Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—D. Idaho: Despite city’s discretionary selection process, Hispanic/Catholic firefighter can’t advance non-promotion claim, (Jun 8, 2026)

By Kathleen Kapusta, J.D.

While the record supported the employee’s criticisms that the assessment process involved substantial discretion and produced significant evaluator disparities, Title VII does “not require the best process to select the best candidate.”

Although a Hispanic and Catholic firefighter—who was passed over for a captain position in favor of a Caucasian and Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) candidate—presented evidence showing the assessment process involved substantial discretion and produced significant evaluator disparities, a federal district court in Idaho nonetheless granted summary judgment against his Title VII and state-law race and religious discrimination claims. The evidence, while sufficient to require careful review, was simply not enough for a reasonable jury to find the city’s score-based explanation for the promotion decision was pretextual (Munoz v. City of Burley, No. 4:24-cv-00303-AKB (D. Idaho June 3, 2026)).

The employee began working for the municipal fire department as a volunteer firefighter in 2001, became a full-time firefighter in 2003, and was promoted to lieutenant in 2013. He claimed that the five individuals holding the department’s highest-ranking positions of captain, deputy chief, and chief had substantial involvement with the LDS church.

New job descriptions. In January 2022, the department implemented updated job descriptions for lieutenants and captains. The department also implemented a three-year grace period for employees to become compliant with the new job descriptions.

Open captain position. In June 2022, the employee along with two others applied for an open captain position even though he did not have certain certifications required by the new job description. The deputy chief determined, however, that he was permitted to apply because of the three-year grace period.

Assessment center. The city used an assessment center to evaluate the candidates. The deputy chief selected the five evaluators, which included three internal evaluators—the chief, the deputy chief, and the HR director—and two outside evaluators. There were three components: an incident-scenario exercise, an oral presentation exercise, and an oral interview. After the assessment, the chief and deputy chief totaled the evaluators’ scores; the employee received a total score of 760 out of 1,200 and the selectee received the highest score of 957.

The completed score sheets reflected substantial differences among evaluators. The two outside evaluators gave the employee 205 out of 480 possible points with one scoring him “not qualified in 21 of 24 performance dimensions, “minimally qualified” in two dimensions, and “qualified” in one dimension. The chief, however, scored him “especially qualified” in 22 of 24 dimensions and “qualified” in the other two. According to one of the outside evaluators, the employee was argumentative and seemed bitter and angry.

After the candidate with the highest score was offered the position, despite having only six months of experience as a lieutenant, the employee sued for race and religious discrimination in violation of Title VII and state law.

Prima facie case. The city first argued that the employee failed to establish a prima facie case of race or religious discrimination because he did not meet the January 2022 lieutenant and captain job descriptions when he applied for captain in June 2022. Although the employee admitted he did not have certain certifications identified in the 2022 captain job description, there was evidence, said the court, the updated certification requirements were subject to a grace period and were not used as an absolute bar to applying or interviewing for any candidate in June 2022.

Further, the department provided the candidates with the pre-January 2022 captain classification description; the chief explained that this description would apply because of the three-year grace period; and the employee had earned all licenses and certifications required to apply for a captain position under that job description. The deputy chief also testified that the employee met the minimum qualifications to interview for the position. Based on this evidence, the court assumed without deciding that he established a prima facie case.

Pretext. Because the city articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for promoting the selectee—he received the highest total score in the assessment center—the court turned to the employee’s evidence of subjectivity, evaluator discretion, and demographic background as circumstantial evidence bearing on whether the city’s stated reason was pretextual. According to the employee, the selectee was not qualified to apply for or receive the captain position because he had been a lieutenant for only six months before he was promoted and thus he lacked the required two years of lieutenant experience.

Combination of experience. But pursuant to the captain job description, observed the court, “any combination of experience and training that would likely provide the required knowledge and abilities” and was qualifying. While the job description described a “typical” and “preferred” path of five years of increasingly responsible full-time fire-department experience, including at least two years as a lieutenant, allowing a combination of experience and training to be qualifying established that the preferred two-year requirement was at most a preferred path for experiential qualification.

Moreover, said the court, there was evidence indicating that during the grace period, the city allowed internal candidates to apply and participate even if they did not possess all updated certification requirements. While that supported a dispute over the wisdom in allowing “any combination” to suffice, it did not materially advance the employee’s assertion that having less than two years rendered the selectee unqualified. Nor did it show the city’s stated reliance on the highest total score was false or connect any qualification determination to the employee’s race or religion.

Scoring process. The employee next argued that the assessment process lacked objective metrics, evaluators were not told how to translate performance into particular numerical scores within the 1-to-10 scale, the outside evaluators scored him unusually low, and those outside scores materially affected the result. The city, however, did not claim the assessment center was wholly objective, mechanically scored, or free from evaluator judgment. Rather, it asserted that it promoted the selectee because he received the highest total score after all the candidates completed the assessment process.

Noting that the employee did not dispute that the score-based explanation was facially legitimate and nondiscriminatory, the court explained that “evidence that the assessment process involved subjective evaluator judgment does not, by itself, show that Defendant was motivated by discrimination or that its stated reason is false or unworthy of credence. It shows that the facially legitimate score-based process had discretionary components.”

Substantial discretion. Agreeing that the assessment process involved substantial discretion, the court pointed to the deputy chief’s testimony that in scoring the “educational background” component, he reasoned that someone who had been with the department for 15 years with only minimal certifications could appear less motivated than someone who had been with the department for a year or two and was “getting cert after cert.” While this supported the employee’s contention that the scoring was not purely mechanical, it did not support a reasonable inference that the deputy chief’s judgment was based on the employee’s race or religion.

Explaining that subjectivity does not automatically establish disparate-treatment pretext, the court found no evidence showing the low scores were assigned because the employee was Hispanic, Catholic, or non-LDS or that the deputy chief selected the outside evaluators for that discriminatory purpose. While the scoring disparities were significant, the employee did not argue that the outside evaluators personally considered race or religion when scoring him. Rather, he argued that the deputy chief selected them to score the candidate he favored higher than the others. Though that could infer possible favoritism or outcome-driven structuring, there was no evidence the scoring process was a proxy for race or religious discrimination.

To the contrary, said the court, there was performance-based evidence explaining at least some of the employee’s lower scores, including the outside evaluator’s testimony that he was very argumentative and bitter. For these reasons, the court found the scoring evidence did not create a triable issue of pretext.

Demographic evidence. Finally, the employee pointed to the relative lack of Hispanic or non-LDS representation in department leadership positions to support his assertion the process was motivated in part by his race and religion. The city and surrounding area, he argued, include a significant Hispanic population but the department’s highest-ranking positions were held by Caucasian employees and most were held by individuals with LDS connections.

Finding this only minimally probative, the court explained that the relevant comparison was not between department leadership and the general population of the city or county but between department leadership or promotion outcomes and the pool of persons eligible to apply for the captain position. Without evidence of that eligible applicant pool, general population data did not alone support an inference the city’s rationale was pretextual.

Nor, said the court, was there any evidence the relevant evaluators or decisionmakers knew, during the June 2022 assessment process, that the employee was Catholic or non-LDS. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment against the employee’s claims.

The case is No. 4:24-cv-00303-AKB.

Judge: Brailsford, A.

Attorneys: Jeremiah Matthew Hudson (Fisher & Hudson) for Henry Munoz. Sam L. Angell (Hall Angell & Associates) for City of Burley, Idaho.

Companies: City of Burley, Idaho

Cases: Discrimination RaceDiscrimination ReligiousDiscrimination IdahoNews GCNNews