IP Law Daily, COPYRIGHT—6th Cir.: Granddaughter of “Que Sera Sera” composer fails in attempt to stop mom’s copyright terminations, (Jul 8, 2025)

By Deirdre Kennedy, J.D.

None of the granddaughter’s theories of why the termination notices were ineffective, defective, or invalid were successful.

The granddaughter of composer Jay Livingston failed in her appeal from a district court’s determination that her complaint alleging improper terminations of copyrights by her mother failed to state a claim (Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc., No. 24-5263 (6th Cir. July 7, 2025)).

Travilyn and Tammy Livingston (mother and daughter) each claim a right to royalties tied to certain songs authored by Jay Livingston (Travilyn’s father and Tammy’s grandfather). Between 1984 and 2000, Jay assigned his copyright interests in several songs to a music publishing company. In recent years, Travilyn invoked her statutory right to “terminat[e]” those copyright grants. To do so, she filed termination notices with the United States Copyright Office, seeking to undo her father’s assignments to the company and recapture his interests in the copyrights for herself. Travilyn’s daughter Tammy, a beneficiary of her grandfather’s assignments, sued her mother, challenging the terminations. The district court dismissed Tammy’s complaint, holding that it failed to state a claim.

Livingston’s rights to the many compositions he produced with his co-writer Ray Evans are governed by a series of transactions involving Livingston, an affiliated company, and his family. And their ownership is at the heart of this litigation.

The July 1984 Agreement. On July 15, 1984, Livingston promised to transfer his copyright interests in several of his songs to a music publishing company, Jay Livingston Music, owned by his daughter, Travilyn. “With respect to each musical composition assigned to Jay Livingston Music by Jay Livingston,” the July 15, 1984, Agreement explained, “the parties shall enter into a separate popular songwriters agreement.” In keeping with this promise, between 1984 and 2000, Jay executed at least 248 “popular songwriters agreements.” As a result, Jay assigned his copyright interests in at least 248 songs to Jay Livingston Music. Each popular songwriters agreement had the same terms. For example, the popular songwriters agreement for the hit song “Que Sera, Sera” stated that Jay Livingston Music would possess Jay’s interest in that song’s copyright for 28 years from the date the copyright’s original term expired.

The popular songwriters agreements had other important terms. Jay, for example, held a reversionary interest in the copyright, meaning that it would “re-vest in Jay” once the company’s interest expired in 2011. For the time Jay Livingston Music owned the copyright, it would keep a portion of its royalties and pay the rest to Jay himself.

The Family Trust. On August 28, 1985, Jay and his wife established a trust called the Family Trust, transferring to it “all right, title and interest” in “their assets, whether real or personal.” Of note, the Family Trust received Jay’s right to receive royalties under each of the popular songwriters agreements. As beneficiaries of the Family Trust, Travilyn, Tammy, and other members of the Livingston family have long received a percentage of these royalties. Further, as Tammy alleges in her complaint, the Family Trust also held Jay’s reversionary interest in each of the copyrights he assigned to Jay Livingston Music. That meant that once the popular songwriters agreements held by Jay Livingston Music expired—2011 for “Que Sera, Sera,” for example—Jay’s interests in the underlying copyrights would revert to the Family Trust.

Jay Livingston Music, Inc. In March 2000, Jay Livingston Music, Inc. was established. Owned by Travilyn and her husband, Jay Livingston Music, Inc. is the legal successor to Jay Livingston Music, meaning that it possesses all the rights and interests held by Jay Livingston Music.

The May 2000 Agreement. On May 18, 2000, Jay agreed with Jay Livingston Music, Inc. to extend the time period that Jay Livingston Music (and thus Jay Livingston Music, Inc.) would possess his copyright interests. Specifically, he amended “each and every” popular songwriters agreement “to replace the fixed term of years as set forth in each... with a term equal to the entire term of [the] copyright, including all renewals and extensions.” In effect, then, under the May 2000 Agreement, Jay Livingston Music, Inc. would own Jay’s copyright interests, not for 28 years from the date of the copyrights’ original expirations, but for the copyrights’ entire terms. (Tammy alleges in her complaint that this latter period amounted to “another 50 years” from the time Jay signed the May 2000 Agreement, suggesting Jay Livingston Music, Inc. would possess Jay’s copyrights until around 2050).

Jay’s death. Jay died on October 17, 2001. His death sparked debate over what copyright interests, if any, the Family Trust continued to hold. A copyright lawyer retained by Jay’s estate “gave the opinion that all of Jay’s copyrights... had been effectively sold [to Jay Livingston Music, Inc.] and that nothing remained [in the Family Trust] other than the songwriter royalties.” In other words, the May 2000 Agreement accomplished what it sought to accomplish—Jay Livingston Music, Inc. would own Jay’s interests in the assigned copyrights until their terms expired. But, of course, in keeping with the popular songwriters agreements, Jay Livingston Music, Inc. would continue to pay the Family Trust royalties for each assigned song.

With this opinion in hand, Travilyn proceeded to make a claim against the Family Trust, asserting that “all copyright interests in every song ever owned by Jay” had been “transferred” to “Jay Livingston Music, Inc.” The trustee of the Family Trust, agreed with Travilyn, so he filed a petition in California probate court seeking an order that the Family Trust held “no interest in property claimed by another.” The probate court approved the petition, entering an order stating: “The FAMILY TRUST holds... no copyright interests and all such interests ever owned by JAY... are now owned by Jay Livingston Music, Inc.” Attorneys for both Travilyn and Tammy signed the court’s order, acknowledging that their respective clients “APPROVED” its content.

May 2015 terminations. Federal copyright law allows a songwriter (or his statutory successor) to terminate the songwriter’s “grant” (i.e., assignment) of a copyright to another party. The termination right, allows an author [or his successor] to undo a prior transfer of his copyright and recapture all interests in the copyright for himself. Exercising that right requires the author (or his successor) to send a termination notice to the grantee and file the notice with the U.S. Copyright Office. Upon the effective date of termination all rights under federal copyright law that were covered by the terminated grants revert to the... persons owning termination interests.

Seeking to exercise that power, Travilyn, in May 2015, served a termination notice for the song “Que Sera, Sera” on Jay Livingston Music, Inc., the grantee of the copyright’s assignment. The termination purported to undo the 1984 popular songwriters agreement through which Jay had granted Jay Livingston Music (now, Jay Livingston Music, Inc.) his interests in “Que Sera, Sera.” The notice stated that the grant’s “effective date of termination” was July 15, 2019, with all rights under the “Que Sera, Sera” popular songwriters agreement then immediately reverting to Travilyn. After serving the notice on her company, Travilyn recorded it with the U.S. Copyright Office. She proceeded to serve termination notices for 31 other copyright grants on her company.

Federal court litigation. In July 2022, Tammy sued her mother Travilyn in federal court, seeking a declaration that the termination notices Travilyn filed with the U.S. Copyright Office were ineffective, defective, or invalid. The district court dismissed Tammy’s complaint under Civil Rule 12(b)(6), holding that it failed to state a claim, and Tammy timely appealed.

The appeal. The Court of Appeals addressed whether Tammy’s complaint alleged sufficient facts to support a plausible theory of relief, finding that of all the reasons Tammy gave for why Travilyn’s termination notices were ineffective, defective, or invalid, not one did the job.

Tammy first argues that Travilyn’s 2015 termination notices were ineffective because, at the time they were issued, no active copyright assignments existed for Travilyn to terminate. According to Tammy, Travilyn’s termination notices covered popular songwriters agreements (i.e., copyright grants) that had already expired. To support this argument, Tammy claims that the agreement failed to extend the popular songwriters agreements beyond their 28-year terms because Jay signed the agreement as an “individual.” Only Jay as a “trustee,” Tammy asserts, could have extended the popular songwriters agreements beyond their original terms, given that the Family Trust held Jay’s reversionary interest in the copyrights at that time. Therefore, Travilyn no longer had any copyright grants to terminate.

The court noted the 2003 California probate court order, which held that the Family Trust owned no interests in Jay’s copyrights and found that this order had preclusive effect. Therefore, Tammy’s claim should have been raised in this earlier probate case.

Tammy also claimed that Travilyn filed an invalid termination notice for the specific copyright grant covering “Que Sera, Sera” because Jay never assigned his interests in that copyright to a third party. Tammy claims that Livingston assigned the specific copyright for “Que Sera, Sera” to himself as sole proprietor of Jay Livingston Music on July 15, 1984. The court noted, however, that by that time, Travilyn owned Jay Livingston Music.

Tammy further contended that the district court committed reversible error when it observed that Travilyn became the owner of Jay Livingston Music “sometime before July 15, 1984,” when, according to Tammy, the record supports only that Travilyn became the company’s owner on (not before) July 15, 1984. Even if accurate, the court noted, this does not warrant a reversal because the district court never relied on its assertion that Travilyn owned Jay Livingston Music before July 15, 1984 in issuing its judgment.

In a final effort to convince the district court that Travilyn’s termination notices were ineffective, Tammy argued that the notices violated copyright law. The notices, she claimed, did not reasonably identify the grants to which they applied, did not correctly identify the dates of publication, and did not contain a complete statement of the facts. The district court rejected these arguments as applied to the termination notice for “Que Sera, Sera”—a conclusion Tammy does not challenge here. Tammy instead argues that the district court committed reversible error when it held that she failed to plead specific factual allegations for the other 31 termination notices, especially the one for “Give It All You Got.” The court found that the district court did not err – Tammy had focused exclusively on why the termination notice for “Que Sera, Sera” failed to comply with federal law; she made no specific factual allegations regarding the substance or content of any other termination notice.

In sum, Tammy has not plausibly alleged that Travilyn’s termination notices were ineffective, defective, or invalid. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed her first declaratory judgment request.

Concurring opinion. In his concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Chad Readler struggled to identify an underlying cause of action. He noted that the Declaratory Judgment Act did not entitle Tammy to declare Travilyn’s termination notices invalid because it does not create an independent cause of action – it merely creates a new remedy for a preexisting right enforceable in federal court.

Nor does the Copyright Act fit the bill. The Ninth Circuit has observed that “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly provide for a private right of action under § 203;” nor does it create an implied right of action. Readler noted that implied causes of action these days are, to put it mildly, the exception, not the rule. Further, nothing in § 203 itself suggests that Congress intended private litigants to enforce the termination provisions in standalone declaratory judgment actions.

The Case is No. 24-5263.

Judge: Readler, C.

Attorneys: Jonathan Martin Wolf (Jonathan M. Wolf, PLLC) for Tammy Livingston. Timothy L. Warnock (Loeb & Loeb LLP) for Jay Livingston Music, Inc.

Companies: Jay Livingston Music, Inc.

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