Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—DISABILITY—N.D. Ill.: Jury to decide if SSA unreasonably denied bipolar employee’s full-time telework request, (Jan 21, 2026)

By Marjorie Johnson, J.D.

A jury could reasonably conclude that the SSA’s offer of a different cubicle, noise-cancelling headphones, and a white-noise machine did not “even theoretically address” the need for stability and predictability articulated in her psychiatrist’s letter.

The Social Security Administration will face trial on a customer service representative’s claim that it violated the Rehab Act by denying, for a seemingly “baseless” reason, her request to convert from part-time to full-time telework as a reasonable accommodation for her bipolar disorder, resulting in her needing to take several months of medical leave due to an exasperation of her symptoms before returning to work pursuant to the COVID-19 telework policy. Denying the SSA’s bid for summary judgment or to limit damages, a federal court concluded that while the agency eventually approved her request after she successfully teleworked during the pandemic, a jury could find that an official’s initial denial of her request—which was contrary to her supervisor’s recommendation that it be granted—was made in bad faith, and that the entirety of her leave of absence resulted from the unreasonable delay (Tate v. Bisignano, No. 23 CV 16421 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2026)).

Part-time telework. The employee has worked for the SSA since 2009 and was initially allowed to telework two days per week. In 2016, she asked to telework four days per week to accommodate her bipolar disorder. Instead, the agency allowed her to relocate to its Chicago office, where she could telework three days per week. In October 2019, the office changed its policy to only allow staff to telework two days a week. As a result, the employee’s symptoms began to worsen.

Requests and doctor’s note. On November 19 and 20, she submitted requests to telework on a full-time basis to accommodate her increasingly severe mental illness. She also submitted a letter from her psychiatrist that “strongly recommended” full-time telework since she needed “the predictability and stability her home provides,” and “the overstimulation caused by the lights, smells, and sounds at work and during the commute” worsened her symptoms such that she may eventually be prevented from working altogether.

On November 27, the employee expressed concern with her second-line supervisor that her disability was not being taken seriously. He responded two days later, relaying that he would reach out to her if they needed any additional information. She again reached out to him the following week and emphasized that she was “not doing well at all” and detailed several problems that affected her focus, including her noisy coworker, loud background sounds, and the office’s bright lights.

Declines alternatives. In early December, her supervisor offered to let her move to a new cubicle, but she stated that she did not believe it would help. In an email the next day, he also offered noise-cancelling headphones and a white noise machine, but she explained that this would actually exacerbate her auditory hallucinations.

Leave of absence. On February 26, she took a leave of absence due to the worsening of her mental health symptoms—first using sick leave and then FMLA leave. About two weeks later she filed an EEOC charge.

Accommodation process. Meanwhile, her request wended its way through the SSA’s approval process. Only the regional chief ALJ (the chief) could approve the request, and only the national reasonable accommodation coordinator (NRAC), could deny the request. An RA coordinator assisted the chief in liaising with her supervisors and the NRAC.

Chief’s recommendation. Though her supervisors recommended that her request be approved, the chief instructed the RA coordinator to submit a form recommending denial the NRAC. He submitted the form on January 7, which cited “insufficient portable work/need for employee to perform in-office duties” and erroneously identified her disability as “depression and anxiety.”

On March 18, a NRAC analyst sent the employee a letter informing her of the chief’s recommendation to deny her request. On March 19, her supervisors clarified that they had not recommended denial due to lack of portable work. The employee also explained that she declined alternatives because they would exacerbate her disease. In a subsequent phone call, she further expounded on the severity of her illness and symptoms, including how she felt more agitated while at work and how the long commute left her mentally exhausted.

Officially denied. On April 20, the NRAC officially denied her request, stating amongst other things that her medical documentation was insufficient. She sought reconsideration and submitted an additional doctor’s note, but the NRAC reaffirmed the denial nearly six months later.

COVID-19 telework. Meanwhile, she returned to work as a full-time teleworker on June 1, 2020, in accordance with the agency’s COVID-19 telework policy, which had taken effect on March 21. In March 2022, she again requested full-time telework as a reasonable accommodation, and this time her request was granted subject to annual review. Up to that point, she successfully teleworked, her mental health symptoms decreased, and she took no sick leave.

Lawsuit. She sued, alleging the SSA failed to reasonable accommodate her disability, and sought backpay for the unpaid FMLA leave that she took in 2020 and reimbursement to her leave bank, compensatory damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. The SSA filed a motion seeking summary judgment or to bar any damages resulting from the leave taken after its March 2020 implementation of full-time telework due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Qualified individual. The SSA first argued that she was not a qualified individual because she did not immediately return from her leave when the agency implemented its COVID-19 telework policy. The court was unpersuaded, explaining that her taking of leave to recover from her illness did not automatically preclude a finding that she was qualified. Notably, her leave was confined to a discrete period (from February 26 to June 1), and upon her return she was able to successfully perform her job and was even eventually promoted. Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude that, when allowed to telework as she had requested, she was able to perform the essential function of attending her employment.

Unreasonable alternatives? A triable issue also existed as to whether SSA’s alternative accommodations were reasonable. While the agency offered to move her workstation and provide her with noise cancelling headphones and a white noise machine, a jury would decide whether those alternatives satisfied its duty to ensure that she could “work in reasonable comfort.” Significantly, these alternatives were not fully responsive to the broader concerns that she communicated through her doctor’s letter, which stated not only that the symptoms were exacerbated by “the lights, smells, and sounds at work and during the commute” but also that she needed “the predictability and stability her home provides.” In addition, she provided the NRAC analyst with much more detail about the scope of her mental illness, explained how her symptoms were worst at work, and emphasized that her commute left her feeling “tired and frazzled” by the time she arrived.

Good faith? Though the SSA also argued that its good-faith engagement in the interactive process should shield it from liability, a jury could instead find that its refusal of full-time telework was made in bad faith. For instance, when the NRAC analyst contacted the employee months after her initial request to tell her that the chief had recommended denial of the request, the only reason given was insufficient portable work and the need for her to perform in-office duties. Yet these reasons did not appear to have any factual basis since her supervisors recommended granting her request, and the SSA conceded that there were no job duties that required her to work in the office. Moreover, when the NRAC ultimately denied her request five months after her initial submission, she told the employee for the first time that her medical documentation was inadequate.

Leave due to unreasonable delay? The court also denied the SSA’s bid to bar damages arising from any events following its implementation of the COVID-19 telework policy since a jury could conclude that she needed to continue her leave to recover from an aggravation of her illness that would not have occurred if she had been permitted to telework sooner. The SSA could be liable for the entirety of her leave if it unreasonably denied her request before she began her leave on February 26, and relevant to this determination was the fact that the employee’s requested accommodation of full-time telework was not particularly complex or burdensome.

She previously teleworked part-time, so full-time telework would not have required any additional infrastructure or equipment, and the SSA did not dispute that she did not need to be present in the office to perform her job duties. Indeed, her supervisors both recommended granting her request, and the SSA was able to transition immediately to full-time telework for almost all staff in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. As discussed, a reasonable jury could conclude that the SSA should have known that the alternatives it offered were insufficient.

“Active consideration.” Though the SSA also argued that the delay was reasonable because the employee’s request was under active consideration, the evidence suggested that SSA’s consideration of her request “was sporadic, not continuous.” And while the agency also argued that the three-month delay between her request and the beginning of her leave suggested reasonableness, the context suggested otherwise. If the chief had heeded her supervisors’ recommendation, she could have been approved for full-time telework in early January. Instead, he recommended denial for “an apparently baseless reason,” and she had to continue working under conditions that progressively exacerbated her mental illness until she had to take a leave of absence in late February. Thus, a jury could reasonably conclude that any delay past early January was unreasonable.

The case is No. 23 CV 16421.

Judge: Alexakis, G.

Attorneys: Arthur R. Ehrlich (Goldman & Ehrlich) for Laurie Tate. Kate Lambert, U.S. Attorney's Office, for Martin O'Malley.

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