IP Law Daily, COPYRIGHT—D.P.R.: Misdirected streaming royalties? Look to state court for relief, (Oct 3, 2025)

By Matthew Hersh, J.D.

No federal cause of action for claims that streaming royalties were sent to the wrong writer.

A Puerto Rican musician and composer could not proceed with a lawsuit against a music publisher it accused of improperly diverting music streaming remedies because he did not state a claim for copyright infringement and Congress had not created any other federal right of action to pursue such claims, the federal court for Puerto Rico has held. The court, in dismissing the claim, nonetheless made clear that the aggrieved copyright holder could pursue an action in the nature of unjust enrichment in a local court in the island commonwealth (Brown v. Latin American Music Co., Inc. No. 3:24-cv-01523-MAJ (D.P.R. Oct. 2, 2025)).

The lawsuit was brought by Roy Brown, a musician and songwriter who claims ownership of 13 songs adapted to various poems written by renowned Puerto Rican poets. The complaint takes aim at Latin American Music Company, a music publisher that owns the rights to a large catalogue of Latin American musical compositions. According to the allegations of the complaint, the music publisher falsely claimed ownership of these songs by registering a copyright interest with the Mechanical Licensing Collective, or MLC, a non-profit organization designated by the U.S. Copyright Office to administer copyright licenses. In so doing, the complaint details, the publisher infringed on Brown’s copyrights by collecting royalties from digital streaming—royalties that, Brown claims, should have gone to him.

The music publisher moved to dismiss the lawsuit, leading to this opinion.

Cause of action. The court dismissed the lawsuit. The problem for Brown was a straightforward one: He stated no claim for copyright infringement. Under the “compulsory license” provisions of the Copyright Act, as revised by the 2018 Music Modernization Act, a digital music provider such as Spotify or Pandora is entitled to stream any sound recording it wishes as long as it pays royalties to the MLC. Brown argued, in essence, that by registering itself with the MLC as the owner of the songs, the publisher thereby falsely authorized those digital providers to use his music without his permission. But the music publisher could not have wrongfully “authorized” the performance or distribution of the copyrighted materials at issue, the court emphasized, “because no such authorization was ever required.” To the contrary, the court noted, digital streamers were “permitted to stream the songs regardless of any such purported ‘authorization’ by virtue of the blanket compulsory license” provided under the MMA.

Nor did Brown identify any other cause of action entitling him to bring a federal action, the court found. Whatever the merits of the songwriter’s claims against the music publisher, the court noted, “private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.” And there was no evidence, the court noted, that Congress had created a “novel right of action permitting a copyright claimant to sue a third-party who mistakenly receives royalty payments that are owed to the claimant.” To be sure, the court observed, Congress was aware that the compulsory licensing system created by the MMA would inevitably lead to disputes among competing claimants. But for that reason, the court noted, Congress directed the MLC to establish a “dispute resolution committee” in order to resolve those disputes. But “[d]espite their awareness that such disputes were bound to occur,” the court concluded, “Congress never expressly created a right of action against wrongful recipients of copyright royalties.” Thus, Brown had no basis for bringing a claim in federal court.

Moreover, the court observed, Brown had other options available to litigate the question of his entitlement to royalties. While the MMA expressly preempts certain state laws, the court noted, it would not preempt a state law cause of action for unjust enrichment—a remedy available to Brown under Puerto Rican law. But that would be the extent of Brown’s right to court intervention on the matter, the court emphasized. “Where, as here, the statute does not display that Congress intended to create a private remedy,” the court concluded, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”

The Case is No. 3:24-cv-01523-MAJ.

Judge: Jordan, M.

Attorneys: Patricia Rivera-MacMurray (Bufete Hernandez Mayoral CSP) for Roy Brown. Benjamin Halperin (Cowen, Debaets, Abrahams & Sheppard LLP) for Latin American Music Co., Inc.

Companies: Latin American Music Co., Inc.

Cases: Copyright TechnologyInternet PuertoRicoNews