Cybersecurity Policy Report, DHS Seeks to Convene Stakeholders to Secure Undersea Cables, (Dec 19, 2024)
The Department of Homeland Security intends to sharpen its focus on the security and resilience of undersea communications cables by collaborating more closely with federal agencies and private sector stakeholders, according to a report published yesterday.
“Despite an overarching need to enhance the security and resilience of this critical infrastructure, doing so is difficult due to cable systems’ diversified international ownership, their multinational connections, and their presence in the global commons,” the report says.
“Consequently, successfully expanding, maintaining, and protecting this network will depend on increased partnership between government and industry to develop solutions to shared problems,” it says.
“As with most critical infrastructure assets, subsea cable systems are generally privately owned and operated, but as the backbone infrastructure of the global internet and telecommunications network, the loss or unavailability of these cables poses risks to the public, including to the national and economic security of the United States,” it adds.
The report, prepared by DHS’s Supply Chain Resilience Center (SCRC), suggests that fishing gear and ships’ anchors pose the greatest threat to undersea cables. But intentional damage and cyber surveillance remain serious threats, it warns.
“This network and its supporting ecosystem are vital to the strategic and economic interests of the United States, but they face complex and challenging risks from natural, accidental, and malicious threats,” the report says.
“The cable industry has long built resilience into its systems to mitigate the effects of the hundreds of incidents that occur every year and predominantly relies on redundancy (multiple systems, excess capacity, and alternate routes) to ensure system-wide resilience while damaged systems undergo repairs,” it says.
“At the same time, however, the resurgence of great power competition increases the potential for foreign adversary interference with subsea communications networks that carry sensitive government and other types of critical information upon which our national and economic security depend,” it says.
“The subsea cable industry spans multiple critical infrastructure sectors, including communications and information technology, which means that it does not fit cleanly within existing U.S. government mechanisms for engaging critical infrastructure owners and operators, such as Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs) and Government Coordinating Councils (GCCs),” according to the report.
“This has limited DHS’s and the U.S. government’s opportunities to gain insights from the cable industry on its unique risks and challenges,” it says.
DHS said it would “work internally and across the U.S. government to improve subsea cable industry representation and engagement, including by leveraging existing critical infrastructure engagement bodies like SCCs and GCCs, and by exploring new ways to engage industry through forums for ongoing classified and unclassified information exchange.”
The report also cited the need to untangle the “fragmented regulatory landscape for subsea cables,” including “permitting timelines and unpredictability.”
It said DHS would “conduct a comprehensive assessment of cable permitting and licensing authorities—with an initial focus on federal authorities—to inform efforts to reduce unnecessary redundancy, clarify reporting requirements, and align resources to policy priorities.”
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