IP Law Daily, COPYRIGHT—C.D. Cal.: Let the distinctions begin—a court looks for cracks in Supreme Court’s Cox contributory infringement ruling, (Apr 8, 2026)

By Matthew Hersh, J.D.

X will continue to face a contributory infringement claim, at least for now, based on a refusal to take down infringing content.

A recent Supreme Court decision that substantially narrowed the contributory infringement doctrine did not shield X because the social media company, unlike the Internet Service Provider (ISP) at issue in the earlier action, was on notice of a specific infringing post and still refused to take it down, the District Court for the Central District of California has held. The court’s decision, which addressed the recent precedent only briefly and in a footnote—and is therefore likely to be the subject of additional scrutiny and analysis by that court and others—also greenlit direct and vicarious infringement claims against the company (Michael Grecco Productions Inc. v. Twitter, Inc., No. 2:24-cv-04878-MEMF-AYP (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2026)).

The lawsuit was brought by Michael Grecco, a professional photographer and frequent copyright litigant. He alleged that X, the social media company formerly known as Twitter, refused to respond to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) takedown requests covering 111 different images. He sued X for direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright infringement.

X moved for judgment on the pleadings, leading to this opinion.

Direct infringement. The court found that the photographer had adequately alleged a claim of direct infringement. In order to properly state a direct infringement claim, the court noted, the photographer had to allege that X engaged in “volitional” conduct—or as precedent has described it in connection with automated postings, conduct with “a nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying that one could conclude that the machine owner himself trespassed on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner.” The photographer met that threshold, the court found, because he alleged that X “failed to reasonably respond” to his takedown requests. As a result, the court reasoned, the complaint “adequately plead[ed] that Twitter committed a volitional act pertaining to the alleged infringing material.”

Contributory infringement. The court also found that the photographer adequately alleged that X committed contributory infringement. Under the law at the time the motion was initially briefed, the court noted, in order to state a claim for contributory infringement, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that a defendant: “(1) has knowledge of another’s infringement and (2) either (a) materially contributes to or (b) induces that infringement.” Here, the court found, the photographer’s DMCA notices put X on notice of the infringement. Moreover, the court found, the photographer alleged that X could have taken “simple measures to prevent further damage” to the photographer’s works. X’s alleged failure to do so, the court reasoned, constituted contributory infringement.

The court also found, though only in a brief footnote, that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, No. 24-171 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2026), did not alter the outcome. In that case, decided just five days earlier, a seven-Justice majority held that in copyright cases, as with patent actions, contributory infringement claims required a showing that a defendant “affirmatively induced” the infringement or “sold a service tailored to infringement.” Neither of those was alleged here, the district court acknowledged. But the case was still distinguishable, the court found, because the photographer “submitted numerous DMCA takedown requests, which included the copyright and infringing material information—placing Twitter on notice of the infringing activity,” and because the photographer alleged that “Twitter’s acts of infringement were willful.”

Vicarious infringement. The court also found that the photographer adequately alleged vicarious copyright infringement. To state a claim for vicarious infringement, the court noted, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant “has (1) the right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct and (2) a direct financial interest in the infringing activity.” The photographer sufficiently pleaded, the court found, that “Twitter had the right and ability to supervise the alleged infringing content through the DMCA takedown requests.” Moreover, the court found, the photographer adequately asserted a direct financial interest by asserting that Twitter had generated revenue through the increased traffic from the infringing content. The photographer “need not explain at this stage how the infringing content operates as a draw to consumers,” the court emphasized, “but merely that this specific infringing content does.” The photographer met this low bar.

Statute of limitations. Although the claim would go forward on all three counts, the court found, it would have to be narrowed on other grounds. Alleged infringement on 38 of the 111 copyright materials at issue, the court found, occurred more than three years before the lawsuit was filed. Moreover, the court noted, the photographer did not assert “the discovery rule or an alternative tolling basis” for these materials. Thus, they could not be included in the lawsuit.

The Case is No. 2:24-cv-04878-MEMF-AYP.

Judge: Mensah Frimpong, M.

Attorneys: Taylor C. Foss (One LLP) for Michael Grecco Productions Inc. Kenneth Michael Trujillo-Jamison (Willenken LLP) for Twitter, Inc.

Companies: Michael Grecco Productions Inc; Twitter, Inc.

Cases: Copyright TechnologyInternet CaliforniaNews GCNNews