Labor & Employment Law Daily Wrap Up, COVERAGE, LIABILITY—7th Cir.: Former prison mental health worker cannot revive claims against Illinois DOC, (Aug 3, 2026)

By Todd Harrison, J.D.

Applying a five-factor joint-employer test, the court found that although the department could veto a proposed hire, this manner of control was over another contracting party, not the worker herself.

Affirming a district court’s grant of summary judgment against the Title VII race and sex discrimination claims asserted by a prison mental health worker, the Seventh Circuit found that the Illinois Department of Corrections could not be considered a joint employer under the five-factor test in Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 950 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1991). Among other things, the court found that the department did not exercise sufficient control over the employee, noting that while the department investigated and had concluded she violated its dress code policies, its report did not impose punishment and merely substantiated a claim against her. This “most important” factor suggested that the department was not the employee’s employer (Stokes v. Illinois Department of Corrections, No. 25-1116 (7th Cir. July 31, 2026)).

The department contracted with Wexford Health Services, Inc., to provide mental-health services at its facilities, including Pontiac, a prison for men. Wexford, the “vendor,” served as an independent contractor, not an agent or employee of the department. As part of its duties, Wexford was responsible for hiring individual employees to staff Pontiac’s medical units, subject to the department’s approval.

New hire. In 2017, the employee in this case applied through and interviewed with Wexford for a mental-healthcare position at Pontiac. Wexford hired her and she was assigned to work at the prison.

Personal appearance policy. When she was hired, the employee was informed of Wexford’s personal appearance policy requiring workers to comply with Pontiac’s “standards of personal appearance.” Pontiac, in turn, treated dress as a security matter, noting that inappropriate dress might subject personnel to additional attention, heckling, or assault.

Problems began to arise with the employee’s clothing in May 2018 when her supervisor took issue with a shirt through which he claimed to be able to see impressions of the employee’s nipples. A lieutenant at Pontiac lodged an identical complaint in July. A major agreed with the lieutenant and the employee was sent home to change. Pontiac later investigated this incident and concluded that she had violated its code of conduct, though the report imposed no discipline.

A few days after the July incident, the same lieutenant and major confronted the employee about a report that the clothing she was wearing showed her underwear. Other issues with her choice of dress began to crop up around this time as well. The employee lodged complaints about these and other incidents and alleged that Pontiac retaliated against her because of her complaints, at one point claiming a prison guard had locked her in an interstitial hallway. At no point was the employee disciplined or fired for the alleged misconduct, and she resigned from her position in November 2018.

Lawsuit. Subsequently, the employee sued Wexford and the department, asserting claims under Title VII for race and sex discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation. The department moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not liable to the employee because it did not jointly employer her with Wexford. The district court agreed, granting the motion for summary judgment. The employee then voluntarily dismissed Wexford and appealed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the department.

Five-factor test. In reaching a determination as to whether a defendant employed a plaintiff for Title VII purposes, the Seventh Circuit utilizes a five-factor test, which consists of: (1) the extent of the purported employer’s control and supervision over the employee, including directions on scheduling and performance of work; (2) the kind of occupation and nature of skill required, including whether skills are obtained in the workplace; (3) the responsibility for the costs of operation, such as equipment, supplies, fees, licenses, workplace, and maintenance of operations; (4) the method and form of payment and benefits; and (5) the length of job commitment and/or expectations.

Here, the court considered each factor in turn, minus the fifth factor because no party had argued it.

Control. First addressing the issue of control, the court noted that Wexford interviewed and hired the employee, subject to the department’s approval, set her schedule, and told her whom to treat. She reported to a Wexford employee and only Wexford personnel disciplined her. Although the department completely controlled the premises where the employee was assigned, this did not show that it controlled the employee with respect to her duties as a mental-health professional, explained the court.

Even though the department controlled some of Wexford’s actions, such as vetoing a proposed hire, the court found that this pointed to control over the conduct of another contracting party, not that it controlled the employee herself.

Dress policy. As to the employee’s argument that the department exercised control over her through its dress policy, the court noted that the department controls what everyone wears, from employees to contractors to visitors, because dress in a prison is a security matter. Such control, observed the court, “does not tell us much about controlling employees specifically.”

Disciplinary power. According to the employee, the department could discipline and thus control her. However, the court found that the record squarely contradicted this claim. The department’s employees testified that they disciplined department staff, not Wexford’s, and Wexford supervisors testified they disciplined Wexford staff, not the department’s. The employee argued that the department must have been able to discipline her because it had investigated the July incident. While this was true, the report did not impose a punishment, it merely substantiated a claim against her. Indeed, the employee testified that she was not even aware of this report until this litigation and was not punished for its findings. Thus, the court found that this “most important” factor suggested that Wexford, not the department, employed the employee.

Skills. Next, the court considered whether the department provided the employee the skills and training she needed to work as a mental-health professional. The court concluded that it did not.

The employee obtained her primary credentials before applying to Wexford or receiving an assignment to Pontiac. There was no evidence the department gave her additional mental-healthcare training.

Even if the department trained her to work in a prison setting, such training would not show the department was responsible for her training or certification as a mental-health professional. Providing training and credentials, facilitating access to premises, and compliance with protocols is not the same as providing training for one’s substantive work, said the court.

With no evidence the department provided the employee with the skills or training required to work as a mental-health professional, this factor suggested that the department did not jointly employ her.

Supplies. Turning to the question of whether the department bore the responsibility for the costs of operation, such as equipment and supplies, the court found that although this was a closer call, it concluded that this factor too suggested that the department did not employ the employee.

As previously explained, just because the department maintained the premises to which the employee was assigned, maintaining Pontiac is not enough to show the department employed the employee. Further, merely incurring ancillary costs in “hosting” the employee is not on the same footing as incurring the primary costs of employing her, said the court.

Given the department merely provided the employee with supplies one would expect for an independent contractor, this factor suggested that the department did not employ her.

Pay. Finally, the court considered who paid the employee. “That was Wexford,” said the court, which also suggested the department did not employ her. Thus, the four Knight factors at issue in this case pointed to one conclusion: the department did not jointly employ the employee and was not liable to her under Title VII. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed.

The case is No. 25-1116.

Judge: Kolar, J.

Attorneys: Deadra Woods Stokes (C-K Law Group) for Jimia Stokes. Samantha Cutler, Office of the Attorney General, for Illinois Department of Corrections. Lisa H. Ackerman (Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker) for Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

Companies: Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

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