, it informed the employee that she could only retain her current position if she could commit to the role without pushback or questioning. The employee claimed that one of the non-negotiable points in the employer’s recent contract with DPI was that staff have “a demonstrated commitment to examining their personal biases in the areas of race and ability, and to dismantling racist and ableist educational systems.”

The employee opted not to make such a commitment, stating she was unwilling to “agree to keep silent regarding DPI’s racist philosophy, policies, and plan of action.” Indeed, she maintained that she had the “right to express” her “personal views and opinions regarding matters of race.” Subsequently, the employer declined to renew her contract as an integration director, instead employing her in a different position that paid significantly less.

Lawsuit. Following her demotion, the employee filed this lawsuit, asserting claims for race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII. She also alleged that the employer violated her First Amendment rights by retaliating against her because of her speech and beliefs. The district court entered summary judgment against all claims.

As to the claims for racial discrimination, the district court reasoned that the employer demoted the employee due to her objections to its “opinion or ideology,” not because of her race. Unable to prove discrimination, her Title VII retaliation claim necessarily failed.

With regard to her First Amendment claims, the district court analyzed them one at a time, starting with the claim that the employer retaliated against her because of what she said and what she declined to say, ultimately concluding that none of her statements were constitutionally protected and that she never had to say anything against her will. As to her claim that she was retaliated against because of what she believed or declined to believe, it determined she did not sufficiently plead the claim and the district court declined to consider it. This appeal followed.

Race not a factor. First, the court addressed the employee’s claim for racial discrimination, concluding that no reasonable jury could find that her race caused her demotion. Beginning with but-for causation, the employee admitted that the employer would likely have removed a Black employee from the same role if the employee refused to agree with DPI on matters of race. In considering the motivating factor test, the court noted that the employee presented no evidence that her race was one of the reasons the employee took adverse action against her.

Ideological demands. In response, the employee again pointed to but-for causation. She argued that the ideological demands of her employer and DPI asked more of white employees than employees of color. In her view, DPI taught that “the natural state of White people—unlike people of color—is to be racists.” It was on this point, contended the employee, that she was demoted because she, as a white person, was unwilling to agree that she was born racist, while the employer would have allowed an employee of color to deny the same. However, the court noted that the employee failed to proffer any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that she was compelled by her employer to embrace this view.

Much of the evidence presented by the employee, such as DPI’s coaching competency practice profile, merely demands that coaches of all races recognize their implicit biases and resist white supremacy. Her other evidence, such as DPI’s definitions of “white supremacy” and “whiteness” fell short too, as neither state that all white people are naturally and necessarily racist.

In addition, the employee identified various articles written by third parties that DPI distributed to coaches, but she provided no reason to believe that the employer demanded that she assent to the content of those articles to keep her position.

“To be sure,” continued the court, it appeared that the employee had to adopt an “equity mindset,” but DPI’s coaching competency practice profile describes the equity mindset as applying to coaches of all races without ever suggesting that all white people are uniquely racist. As to her assertion that the new contract terms between her employer and DPI required staff to commit to examining their personal biases in the areas of race and ability, the court again noted that this condition applied to all races, and it saw no evidence that a condition of employment was that the employee be required to believe that all white people—and only white people—are naturally racist. Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment against the racial discrimination claim was affirmed.

Retaliation. Because there was no objectively reasonable basis for believing the employer discriminated against the employee because of her race, the court found she could not satisfy the first element of her Title VII retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment against this claim as well.

First Amendment retaliation. Turning to the employee’s First Amendment claims, she did not appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her claim that she was retaliated against because of what she said and what she declined to say. However, she did appeal the district court’s failure to address her claim that she was retaliated against because of what she believes and what she declines to believe.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, explained the appellate court. Based on this pleading standard, the district court should have considered the employee’s claim that the employer retaliated against her because of her beliefs.

The employee’s operative complaint provided the employer with fair notice that she was bringing this claim. Most directly, she alleged that “[d]espite her positive job performance and track record,” the employer “repeatedly informed [her] that she could not properly perform the Director of Integrated Services job unless she believed and otherwise agreed with and embraced DPI’s racist philosophy, programs, and actions,” even saying this demand “violated [her] constitutional rights.” This was sufficient to satisfy the demands of Rule (8)(a)(2), said the court, and this claim was remanded for further consideration by the district court.

The case is No. 25-2532.

Judge: Scudder, M., Jr.

Attorneys: Ross William Townsend (Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry) for Becky Spengler. Danielle Baudhuin Tierney (Axley) for Cooperative Educational Service Agency 7 aka CESA 7. Rachel Bachhuber, Wisconsin Department of Justice, for Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction.

Companies: Cooperative Educational Service Agency 7; CESA 7

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