Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—N.D. Tex.: Use of Spanish in the workplace did not support white American employee’s race, national origin bias claims, (Aug 27, 2026)
Law Firms Mentioned:Hutchison & Foreman | Ogletree Deakins
Organizations Mentioned:Champion Home Builders Inc. | Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, PC
By Kathleen Kapusta, J.D.
The manufactured homes company employee claimed his manager “refuses to speak in a language I understand, and is using his Hispanic, or Spanish language” to discriminate against him because he is a white American.
An assistant production manager for a manufactured homes supplier, who claimed the Hispanic production manager sometimes spoke in Spanish to purposedly exclude him from communications necessary to do his job, failed to show the production manager discriminated against him because he is a white American, a federal court in Texas ruled, granting summary judgment against his Section 1981 and state-law race and national origin discrimination claims. His retaliation claim also failed to survive the company’s motion (Maue v. Champion Home Builders, Inc., No. 3:23-CV-0443-K (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2026)).
The employee was hired by the company as a wall builder in April 2021 and elevated to quality inspector by the general manager three months later. He resigned not long after to work as a project manager with a custom home builder. When the GM offered him a newly created assistant production manager (APM) position, he returned to the company in September.
As an APM, he followed and supported the production manager’s direction and managed subordinate supervisors when the production manager was unavailable. According to the employee—a white American who spoke only English—the production manager, who is Hispanic and speaks English and Spanish, did not want him in the APM role “from the very beginning.”
Daily meetings. The production manager held two meetings every workday—one at 6:40 a.m. and one at 10:00 a.m. At the 6:40 meeting, department supervisors discussed the status of each department from the end of the previous workday to the production that was to start that morning. These meetings, the employee claimed, were always conducted in English.
“Sometimes” in Spanish. The 10:00 a.m. meetings, which were attended by the same people and were used to check in with the supervisors, however, were “sometimes” conducted in Spanish. After one such meeting, the employee told the production manager he did not understand what was going on for the day. In response, the production manager purportedly told him that some of the supervisors were “just more comfortable in Spanish.” He also told the APM that the supervisors had reported that the status of their departments was “just the same” as when they had the earlier meeting. Rather than translate exactly what was said, the employee alleged, the production manager summed up the 25-minute meeting in a sentence or two.
The employee complained to the HR manager about the production manager conducting the meeting in Spanish and then not translating it word-for-word and although she promised to look into it, she “didn’t have an answer” when he followed up with her. He claimed he told her many times about the alleged discrimination.
In addition, the employee claimed the production manager spoke Spanish in front of him at other times to exclude him from conversations. On one occasion, he alleged, the production manager was speaking with a supervisor in English, but when he saw the employee approaching, he began speaking in Spanish. On another occasion, the employee was discussing a problem with a department manager when the production manager joined the conversation, “converted it to Spanish,” and resolved the issue without telling him what the solution was.
Termination. In February 2022, the company’s operational excellence (OE) team visited the facility for a week. Although the production manager told the employee on the first day of the visit to keep an eye on the roofing department because he would be occupied with the OE team, the GM saw the employee following the OE team around the facility, talking to team members, and picking up screws off the ground. After discussing the employee’s behavior with the production and HR managers, the GM fired him for insubordination.
Race and national origin discrimination. The employee subsequently sued for race and national origin discrimination in violation of Section 1981 and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. Moving for summary judgment, the company argued that language could not be the source of such claims. In response, the employee argued that his claims were not based simply on the use of Spanish at the facility but rather that Spanish was used to purposely exclude him from “communications” necessary to perform his job. And this, he asserted, demonstrated the production manager’s discriminatory attitude toward him because he is a white American.
Here, said the court, “Despite his attempt to portray the basis of his claims differently, there is simply no question that, on this record, language is the source of Plaintiff’s race and national origin discrimination claims.” There was nothing in the caselaw or statutory language, the court explained, to support the premise that an individual’s ability or inability to speak a particular language “is automatically tethered to his race or national origin and, therefore, can provide the basis for a discrimination claim.”
Further, the court found the employee’s own evidence supported this conclusion. He made efforts to learn Spanish while working for the company and at least one of his white American coworkers was actively learning and speaking Spanish while working there.
No language policy. Moreover, the company did not have a language policy that was intended to discriminate against white Americans or had the effect of discriminating against white Americans. “Plaintiff simply complains that Spanish was (occasionally) spoken in his presence at the Mansfield facility, he could not understand what was said, and, when he did ask for a translation, he was given a summary of what was said,” the court observed, finding none of this attributable to him being white or American. “The fact that Plaintiff preferred that only English be spoken is of no consequence.”
Finding it clear the employee’s race and national origin discrimination claims were based solely on the production manager’s use of Spanish in front of him, which was a language he did not speak or understand, and that language cannot sustain a race or national origin discrimination claim, the court concluded that his claims failed as a matter of law.
McDonnell Douglas. Even if they did not fail as a matter of law, the court found they would fail under the McDonnell Douglas framework as he failed to establish a prima facie case. Specifically, said the court, he failed to show he was replaced by someone outside his protected group. While he identified a Hispanic “roof build manager” who was cited for insubordination for lying to the GM and was transferred to another facility instead of being fired, he did not claim he was treated less favorably than the manager because of his own race or national origin. Rather, he simply relied on the fact that the manager was Hispanic. Nor did he establish the manager’s national origin or any discriminatory motive.
He also failed to show the manager was a valid comparator, said the court, noting that the employee was an APM with numerous supervisory responsibilities throughout the facility and all departments while the alleged comparator was a supervisor of the roof build department. There was no evidence showing they had similar job responsibilities, qualifications, experience, or other such considerations. Accordingly, the court found the company was entitled to summary judgment for these reasons as well.
Retaliation. As to the employee’s retaliation claim, even if it were to assume without deciding that he established a prima facie case under Section 1981 and the TCHRA, the court found he failed to show the company’s reasons for terminating him were pretextual. While he incorporated by reference the pretext evidence provided for his discrimination claims, he did not address, let alone demonstrate, that the company’s legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for terminating him was pretext for retaliation, said the court, noting that the Fifth Circuit has held that arguments and evidence of pretext for a plaintiff’s discrimination claims “[are] irrelevant to [his] retaliation claim.” As a result, he did not rebut the company’s proffered reason for terminating him and summary judgment was appropriate as to this claim as well.
The case is No. 3:23-CV-0443-K.
Judge: Kinkeade, E.
Attorneys: Susan E. Hutchison (Hutchison & Foreman) for Mark Maue. John M. Barcus (Ogletree Deakins) for Champion Home Builders Inc.
Companies: Champion Home Builders Inc.
Cases: Discrimination RaceDiscrimination NationalOrigin Retaliation Discharge TexasNews