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    Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, DISCHARGE—N.D. Ill.: Muslim doctor who received six months of pregnancy-related leave gets constructive discharge claim tossed, (Apr 1, 2026)

    Law Firms Mentioned:Case + Sedey | Morgan Lewis & Bockius
    Organizations Mentioned:Advocate Health & Hospitals Corp. | Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp. | Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP

    By Marjorie Johnson, J.D.

    “Defendant’s actions—accommodating six months of leave and then asking for her return—would not compel a reasonable person to quit; many employees return from leave under such conditions without resigning.”

    A Muslim ...

    By Marjorie Johnson, J.D.

    “Defendant’s actions—accommodating six months of leave and then asking for her return—would not compel a reasonable person to quit; many employees return from leave under such conditions without resigning.”

    A Muslim physician who resigned from her position in an Advocate Health medical group after she was denied an additional 90-day personal leave—following nearly six-months of pregnancy and childbirth leave—failed to survive summary judgment on her federal and state-law claims alleging she was constructively discharged. A federal district court held that she failed to establish she met the high standard for a constructive discharge because there was no evidence that animus related to her pregnancy or Muslim faith motivated the denial of her request for personal, nonmedical leave; she acknowledged that her supervisor treated her kindly and accommodated her with a modified schedule and extended leaves; and she resigned before giving the employer an opportunity to consider a shorter extension, medical leave, or an alternative role (Sharabash v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp., No. 23-cv-00359 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2026)).

    Pregnancy accommodations. The doctor was one of two gastroenterology hospitalist physicians in the medical group and the only Muslim physician in the practice. On October 15, 2021, she went on leave due to pregnancy-related medical issues. In November, she sought to return with medical restrictions that prohibited her from performing in-person care. Since that was a primary function of her job, the employer initially placed her on FMLA leave until early December, when it identified remote tasks for her to perform until her baby’s birth on January 15, 2022.

    Sought additional personal leave. The employer provided the doctor with almost six months of leave related to her pregnancy and childbirth—combining FMLA leave, medical leave, and paid parental leave—and this leave was set to ultimately expire on April 8. However, in late December 2021, she inquired about taking additional personal leave beyond April 8. During the call, the administrator allegedly raised her voice and would not let the doctor speak.

    On February 4, 2022, she formally requested unpaid personal leave from April 8 to August 1—about 90 days beyond her existing leave. She did not frame her request as a medical necessity because, although she was having health issues, she did not want to disclose them. She also had lingering breathing issues from a COVID-19 infection in January but chose not to inform the practice of the illness.

    Request denied. On February 7, the administrator denied her request via email and advised her that she was needed back at work on April 8. Her supervisor and the other physicians in the group unanimously agreed that extending her absence would impose an undue strain on the practice as they had already been covering all of her duties for almost six months.

    Resignation. On March 30, she submitted a letter of resignation in which she gave the contractually required 90-day notice and listed her termination date as June 28. Her stated reason was “family reasons,” and she did not mention any need for a medical accommodation or allege discrimination. On April 5, her supervisor accepted her resignation stating that the practice expected her to resume active employment on April 8 and work for the next three months until her resignation date.

    Reveals health issues. On April 6, the doctor asked to move up her last day because of health issues, and her supervisor advised her to apply for medical leave if she was unable to work. She did so, and on April 9, her personal physician provided a note recommending that she work from home due to breathing problems and other symptoms. Advocate approved a five-week personal medical leave through May 12 and then placed her on unpaid leave until her employment ended on June 28.

    Lawsuit. She filed this lawsuit, alleging that she was constructively discharged based on her pregnancy, childbirth, and/or religion in violation of Title VII and the Illinois Human Rights Act. She also asserted FMLA retaliation and failure-to-accommodate claims but later waived both those claims. The court further noted that the accommodation claim was untimely and the retaliation claim failed on the merits.

    No pregnancy-related adverse action. Granting summary judgment on her pregnancy discrimination claims, the court found she could not meet the high bar for constructive discharge because she did not fall within the narrow category of cases “where discriminatory or retaliatory conditions are so objectively intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign, or where the employer communicates that termination is imminent.”

    First, there was no evidence that Advocate suggested she would be fired or penalized if she did not return on April 8. She was simply denied additional discretionary unpaid leave beyond what had already been provided. Her job remained available, and when she later indicated she could not return for health reasons, the employer facilitated her medical leave.

    Moreover, from Advocate’s perspective, when she resigned on March 30, she was able to return to work and had not disclosed any ongoing medical issues. “Requiring an employee to return to work after a lengthy leave is not objectively intolerable treatment—it is a fundamental expectation for any job,” noted the court. Quitting was also not her only option; she could have sought a medical accommodation or extension. Indeed, she made such a request only after she resigned, and Advocate promptly granted it.

    Finally, there was no evidence that pregnancy-based harassment or animus motivated the denial of her leave request. Rather, the decision was undisputedly driven by staffing needs, and her colleague’s comments reflected the strain of the long duration of coverage already provided to her. She herself acknowledged that she appreciated how her supervisor had treated her, further undermining any claim that her working conditions were unbearable.

    No religious animus. Her claim that she was constructively discharged on the basis of her religion was even weaker, as her stated reason for resigning was the leave denial, not any religious conflict. None of her communications suggested she quit over religious harassment, and there was no evidence she was subjected to harassment tied to her Muslim faith that was so severe a reasonable person would feel forced to quit. Notably, there was no evidence that anyone at Advocate made derogatory comments about her religion or Islamic customs.

    While she pointed to two occasions when the group’s administrator raised her voice at her, “occasional yelling or a stern tone, without threats, slurs, or sustained harassment based on a protected class, does not approach the ‘intolerable’ environment required to deem a resignation a termination.” This is especially true where the employer soon after accommodated her with remote work and later approved medical leave once she reported her restrictions. More significantly, her supervisor was the key decisionmaker and showed no religious bias. Rather, the doctor admitted the supervisor treated her kindly and accommodated her needs with a modified schedule and extended leaves thereafter.

    It would be unreasonable to find a hostile work environment where the direct supervisor was supportive, and the only nonreligious hostile conduct came from an indirect supervisor on two occasions. Those circumstances were insufficient to meet the threshold of severity or pervasiveness required for a hostile work environment theory, let alone constructive discharge.

    The case is No. 23-cv-00359.

    Judge: Kness, J.

    Attorneys: Kathleen O. Sedey (Case + Sedey) for Noura Sharabash. Jill Susan Vorobiev (Morgan Lewis & Bockius) for Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp.

    Companies: Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp.

    Cases: Discharge PregnancyDiscrimination ReligiousDiscrimination Discrimination IllinoisNews

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