IP Law Daily, COPYRIGHT—S.D. N.Y.: Photographer proved infringement of New York City skyline photo, (Jan 6, 2026)

By Carolin Dennis, B.Sc., LL.B., LL.M.

A photographer’s copyright infringement claim based on the use of his aerial photograph of the Manhattan skyline on a retailer’s website to market its products was granted.

A federal district court in New York granted the photographer’s motion for summary judgment on his copyright infringement claim as he demonstrated the elements of copyright infringement and removal of copyright management information (CMI). The district court also noted that typically, statutory copyright damages are a question for the jury under the Seventh Amendment and denied his motion for summary judgment on damages (Davidson v. Blankenship Dry Goods LLC, No. 1:24-cv-07544-AS (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2026)).

Background. Bruce Cameron Davidson (Davidson) is a photographer who shoots landscapes and aerial photographs. In 2014, he shot an aerial photograph of the Manhattan skyline, and the photograph was registered with the Register of Copyrights at the Library of Congress on December 1, 2015. Blankenship Dry Goods LLC (Blankenship), is a clothing retailer which owns and operates the website blakenshipdrygoods.com. Blankenship displayed Davidson’s photograph on its website without a license or other permission to display it. Blankenship acknowledged that the photo was displayed as of August 8, 2020. Davidson sued Blankenship on October 4, 2024, alleging copyright infringement and the unlawful removal of CMI. Blankenship moved to dismiss the complaint, citing fair use. The district court denied the motion. Blankenship then filed an interlocutory appeal of the denial, which was dismissed. Following discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment.

Copyright infringement claim. Davidson raised two claims in his complaint: copyright infringement, in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 501, and removal of CMI, in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b). The district court noted that Davidson received a certificate of registration for the work in question. As Blankenship did not provide any evidence that would contradict that prima facie evidence, the district court concluded that he owned the copyright as a matter of law. Further, the district court noted that Blankenship’s owner, Tony Lenzo, admitted in a deposition that Blankenship maintained the website, that the image appeared on the website, and that Blankenship never received confirmation it had received a license. That was sufficient to show the elements of infringement as a matter of law.

For a removal-of-CMI claim under § 1202(b), a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of CMI in connection with a copyrighted work; and (2) that a defendant distributed works or copies of works; (3) while knowing that CMI has been removed or altered without authority of the copyright owner or the law; and (4) while knowing, or having reasonable grounds to know that such distribution will induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal an infringement.

The district court determined that Davidson’s original photo clearly displays the CMI, and that Blankenship did not dispute distributing the work. The district court also noted that Lenzo in his deposition acknowledged that he understood what the CMI watermark represented and that the photo was copied without the CMI that was in the original photo, which was sufficient to suggest the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the third element. As for the fourth element, while Blankenship did not admit knowing that posting the photo “will induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal an infringement,” Davidson suggested that any reasonable juror would find that Blankenship had reasonable grounds to know that posting the photo stripped of its CMI would conceal the infringement. After Davidson met his initial burden to suggest the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the burden shifted to Blankenship to rebut the suggestion. But Blankenship did not point to anything in response, and did not even address the argument. As a result, the district court held that Davidson demonstrated the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact on all elements of the removal-of-CMI claim.

Accordingly, the district court concluded Davidson has demonstrated the elements of both the claims in his complaint as a matter of law.

Statute-of-limitations defense. The district court noted that civil copyright claims must be filed “within three years after the claim accrued.” However, the Second Circuit has held that the claim accrues based on the “discovery rule,” i.e., “the claim accrues when a diligent plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury (e.g., an infringement).” Here, Davidson’s complaint was filed slightly more than four years after the acknowledged infringement. Blankenship argued that Davidson “should have discovered it” before October 4, 2021. Blakenship’s argument rested on the theory that Davidson discovered many other possible infringers during the same period and worked with a vendor to uncover infringement. It also argued that Davidson is a “serial litigator” who would have been expected to uncover the infringment more than three years before he filed the complaint.

The district court found that the problem with Blankenship’s argument was that the Second Circuit explicitly directed district courts to apply an objective analysis to whether the infringement should have been discovered. Davidson alleged that he discovered the infringement on May 14, 2024, only a few months before the complaint was filed. Blankenship points to no evidence at all that a reasonable copyright holder should have discovered the infringement earlier; instead, its entire argument rests upon a theory that runs counter to binding precedent. As that was Blankenship’s sole argument against liability, the district court granted Davidson’s motion for summary judgment as to liability, and denied Blankenship’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety.

Summary judgment on damages. Davidson sought to have the district court decide the amount of damages on summary judgment. However, Blankenship did not discuss statutory damages at all in its opposition. Further, as Blankenship demanded a jury trial in its answer, the district court concluded that determining the amount of statutory damages was inappropriate on summary judgment unless the parties agree to waive their rights to a jury trial. Thus, the district court denied the motion for summary judgment on damages.

Accordingly, the district court granted in part and denied in part Davidson’s motion for summary judgment.

The Case is No. 1:24-cv-07544-AS.

Judge: Subramanian, A.

Attorneys: Joseph Anthony Dunne (Sriplaw, P.A.) for Bruce Cameron Davidson. Galen Joseph Criscione (Criscione Ravala, LLP) for Blankenship Dry Goods LLC.

Companies: Blankenship Dry Goods LLC

Cases: Copyright NewYorkNews