Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCRIMINATION—1st Cir.: Tenured professor, fired after LGBTQ+ rights discussion, failed to adequately allege discrimination, (Jun 12, 2026)

By Jason Albright, J.D.

A student who complained about her said she cannot tell him what he finds offensive because she “is a white straight cis woman.”

A tenured Spanish professor, fired “for cause” after she taught a class focused on “Gender and Sexuality in Latin America”—which one student found “triggering”—and several students submitted written complaints about her, failed to state claims of gender, race, sexual orientation, age, or religious discrimination; a hostile work environment; or retaliation, the First Circuit found. The professor failed to attribute the discriminatory animus she alleged—from students and other faculty—to the university’s decisionmakers and failed to provide any factual detail to support animus based on her protected characteristics. And although she alleged that she was called “a parasite; inhumane, and toxic,” among other things, none of the comments plausibly suggested harassment based on a protected characteristic (Crawford v. Salve Regina University, No. 24-1656 (1st Cir. June 11, 2026)).

Spanish professor. The plaintiff, according to the court, was a tenured Spanish professor in Salve Regina University’s Modern Languages Department from 2004 until her termination in 2022. In the years preceding her termination, she “maintained a positive record of employment,” with her evaluations showing “no negative trends in her performance or deviations [from]... her teaching responsibilities.”

Class on “Gender and Sexuality in Latin America.” On November 15, 2022, however, she taught a class, in her Spanish American Culture and Civilization course, focused on “Gender and Sexuality in Latin America.” In preparation for the class, she had assigned a reading that contained the word “trans[vestites].” During the class, she led a brief discussion on LGBTQ+ rights in Latin American countries, noting “that these rights have not evolved to the level such rights have evolved [to] in the United States.”

Student D’s objections. A student identified as “Student D” became upset. He objected to the terminology used in the assigned reading and “had an outburst in class.”

Department chair and student complaints. Afterward, some of the students who were upset about the class met with the Modern Languages Department chair, and he allegedly “encouraged and/or directed the students to submit written statements to the [U]niversity criticizing” the professor. She alleged that he coordinated these student complaints “to retaliate against” her based on prior disagreements and a prior grievance against him. She alleged that this was also not an isolated event: at the start of the semester, he and the University Provost had allegedly instructed undergraduate students to “keep a running list of criticisms” about her.

Students’ submissions. Several students followed his suggestion and submitted written complaints to the university. Student D wrote a lengthy letter to the Provost explaining his view that the reading for that day, using the word “transvestite,” was “inappropriate.” Student D wrote that he had told the professor “he was a ‘transgender gay man,’” and that because she “is a white straight cis woman,” she cannot tell him what he finds offensive. Student D asked the Provost to “take action” against the professor, whom he described as “ignorant.”

Another student, Student C, wrote that he was “directed by an advisor,” who the professor identified as the department chair, to email the Provost about “derogatory language regarding transgender people in [[the professor’s]] class.” Student C reported that he found the language at issue to be “triggering” and opined that the classroom should be a “warm and safe space.”

Describing the student complains as “the product of a deliberately coordinated effort” to undermine her reputation and denigrate her performance, the professor characterized “certain students” as taking “the position that [she] had no right to teach about certain cultural norms in Latin America because she was [a] ‘cis white woman.’”

Zoom meeting. After receiving these complaints, the university held a group Zoom meeting for students to share what had occurred in the professor’s classes that semester. Some students described her as using “offensive language and hateful rhetoric” toward the LGBTQ+ community and people of color. The university did not inform her of the meeting or permit her to participate. It also never properly investigated or verified any of the allegations, according to the court.

Interim action. On November 22, 2021, the university’s Title IX Coordinator emailed the professor a “Notice of Interim Action.” According to the notice, students alleged that the professor had made derogatory comments toward “a population based on that population[’s]... gender identity or expression” and expressed that they did “not feel safe around” her. The notice restricted some of her duties but stated that it should not be construed to indicate that the university had taken any disciplinary action against her.

Discharge “for cause.” Then, on January 3, 2022, the university informed the professor that her employment was terminated “for cause.” The university cited “continued misconduct,” “failure to communicate,” and “failure to comply with the requirements of a faculty member in accordance with the Faculty Manual.” According to the professor, the university’s president described the November 15, 2021 class as the “catalyst” for the termination, but went on to “falsely assert that the past seven years of [her] employment ha[d] been ‘fraught’ with misconduct in the classroom and unacceptable teaching practices....”

Termination upheld. The professor appealed her termination to the Faculty Hearing Board, which ultimately upheld the decision. She alleged, however, that the appeals proceeding was prejudiced and driven by an intent to destroy her career. Some of her colleagues in the Modern Languages Department allegedly submitted false and defamatory statements, with one writing that she made transphobic, homophobic, antisemitic, and xenophobic comments. Another colleague wrote that she “s[o]wed acrimony” among students, faculty, and staff, and that she made antisemitic remarks.

On the merits of her termination, the board, which decided against her 3-2, concluded that the professor “regularly and routinely use[d] derogatory language that minimize[d] others and promote[d] hurtful stereotypes.” Although it recognized that her in-class lessons were crafted to explore the nature of stereotypes and foster educational dialogue, it determined that she lacked “the training to teach these controversial topics in a way that le[d] to transformative interactions with students.” The majority thus believed that the issues were “not taught in a culturally responsive manner.”

Replaced by younger male. She appealed the faculty board’s decision to the University’s Board of Trustees, which affirmed the termination unanimously. The university then allegedly “replaced [[her]] with respect to at least part of her teaching schedule with a male significantly younger than [her] who is believed to be the husband of [a colleague who submitted a critical statement about her].”

To support her age discrimination claim, the professor also alleged that unidentified individuals referred to her “as ‘old school’” because she requested that students use her title and not her first name; that a student requested a different advisor with “fresh ideas and perspectives”; that she was “criticized” “for not using gender neutral endings in Spanish and told this was because she was ‘older’”; and that the University did not provide office assignments by seniority, instead providing favorable spaces to younger/junior faculty.

Lawsuit and decision below. The professor sued, alleging breach of contract, various torts (defamation, tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and intentional infliction of emotional distress), and violations of federal and state anti-discrimination law related to her termination, and a federal district court granted the university’s motion to dismiss all her federal and state discrimination claims. It found that she failed to allege any nexus between her protected categories and the university’s decision to fire her. Then, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state-law claims and remanded them to Rhode Island Superior Court.

She timely appealed the dismissal.

Discrimination claims. The appeals court first found that the professor’s discrimination claims were properly dismissed. She simply failed to attribute the discriminatory animus she alleged—from students and other faculty—to the university’s decisionmakers, and she failed to provide any factual detail to support animus based on her protected characteristics.

The professor, for instance, pointed to Student D’s reference to her as a “cis [w]hite woman” to suggest that “faculty and students... harbored an animus towards her” based on her gender, sexual orientation/identification, and race. Student D, however, did not participate in the termination decision, and so his alleged bias alone did not plausibly give rise to an inference of discrimination by the university. Her complaint also supplied no facts suggesting that the decisionmakers referenced Student D’s language when deciding to fire her, endorsed his characterization of her, or acted for reasons tied to her protected traits.

And as to the department chair, she maintained that he sought to retaliate against her for “a protracted history of disagreements” and her prior grievance against him. Here, the appeals court found that she provided no context about her disagreements with him or her grievance’s nature, “no facts from which we could assess whether they bore any relationship to her protected characteristics.”

As to age discrimination, she did allege that she was replaced with a “significantly younger” male for “part of her teaching schedule” and that the university assigned favorable office spaces to younger faculty, but the appeals court found that she offered “no factual details supporting these statements.” And though she alleged that she had been called “old school” for asking students to use her title and not her first name and that a student requested a different advisor with “fresh ideas and perspectives,” these statements, again, came either from students or from unidentified individuals at unspecified points in time, and she did not allege that they were made by or in the presence of any decisionmaker responsible for her termination.

HWE claims. Her HWE claims were likewise properly dismissed. Although the professor alleged that she was called “a parasite; inhumane, and toxic,” among other things, none of the comments plausibly suggested harassment based on a protected characteristic: her gender, race, sexual orientation, age, or religion. “The students’ and faculty’s statements may reflect disagreement with—or criticism of—her views about certain minority groups,” the First Circuit observed. “But it does not follow from that disagreement that [the professor’s] protected characteristics were targeted.”

Retaliation. Finally, the professor’s retaliation claims fared similarly. She failed to adequately allege that she engaged in protected conduct before her discharge. First, she argued that she engaged in protected conduct by filing a grievance against the department chair, but again, she did not describe the substance of the grievance itself or include any facts tending to show that the grievance concerned conduct protected under Title VII or Title IX. Second, she argued that she participated in the university’s disciplinary process when the allegations against her arose, and that it was plausible that the university terminated her in retaliation for defending herself and accusing it of unlawful conduct. Unpersuaded again, the court observed that she failed to contest the defendants’ assertion that the Faculty Hearing Board’s hearing, during which she allegedly engaged in the protected conduct, occurred after her termination.

The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

The case is No. 24-1656.

Judge: Gelpí, G.

Attorneys: Stephen T. Fanning (Law Offices of Stephen T. Fanning) for Linda Crawford. Joseph D. Whelan (Whelan Corrente & Flanders) for Salve Regina University, Salve Regina University Board of Trustees, James G. Mitchell, Esther Alarcon-Arana, and Emily Colbert-Cairns.

Companies: Salve Regina University

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