Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, COVERAGE, LIABILITY—U.S.: FAAAA’s safety exception saves state-law negligent hiring claim from preemption, (May 14, 2026)

By Todd Harrison, J.D.

Under federal law, states retain the authority to regulate safety “with respect to motor vehicles,” and a state-law claim for negligent hiring falls within that exception.

In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the safety exception found within the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act allows for state-law claims for negligent hiring, rejecting the argument that such claims were preempted by the Act. Although the Court noted that it was not obvious why Congress would insert a safety exception into subsection (c) of the Act, which concerns interstate brokers, but not subsection (b), which pertains to intrastate brokers, the Court found it was, “Better to live with the mystery than to rewrite the statute.” In a concurrence, Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Alito, noted the case raised serious questions about the repercussions of state tort liability against brokers, but as of now preemption did not apply (Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC , No. 24-1238 (U.S. May 14, 2026)).

Accident, injury. While driving a load of plastic pots through Illinois in a Mack Truck, the driver veered off course, striking a tractor-trailer stopped on the side of the road. The petitioner suffered severe injuries as a result of the collision, including the amputation of a leg.

Lawsuit. Subsequently, the petitioner sued the truck driver, the motor carrier, and the broker who had coordinated the shipment, asserting, among other claims, a claim for negligent hiring. He contended that the motor carrier had a “conditional” safety rating from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration when the broker had hired it. The agency had allegedly found the motor carrier to be deficient “with respect to qualification of drivers,” “hours of service of drivers,” “inspection, repair and maintenance,” “recordable crash rate,” and more.

Based on that safety rating, the petitioner claimed that the broker knew, or should have known, that choosing the motor carrier to transport goods was reasonably likely to result in crashes that would injure others.

Applying Seventh Circuit precedent, the district court held that the FAAAA expressly preempted the petitioner’s claim against the broker and that the claim did not fall within the safety exception. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Noting a circuit split on this question, the Court granted certiorari and considered the issue at hand.

Straightforward interpretation. At bottom, the Court was tasked with determining whether the negligent hiring claims of the type pressed by the petitioner were claims “with respect to motor vehicles.” The Court concluded that they are.

The FAAAA supplies no definition of “with respect to,” so the Court gave the phrase its ordinary meaning. The FAAAA goes on to define “motor vehicle” as “a vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used on a highway in transportation.” Putting the pieces together the Court determined that a claim is “with respect to motor vehicles” if it “concerns” or “regards” the vehicles used in transportation.

“Applying that interpretation here is straightforward,” said the Court. The petitioner alleged that the broker failed to exercise reasonable care when it hired the motor carrier, which had a subpar safety rating from federal regulators, to transport goods via truck. Based on that safety rating, the broker knew, or should have known, that choosing the motor carrier in question to move goods was reasonably likely to cause an accident.

Requiring the broker to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles, and motor vehicles in this instance are most obviously the trucks that are being used to transport the goods. Accordingly, the negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, saving it from preemption, explained the Court.

Subset of claims. In response, the broker, joined in part by the United States, argued that construing the safety exception as requested in this case “would swallow the FAAAA’s express preemption provision whole.” In other words, everything that Congress preempted would also qualify for the safety exception. Not so, said the Court, noting that the safety exception saves only a subset of preempted claims: those involving regulations concerning motor vehicle safety.

“One can imagine many state laws that are related to motor carrier prices, routes, and services—such as how much a carrier may charge or which highways it may traverse—that have no relationship to safety,” said the Court.

Surplusage? Next, the broker contended that such an interpretation would create surplusage. In addition to preserving a state’s regulatory authority with respect to motor vehicles, the FAAAA also preserves state authority to impose route controls based on the size or weight of the vehicle or the hazardous nature of the cargo. If the Court’s interpretation were adopted, the argument goes, those carveouts would be redundant because they also speak to safety. However, the Court noted that the surplusage exists whether the disputed phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” is defined narrowly or broadly, because any overlap comes from the reference to a state’s regulatory authority over “safety.”

The Court found that the provisions could be harmonized, explaining that, “A State’s choice to impose route controls or weight limits may serve ends other than safety, such as guarding against highway wear and tear.”

Anomaly. Finally, the broker and the U.S. asserted that interpreting the safety exception to cover brokers would create an anomaly with subsection (b) of the FAAAA. That subsection preempts state regulation of “intrastate” rates, routes, or services “of any freight forwarder or broker.” Unlike subsection (c), subsection (b) does not contain a safety exception. This raises the question of why Congress would completely preempt the state regulation of brokers for intrastate rates, routes, and services while only partially preempting state regulation of brokers for interstate rates, routes, and services? To avoid this anomaly, the broker argued that the Court should interpret subsection (c)’s safety exception to exclude brokers. Then, states could not impose either interstate or intrastate safety regulations on them.

On this point, the Court noted that it was not obvious why Congress would include a safety exception in (c) but not (b). However, it also noted that it would be even stranger to say that the alleged tort—the negligent hiring of an unsafe motor carrier whose truck caused injury—is not an exercise of “the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” §14501(c)(2)(A).

The text of subsection (c)(2)(A) is what controls, explained the Court. “Better to live with the mystery than to rewrite the statute,” concluded the Court, reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Concurrence. Writing separately, Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Alito, noted that the conflicting contextual considerations made this a close case in determining where to draw the line on the statutory phrase “with respect to motor vehicles.” In the end, Justice Kavanaugh stated that he did not believe that “Congress, through such oblique language in an economic-deregulation statute, simultaneously (i) allowed state tort suits against negligent trucking companies and (ii) categorically preempted state tort suits against upstream brokers who negligently select an unsafe trucking company.”

Justice Kavanaugh acknowledged that the brokers and their amici raised serious concerns about the repercussions of state tort liability against brokers, and brokers may ask Congress and the President to change federal law. However, as of now, federal law does not preempt state tort liability against brokers for the negligent selection of trucking companies.

The case is No. 24-1238.

Judge: Barrett, A.

Attorneys: Paul D. Clement (Clement & Murphy) for Shawn Montgomery. Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher) for C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., C.H. Robinson Co., C.H. Robinson Co., Inc., and C.H. Robinson International, Inc.

Companies: C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.; C.H. Robinson Co.; C.H. Robinson Co., Inc.; C.H. Robinson International, Inc.

Cases: CoverageLiability StateLawClaims TortClaims Safety SupremeCourtNews