Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—PAY—D.D.C.: Part of female D.C. lottery employee’s wage discrimination, retaliation claims advance, (Sep 9, 2026)

By Nicholas Kaster, J.D.

A jury could find that repeatedly excluding an employee from meetings related to their job would dissuade a reasonable worker from making a charge of discrimination.

The federal district court for the District of Columbia has ruled that part of a female D.C. lottery employee’s wage discrimination and retaliation claims survived summary judgment. The court found that the employee made out a prima facie case of wage discrimination under the Equal Pay Act with respect to two of three male comparators, and a jury could find that the District failed to establish an affirmative defense to justify the pay disparity with those two men. A reasonable jury could likewise find that some, but not all, of the actions that the District took after the employee complained about discrimination were retaliatory (Wilson v. District of Columbia, No. 17-cv-948 (JMC) (D. D.C. Sept. 4, 2026)).

The employee in this case is a woman who worked as a senior investigator for the D.C. Lottery, which is run by a subagency within the District’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer.

Unequal pay. According to the employee, she was paid less for her work than were three of her male colleagues who performed substantially similar jobs. She also alleged that, after she complained about her unequal pay, she was retaliated against.

Subsequently, the employee sued the District of Columbia, contending: (1) that it violated the Equal Pay Act by paying her less than her male colleagues; and (2) that it unlawfully retaliated against her—in violation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, respectively—after her “repeated complaints of wage discrimination.” The District moved for summary judgment.

Comparators. To make out her wage discrimination case, the employee compared herself to three of her male colleagues: (1) the Chief of Security; (2) the Chief of Licensing and Charitable Games; and (3) the Director of Sales. It was undisputed that all three of these men were paid more than the employee, satisfying the first element of her prima facie case.

As to the first two male comparators, the District did not contest the employee’s evidentiary showing on the second element—that they performed “substantially similar” work. Thus, for those comparators, the only question was whether the District was entitled to summary judgment on its affirmative defense. The District sought summary judgment as to these two men on the basis that the pay differential was “based on any other factor other than sex.”

Other factors. The District defended the pay differential of the Chief of Security on the basis of a combination of three factors other than sex: (1) prior salary; (2) the time-in-grade requirements; and (3) its bona-fide job classification system. However, the court found that the record did not “so clearly” establish that these were the reasons for the pay differential such that “no rational jury could” find “to the contrary.”

Job classification. While it was true that the first comparator’s salary before he applied for the Chief of Security role was considerably higher than the employee’s salary in her position before she became the Senior Investigator, and that fact might explain offering her a smaller starting salary in her new role, it did not explain why the position was regraded from a 13/14 role to a 13 role, such that the employee would not even have the opportunity to reach the comparator’s pay over time. The District instead attributed that decision to its application of a “bona fide job classification system.”

Under that classification system, positions are graded based on nine factors, including the “knowledge required by the position,” its “complexity,” and its “scope and effect.” A jury could, however, conclude that the reclassification of the role was not in fact prompted by an application of the classification system, but was instead based on the Chief Operating Officer’s direction. And perhaps even more important, the operations manager testified that the employee “continued to perform” the duties of the Chief of Security in her new role as the Senior Investigator.

If a jury credits that testimony and finds that the two roles were the same in practice, that would cast doubt on the District’s assertion that the classification determination resulted from the changing “needs” of the Lottery for this role, said the court. Further, the time-in-grade requirement could not explain the reclassification. Although that requirement might explain why the employee would not immediately be bumped up to a grade 14 when she was temporarily detailed to the Senior Investigator position, this requirement was not the factor contributing to the reclassification. And because the reclassification prevented the employee from ever earning as much as the first comparator, a jury could find that the time-in-grade requirement was not a “factor other than sex” that explained the pay differential.

Step and grade ratings. A similar story applied to the second comparator, the Chief of Licensing and Charitable Games. The District justified that pay differential based only on the length of the comparator’s tenure. He had been with the District for 34 years when he retired, while the employee had been there only six years. In those many years, the District argued, he had received “numerous step increases,” and it was those increases that created the pay disparity. But the court noted that the male comparator’s increased pay was not based solely on his step rating; it was also a result of his grade rating. Thus, a jury could find that the difference in tenure could not fully explain the female employee’s lower pay. Because the record was not “so one-sided as to rule out the prospect” of a jury ruling against the District on its affirmative defenses, the court denied its motion for summary judgment as to the pay disparity with the first two male comparators.

Third comparator. As to the third comparator, the District argued that no reasonable jury could conclude that the employee and he performed substantially equal work and thus she failed to make out a prima facie case when comparing herself to him. The District contended that the employee took on only one aspect of this comparator’s broad portfolio—managing licensing and charitable games—while the bulk of their respective portfolios remained substantially distinct. The court agreed and held that no reasonable jury could find that the employee’s and the third male comparator’s jobs were substantially equal.

Retaliation claims. Next, the court considered the employees claims for retaliation, alleging her supervisors treated her poorly because she “complained about unequal pay for equal work.” The employee alleged that the poor treatment violated the anti-retaliation provisions applicable to the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.

Exclusionary practices. According to the employee, her supervisors retaliated against her by excluding her from meetings that were critical to the performance of her job responsibilities, removing her from an executive-level email distribution list, circulating her personal information to some of the Lottery’s vendors, denying her necessary training opportunities, and failing to provide her with performance evaluations after her complaints of unequal pay. The District argued these claims failed because no reasonable jury could find that any of the alleged actions qualified as adverse nor were they causally linked to the employee’s protected activity.

The court agreed that no jury could find that several of the actions—removal from the email list, the circulation of personal information, the supposed denial of a training opportunity, and the performance-evaluation kerfuffle—would have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from” complaining about discrimination.

On the other hand, said the court, a jury could find that the supervisor took a materially adverse action by repeatedly excluding the employee from meetings that were relevant to her work responsibilities. And a reasonable jury could find that this exclusion was the result of her protected activity. The employee identified six specific meetings that she was excluded from after her protected activity. She explained how attending would have increased her knowledge of relevant “security” and “licensing” issues. She also pointed to testimony from other Lottery employees that suggested the meetings were relevant to her responsibilities.

Dissuading others. In addition, a jury could find that repeatedly excluding an employee from meetings related to their job would “dissuade a reasonable worker from making... a charge of discrimination.” As anyone who has worked in an office can attest, being left out of meetings related to one’s responsibilities can affect “professional advancement,” observed the court. Fearing such ostracization, an employee could well think twice about complaining of discrimination. And even if being excluded from a single meeting might not have been enough, the cumulative effect of the employee’s exclusion could allow a reasonable jury to find in her favor.

Temporal link. So too could a reasonable jury find that this campaign of exclusion was causally linked to the employee’s protected activity. On September 20, 2016, her lawyer sent a letter to the Deputy Chief Financial Officer and Chief of Staff in the office that houses the Lottery, along with that office’s head of human resources, “complaining about gender and equal pay discrimination.” Seven days later, the claimed exclusion began when the employee was left out of a meeting. That “very close” temporal link would support a jury finding that the employee’s exclusion was causally linked to her protected activity.

More than mere proximity. What’s more, said the court, the employee had “positive evidence beyond mere proximity” to support her claim of retaliation. For instance, the District said that she was not invited to a meeting at the MGM casino because it was for “directors” only. The employee, however, pointed out that she was initially invited to that meeting—even though she was not at the time a director—but when the meeting was rescheduled after her lawyer sent the letter, she was no longer invited.

That she was initially invited despite not being a director, yet excluded after her protected activity, could give a jury reason to doubt the District’s explanation for excluding her from this meeting. Because a jury could find that the employee’s exclusion from meetings qualified as an adverse action and resulted from her protected activity, this aspect of her retaliation claims must be decided by a jury, the court concluded.

The other events the employee complained about, however, are the kinds of “trivial harms”—“petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience”—that do not qualify as adverse actions, said the court, and they could not support a retaliation claim.

The case is No. 17-cv-948 (JMC).

Judge: Cobb, J.

Attorneys: Julia M. Coleman (McGuireWoods) for Derrica Wilson. David A. Jackson, Office of the Attorney General, for District of Columbia.

Cases: PayDiscrimination Discrimination PublicEmployees Retaliation DistrictofColumbiaNews