Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—N.D. Miss.: Black female advances sex, race claims where white male assumed duties after she was fired, (Dec 16, 2025)

By Tulay Turan, J.D.

The university employee was terminated based on the uncorroborated testimony of one student worker.

A Black female employee at the University of Mississippi, who was fired after being accused of pinching a student, can proceed to trial with her sex and race discrimination claims, a federal district court in Mississippi ruled. Denying the university’s motion for summary judgment, the court found she raised genuine issues of fact that cast doubt on the university’s proffered reason for terminating her. The pretext evidence included comments from the vice chancellor who hired her that she preferred a white male in the position, and the university’s admission that the allegations were not proven to its satisfaction (Green v. University of Mississippi, No. 3:24-CV-233-SA-JMV (N.D. Miss. Dec. 10, 2025)).

In March 2023, the vice chancellor of the Willam Magee Center, a department within the University of Mississippi, hired the employee, a Black woman, as an intervention specialist. The other candidates were a white man and a Black man, but the vice chancellor said she hired the Black woman because she had the most experience working with alcohol and drug users. However, on two occasions, she allegedly told the employee that she preferred a white male for the position. In September 2023, the vice chancellor hired a white man as the director of the center.

Complaints, termination. About a month later, several graduate and undergraduate workers complained to the director about the employee’s behavior, including an accusation that she had pinched one of them. In October 2023, the university terminated her during a probationary review meeting. She was not informed of any allegations against her or given an explanation as to her termination. She was not given an opportunity to explain the alleged incident, and she maintained she never pinched a student.

Budgetary restraints. After her termination, the university did not fill the employee’s position due to alleged budgetary restraints. Instead, the director took over her intervention specialist duties.

Charges filed. Following her termination, the employee filed a complaint alleging racial discrimination with the University’s Office of Equal Opportunity and Regulatory Compliance. The EORC conducted an investigation and concluded she was terminated because of her inappropriate interactions with student workers, not due to her race.

Thereafter, she filed a race discrimination charge, which she later amended to include sex discrimination, with the EEOC. The EEOC issued a notice of right to sue. She then filed this suit alleging Title VII sex and race discrimination claims. The university filed a motion for summary judgment on both claims. Also, the employee filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking judgment in her favor as to the university’s affirmative defenses.

Replaced? Addressing the employee’s prima facie case for both claims, the court noted only the fourth prong—whether she was replaced by someone outside her protected class—was in dispute. The university asserted she was not replaced after she was terminated. Rather, her position was eliminated, and the director assumed her duties. As such, the university contended this was insufficient for her to meet her prima facie burden. The court disagreed.

The court noted the Fifth Circuit has held that a plaintiff met her prima facie burden when her position was eliminated and her job duties were redistributed among coworkers outside her protected class. Likewise, here, the employee showed she was replaced when her duties were assumed by a white male. Thus, she established a prima facie case.

Legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Next, the court found the university provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her—the report that she pinched a student worker.

Pretext. Turning to the issue of pretext, the court found the employee raised genuine issues of fact that cast doubt on the university’s proffered reason for terminating her. Thus, it denied the university’s motion for summary judgment.

Comment about white male. The evidence the employee proffered to show pretext included the vice chancellor’s comment that she preferred a white male for the position. Although it was unclear whether she made the comment during the hiring process or later, the record showed there was no dispute that she did make the comment. The vice chancellor explained she thought a white male would be the “most qualified” because the demographic of students predominately served by the Magee Center was white male fraternity students. Even considering the university’s explanation, a reasonable jury could infer discriminatory animus, the court said. On the other hand, a reasonable jury could find no discriminatory animus because the vice chancellor ultimately hired the employee over a white male applicant. Thus, whether her comments demonstrated discriminatory animus was a question of fact for the jury.

Timing. In addition, a jury could find the timing of her termination and the director’s hiring was suspicious and indicative of pretext, the court found. In the spring of 2023, the vice chancellor allegedly made a comment about wanting a white male for the position during the employee’s interview. On September 5, a white male, who had the credentials to perform intervention specialist duties, began working at the Magee Center. On September 8, the vice chancellor again allegedly made a comment about wanting a white male for the position. On October 16, the employee was terminated and, thereafter, the university decided to eliminate the position due to alleged budget constraints.

However, the university had a mandated alcohol and drug education program for which an intervention specialist was still needed. Following the employee’s termination, the only person with the requisite license was the white male director, who had been hired roughly a month prior and subsequently assumed all her intervention specialist duties. A reasonable jury could find her termination was pretext, especially when viewed in combination with the vice chancellor’s comments, the court found.

Investigation. The final piece of evidence regarding pretext was the university’s investigation of the alleged pinching incident. The court found a jury could find that, based on the university’s investigatory choices, the university’s reason for the employee’s termination was false or unworthy of credence. The employee presented evidence she was terminated based on the uncorroborated testimony of one student worker, never given a chance to explain herself, and the university admitted the allegations were not proven to its satisfaction. This raised a question of fact as to whether the university reasonably believed the allegations against the employee and acted in good faith in terminating her employment.

Affirmative defenses. Finally, the court denied the employee’s motion for partial summary judgment regarding the university’s affirmative defenses. Relying on its own previous ruling on a similar motion in a similar case, it declined to address each defense substantively at this juncture.

The case is No. 3:24-CV-233-SA-JMV.

Judge: Aycock, S.

Attorneys: Kevin Thomas Hanlon (Law Offices of Joel Dillard) for Deja Green. Pope S. Mallette (Mayo Mallette) for University of Mississippi.

Companies: University of Mississippi

Cases: Discrimination RaceDiscrimination SexDiscrimination Discharge MississippiNews