IP Law Daily, COPYRIGHT—N.D. Ga.: Artist’s copyright lawsuit over SweetWater’s iconic fish logo largely survives dismissal challenge, (Mar 23, 2026)

By Saurabh Kashyap, B.A., M.A., LL.B., LL.M.

Conflicting testimony on oral license terms and copyright ownership precluded summary judgment on infringement and contract claims.

A federal district court in Georgia largely denied summary judgment to SweetWater Brewing Company and its founder, in a long-running dispute with an artist who created the brewery’s iconic fish logo, finding that pervasive factual disputes over the scope and conditions of an alleged oral license to use the logo artwork precluded resolution as a matter of law. The court held that questions surrounding whether the license was conditional, whether it was breached or terminated, and whether the companies exceeded its scope must be resolved at trial. It granted summary judgment only on the artist’s breach of fiduciary duty claim, concluding that no fiduciary relationship existed. The court also rejected the companies’ attempt to limit damages at the summary judgment stage, noting that competing expert testimony created triable issues (Fuss v. Bensch, No. 1:22-cv-00064-AT (N.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2026)).

Background. The plaintiff, Ray Scott Fuss, is an artist and designer who operated a graphic design studio and created branding artwork. Defendant Frederick Bensch is a co-founder of Sweetwater Brewing Company, a craft brewery that grew into a major commercial enterprise.

The dispute centered on two works of visual art created by Fuss: the “Fishing Scene” and the “Trout Banner,” both depicting a rainbow trout motif that became synonymous with the brewery’s branding. Fuss obtained federal copyright registrations for these works—Registration No. VA0002084616 (effective September 26, 2017) for the Fishing Scene, and Registration No. VAu001326605 (effective March 7, 2018) for the Trout Banner. The accused uses included Sweetwater’s continued reproduction and display of the artwork on beer cans, marketing materials, and merchandise, as well as a later “rebranded” logo that allegedly constituted an unauthorized derivative work. Fuss also challenged Sweetwater’s own 2020 copyright registration for the Trout Banner, which the company filed shortly before closing a major acquisition.

The dispute arose from a 1996 handshake agreement under which Fuss created the brewery’s logo for $500, and in exchange for informal consideration, with no written contract governing ownership or licensing. Decades later, Sweetwater was acquired for $366 million, with substantial value attributed to its intellectual property. Following the acquisition announcement, Fuss asserted ownership of the artwork and sought compensation, while Sweetwater asserted that it owned the works or had an unrestricted license to use them. Fuss filed suit alleging copyright infringement, breach of contract, fraud, and related claims. Defendants moved for summary judgment on multiple claims, including copyright infringement, breach of contract, fraud, and damages. The court addressed three motions: (1) a motion by core defendants for partial summary judgment, (2) a motion by trustee defendants on contributory infringement, and (3) a motion addressing damages methodology.

License formation and nature. The court first examined whether a copyright license existed and how it arose. It noted that both parties agreed that some form of license existed but sharply disagreed on its nature. Defendants argued that an implied, unconditional, and irrevocable license arose when Fuss delivered the artwork and accepted payment. Fuss, by contrast, contended that the parties formed an express oral license subject to conditions—namely, that Sweetwater could use the artwork only while Bensch remained an owner and only if Fuss was recognized as the copyright owner.

Applying contract principles, the court held that copyright licenses are governed by state contract law, citing McCoy v. Mitsubishi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917 (Fed. Cir. 1995). It further observed that nonexclusive licenses may be oral or implied, citing Jacob Maxwell, Inc. v. Veeck, 110 F.3d 749 (11th Cir. 1997). Because the parties’ testimony conflicted on whether any conditions were agreed upon, the court found a genuine dispute of material fact. Relying on Rome v. Polyidus Partners LP, 322 Ga. App. 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013), it emphasized that a factfinder must resolve disputes over oral contract terms.

Scope of the license. The court next addressed the scope of the license, which it identified as central to the infringement claims. Fuss asserted that the license included conditions tied to Bensch’s ownership and acknowledgment of Fuss’s copyright. Defendants denied any such limitations. The court concluded that determining the scope of the license required credibility assessments inappropriate at summary judgment. The court also noted that exceeding the scope of a license can constitute copyright infringement, making the unresolved scope issue dispositive of multiple claims.

Further, the court cited documentary evidence indicating that the defendants had historically acknowledged Fuss’s copyright ownership, including a 2002 agreement that referred to the artwork as Fuss’s property. This evidence, while not conclusive, reinforced the existence of factual disputes regarding the parties’ understanding.

Ambiguity and enforceability of conditions. Defendants argued that the alleged license conditions were too vague to be enforceable. The court declined to resolve this issue, holding that it could not assess enforceability without first determining what terms actually existed. It cited Georgia contract law principles, including O.C.G.A. § 13-2-4, and noted that ambiguity and intent often require factual determination. The court emphasized that it could not assess contractual clarity while fundamental disputes persisted over the agreement’s existence and content.

Termination and revocability of license. The court then considered whether the license was revocable. Defendants argued that the license was irrevocable because it was supported by consideration. The court acknowledged authority supporting that principle but clarified that a material breach could render a license voidable. Citing Jacob Maxwell, Inc., it explained that a breach does not automatically terminate a license but may permit rescission. Further, the court explained that whether the defendants breached the license and whether that breach terminated it depended on unresolved factual issues regarding the license’s conditions. It therefore denied summary judgment on termination and infringement claims.

Derivative work. The court also identified an independent basis for denying summary judgment: the unresolved question of whether Sweetwater’s rebranded logo constituted an unauthorized derivative work. Under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), copyright owners hold exclusive rights to prepare derivative works. The court noted that neither party had adequately addressed this issue, making it impossible to resolve infringement claims fully at summary judgment.

Trustee defendants. In addition to the brewery entities, the suit also named certain trust entities and their trustees—specifically, the No Quarter Trust and the Tortoise Trust—which held significant ownership interests in SweetWater Brewing Company at the time of its acquisition. The trustee defendants sought summary judgment on the contributory infringement claim. The court denied their motion, finding factual disputes regarding knowledge and participation. It applied the Eleventh Circuit standard from Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990), which requires knowledge and a material contribution. Although the trustees lacked direct knowledge, the court held that a jury could find imputed knowledge based on agency relationships, particularly where a corporate entity controlled by Bensch acted as their agent in the acquisition. The scope of that agency relationship presented a factual question.

Copyright vs. contract claims. The court addressed whether the dispute sounded in copyright or contract. It explained that license violations may give rise to copyright infringement if they involve conditions limiting scope, but only contract claims if they involve covenants. Citing Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the court suggested that Fuss’s alleged conditions could qualify as scope-limiting conditions, but declined to decide definitively due to factual disputes.

Breach of fiduciary duty. The court granted summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claim. It held that the parties’ relationship, an artist licensing work to a commercial entity, did not constitute a fiduciary relationship under Georgia law.

Fraud and concealment. The court denied summary judgment on fraud and fraudulent concealment claims. It held that a jury could find “particular circumstances” giving rise to a duty to disclose, even absent a fiduciary relationship. The court found that the defendants’ conduct, particularly the timing of the copyright registration and failure to disclose ownership issues during the acquisition, could support an inference of intentional concealment for benefit.

Damages. Finally, the court denied summary judgment on damages. It held that competing expert analyses created a “battle of the experts” unsuitable for resolution at this stage. Citing Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 1999), the court confirmed that damages may be based on a hypothetical license negotiation. It rejected the defendants’ argument that the plaintiff’s royalty-based model was too speculative, noting that such determinations are for the factfinder.

The Case is No. 1:22-cv-00064-AT.

Judge: Totenberg, A.

Attorneys: Blaine Alexander Norris (Blain A. Norris, PC) for Ray Scott Fuss. John O'Shea Sullivan (Burr & Forman LLP) for Frederick M. Bensch.

Cases: Copyright GeorgiaNews GCNNews