Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—DISABILITY—M.D. Tenn.: Firefighter, fired two days after inquiring about additional leave, advances ADA, FMLA claims, (Aug 13, 2026)
Law Firms Mentioned:HMC Civil Rights Law | Lewis Thomason
Organizations Mentioned:Wilson County, Tennessee
By Kathleen Kapusta, J.D.
The firefighter had been out on worker’s compensation leave when he reported that a separate personal illness prevented his return to work.
Denying summary judgment against the ADA failure-to-accommodate claim of a Wilson County, Tennessee, firefighter, who had been on an extended leave due to an enlarged spleen, and who had inquired about additional unpaid leave, a federal court in Tennessee noted that the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that unpaid leave can constitute a reasonable accommodation under the ADA and has also rejected the proposition that indefinite leave is per se unreasonable. Material fact issues also precluded summary judgment on his ADA discrimination claim. And while his FMLA interference claim failed because he had not worked the requisite number of hours over the course of the preceding year, his FMLA and ADA retaliation claims also survived the county’s motion (Spears v. Wilson County, Tennessee, No. 3:24-cv-00716 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 11, 2026)).
In October 2022, the long-tenured firefighter was placed on workers’ compensation leave after injuring his knee while on duty. He underwent surgery in February 2023 and, although he was released to return to light-duty work in early April, he claimed he notified the county’s risk and benefits manager by April 10 that he had an illness that caused his spleen to swell and could not return to work as scheduled because his spleen was at high risk for rupture.
On April 14, the manager informed the department director that the firefighter had told her he could not return because he was under another physician’s care for an unrelated condition and he wanted to use sick and annual leave during his absence. While she claimed she told the firefighter it was not up her to approve his sick leave, and that he had to let HR and the director know of his ongoing personal illness, the firefighter alleged the manager never told him he needed to provide doctor’s notes to anyone but her and said she would keep the director “in the loop for everything.”
Doctor’s note. The firefighter provided a doctor’s note on April 17 listing an anticipated return to work date of May 2. He claimed his doctor provided a follow-up note to the manager on May 2 extending his leave until July 23, but the county claimed the April 17 note was the last it received. None of his supervisors, however, ever told him that his request for sick leave after May 2 was unsubstantiated or that the county had not received a doctor’s note for leave after that date.
On June 8, the firefighter contacted HR to discuss leave options and was purportedly told he only had two weeks of sick leave left, there was a process he had to go through to get FMLA leave, and his best option was to speak to the director about a leave of absence. That same day, the HR director informed the manager and department director that the firefighter had “called HR asking about FMLA.”
Leave request and termination. The firefighter met with the department director on June 12 to request a leave of absence. In response, the director told him he “had to think about the request” and would get back to him. The director later admitted that he understood the firefighter was eligible for and could request FMLA leave, but he did not direct him to do so. The firefighter was terminated two days later for excessive absences without proper documentation.
Failure to accommodate. The county, moving for summary judgment on the firefighter’s ADA failure-to-accommodate claim, argued that it did not know or have reason to know of his disability. For his part, the firefighter claimed he told the manager that he was at risk of a spleen rupture and that he was under the care of another doctor. He also claimed he provided her with a doctor’s note and she assured him she would keep the director in the loop. And while there was no evidence the county received his second doctor's note, there was also no evidence that anyone from the department notified him that they had not received the necessary documentation of his medical need to be off work, and his supervisors all apparently knew that he was off work for a medical condition.
In addition, the director’s notes from his June 12 meeting with the firefighter indicated that the firefighter told him he had norovirus, which caused his spleen to enlarge, that this was why he had been off work since mid-April, and that he anticipated needing to be off work through July 18. While this evidence was not robust and was hotly contested, it was enough to permit a factfinder to conclude the county knew or had reason to know of his disability.
Accommodation request. Rejecting next the county’s assertion the firefighter never requested an accommodation, the court noted that the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that a request for medical leave, whether under the FMLA or not, can qualify as an ADA accommodation request. Nor was the court persuaded by the county’s argument that a request for extended paid leave or for indeterminate leave was per se unreasonable.
The firefighter did not request extended paid leave. Rather, he asked about unpaid leave under the county’s leave of absence policy. Not only is a request for an accommodation in the form of unpaid leave not per se unreasonable, the Sixth Circuit, the court here observed, has repeatedly held that unpaid medical leave can “constitute a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.” In addition, the federal appeals court has rejected the proposition that indefinite leave is per se unreasonable.
Citing the firefighter’s testimony that he had proposed taking an unpaid leave of absence of two to three weeks until his doctor could see him again and authorize his return to work, and the county’s failure to show that this would cause an undue burden, the court found there was at least a question of fact as to whether the firefighter requested a reasonable accommodation and triggered the county’s duty to engage in the interactive process. Noting that the county instead denied his request and terminated him, the court denied summary judgment on this claim.
TDA claim. The firefighter also asserted a disability discrimination claim under the Tennessee Disability Act, which does not include a “reasonable accommodation” requirement. Tennessee courts, observed the court here, have construed this to mean that “[i]f a claimant needs an accommodation to be capable of performing the essential functions of the position, the claimant is not considered to be qualified for the job and may not look to the TDA for protection.” Because it was undisputed the firefighter could not perform any of his essential job functions at the time he requested an accommodation, the court found his TDA claim failed as a matter of law.
ADA discrimination. As to his ADA disability discrimination claim, the court explained that, in the Sixth Circuit, when a failure to accommodate “leads to discharge for performance inadequacies resulting from the disabilities,” the failure to accommodate is considered direct evidence of discharge “because of” an employee’s disability, in violation of the ADA. Here, the court found the firefighter presented direct evidence of disability discrimination premised upon his termination for the same reasons as those set forth above in connection with his failure-to-accommodate claim.
Specifically, he qualified as disabled; the county knew or had reason to know of his disability; he was “otherwise qualified” for his position despite his disability, with a proposed reasonable accommodation; and the county failed to present evidence showing the proposed accommodation would impose an undue hardship upon it. Thus, the court denied summary judgment as to this claim.
FMLA interference claim. Granting the county’s motion on the firefighter’s FMLA interference claim, the court cited the county’s unrebutted evidence showing the firefighter had not worked 1,250 hours over the course of the preceding year and thus he was not eligible for FMLA leave.
Retaliation. Turning to the firefighter’s FMLA retaliation claim, the court noted that until recently, the Sixth Circuit had repeatedly held that “if one is not eligible for FMLA leave, one cannot maintain a cause of action for FMLA retaliation.” In 2023, however, it distinguished between retaliation claims premised upon a plaintiff’s having taken leave to which they were not entitled under the FMLA and claims premised upon merely inquiring about FMLA leave. Where the plaintiff has merely inquired about leave, the appeals court, in Milman v. Fieger & Fieger, P.C., held that eligibility for FMLA leave is not a necessary element of the claim.
Noting that the firefighter alleged he met with the director to request a leave of absence while also indicating that he would like to take FMLA leave if a leave of absence was not approved, the court explained that he alleged he was fired in retaliation for making an inquiry and the fact that he was not eligible for FMLA benefits did not preclude this claim.
Retaliatory termination. Finally, addressing the firefighter’s ADA and FMLA retaliatory termination claims, the court noted that requesting an accommodation and inquiring about FMLA leave are protected activities and there were factual disputes as to whether he engaged in protected activity and whether the county knew he engaged in protected activity. Further, the fact that he was fired two days after allegedly engaging in protected activity was sufficient to show causation.
Although the county set forth a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for firing him—his failure to support his medical absence with documentation—the court found sufficient evidence of pretext to preclude summary judgment. Among other things, the firefighter pointed to the director’s admission he did not ask any of the firefighter’s direct supervisors about whether they had medical documentation to support his sick leave after May 2 before making the termination decision and he did not discuss with the firefighter any issue of excess absenteeism, did not advise him that his sick leave was unsupported, or that he was at risk of termination due to the lack of medical documentation.
Nor did he give the firefighter an opportunity to submit the missing medical documentation, and there was no evidence that any HR employee had asked him about his alleged unexcused absences or the missing medical documentation. Under these circumstances, said the court, the county was not entitled to summary judgment.
The case is No. 3:24-cv-00716.
Judge: Trauger, A.
Attorneys: Ashley Shoemaker (HMC Civil Rights Law) for Phillip Junior Spears. Emily K. Ewald (Lewis Thomason) for Wilson County, Tennessee.
Companies: Wilson County, Tennessee
Cases: DisabilityDiscrimination Discrimination Discharge EmployeeLeave Retaliation PublicEmployees TennesseeNews GCNNews