Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—AGE—6th Cir.: Federal judge properly vacated $2.3M jury verdict in favor of fired employee, (Aug 6, 2025)

By Marjorie Johnson, J.D.

His supervisor’s alleged ageist comment at his 40-year celebration and random “old man” comments were alone insufficient to infer bias, and there was no other evidence to support his claim.

A federal district court did not err in vacating a $2,304,890 jury verdict in favor of a 60-year-old factory maintenance manager who was terminated after his decades-long tenure, ostensibly due to performance and behavior issues and because his position was no longer needed, finding that he failed to present any evidence at trial suggesting the decision was motivated by his age. Affirming judgment as a matter of law in favor of the employer on his claim of age discrimination under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), the Sixth Circuit explained that, though it had previously reversed summary judgment against the employee based on his deposition testimony alleging his supervisor made ageist remarks at his termination meeting, his testimony at trial was materially different, and he failed to point to any younger comparators who were treated more favorably or any other evidence suggesting unlawful bias (Lowe v. Walbro, LLC, No. 24-2011 (6th Cir. Aug. 5, 2025)).

Terminated and sues. The employee worked for Walbro for four decades, and in 2014 he took on the role of area manager at one of the employer’s plants. In 2016, a new plant manager allegedly noticed that the employee lacked a proper understanding of the equipment he oversaw, prompting the plant manager to remove two subordinates from his supervision. Two years later, the plant manager and the HR manager decided to eliminate his position and terminated his employment. He sued, alleging age discrimination under ELCRA.

Summary judgment reversed. The district court dismissed his claim on summary judgment, finding that he failed to present sufficient evidence of age discrimination. However, the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that his deposition testimony concerning the plant manager’s alleged age-based remark at his termination meeting—that he was “getting up there in years” and was “at retirement age”—constituted direct evidence of bias. As such, a triable issue existed as to whether he would have been terminated regardless of any age-related animus.

Verdict and trial motions. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in the employee’s favor and awarded him $443,418 in back pay, $561,472 in front pay, and $1,300,000 in noneconomic damages. However, the district court granted the employer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and vacated the jury verdict. The court held that the evidence that he presented at trial, which was materially different from the evidence that he presented at summary judgment, was insufficient for the case to have been submitted to the jury. This appeal followed.

Standard of causation. As the Sixth Circuit noted in its prior opinion, there is a discrepancy in Michigan caselaw as to whether an ELCRA plaintiff who brings a direct-evidence case involving mixed motives must prove “but for” causation or simply show that the animus was a substantial or motivating factor. However, the difference was immaterial in this instance because no triable issue existed under either standard.

No direct evidence at trial. The Sixth Circuit’s prior opinion found that summary judgment was not warranted since the plant manager’s alleged ageist remarks at the employee’s termination meeting constituted direct evidence of age discrimination. However, this testimony was never presented to the jury, and he did not dispute at trial that his supervisor never mentioned his age during the meeting.

Instead, the jury heard the plant manager’s alleged remark only during the cross examination of the employer’s expert, when the employee’s counsel read the quote from the doctor’s report in order to impeach her testimony. Since the employee agreed at trial that this was being used only for impeachment purposes and did not argue that a hearsay exception applied, the jury could not consider the expert report as affirmative, substantive evidence that the plant manager made the ageist comments at the termination meeting.

The employee also failed to point to any other example of instances where the jury heard direct evidence of age-related discriminatory comments at the termination meeting. His testimony that the HR manager stated that his termination was “not because of [his] age” did not contradict his earlier testimony that the plant manager said nothing about age or retirement at the meeting.

Stray remarks. The only other testimony relating to his age that the jury heard was that the plant manager made a number of stray remarks about his age over an almost two-year period. Most notably, during a ceremony recognizing his 40 years of service, the supervisor allegedly said, “Old man, you been here longer than I have been alive. Are you ready to retire?” The jury also heard about a few other comments made by the supervisor during several team meetings, such as “let the old guy do it.” The Sixth Circuit held that these statements—one made at a ceremony well over a year prior to his termination and several other “random comments made at unspecified times, all unrelated to the decision-making process”—were insufficient to demonstrate that age discrimination was at least a motivating factor in his termination.

No inference of bias. The Sixth Circuit also found that his claim failed under the McDonnell Douglas framework because the plant manager’s alleged ageist comments were alone insufficient to infer age bias, and he failed to present any other evidence to support his claim. Notably, he did not claim a younger comparator was treated more favorably or that the employer filled his position after his termination. He also failed to dispute evidence that the plant manager hired several people close to his age to serve as managers and could have included him in an earlier reduction in force but chose not to do so. This testimony undermined any contention that the plant manager was “predisposed” to discriminating against older workers.

The case is No. 24-2011.

Judge: Gilman, R.

Attorneys: Jonathan Robert Marko (Law Offices of Jonathan Robert Marko) for Kenneth James Lowe. David M. Cessante (Clark Hill) for Walbro, LLC.

Companies: Walbro, LLC

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