IP Law Daily, COPYRIGHT—2d Cir.: Second Circuit affirms rights of ‘Mockingbird’ Broadway producer in copyright dispute over amateur stage performances, (Jul 31, 2025)

By George Basharis, J.D.

Court rejects Dramatic Publishing’s claim to exclusive rights after Harper Lee’s termination of 1969 license.

A long-running copyright dispute over theatrical rights to To Kill a Mockingbird moved decisively in favor of the producers of Aaron Sorkin’s adaptation, with the Second Circuit holding that a prior licensee could not enforce exclusive rights following Harper Lee’s statutory termination of an earlier grant. The decision clarifies the scope of the derivative works exception under Section 304(c) of the Copyright Act and addresses preclusion and timeliness defenses raised by the former licensee, The Dramatic Publishing Company (Atticus Limited Liability Co. v. The Dramatic Publishing Co. , No. 23-1226 (2d Cir. July 29, 2025)).

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s declaratory judgment in favor of Atticus LLC, the entity holding live-stage rights to Sorkin’s Mockingbird play, concluding that Dramatic Publishing’s post-termination assertion of exclusive amateur production rights was contrary to the Copyright Act. The panel vacated an order awarding attorney fees and remanded for reconsideration but otherwise rejected Dramatic’s arguments on the merits.

Rights terminated under Section 304(c). The dispute traces back to a 1969 agreement between Harper Lee and Dramatic Publishing, which granted the company worldwide rights to adapt To Kill a Mockingbird for amateur theater, expressly limiting Lee’s ability to approve competing amateur adaptations. Dramatic used the license to develop the “Sergel Play,” which it licensed widely for community and educational performances.

Lee terminated that grant in 2011 pursuant to Section 304(c) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 304(c), which allows authors or their heirs to reclaim rights in pre-1978 copyright grants during a defined window. The termination became effective in 2016.

In 2015, Lee entered a new agreement with Rudinplay, Inc., designating the company as her exclusive agent for a new stage adaptation, later authored by Aaron Sorkin. That production premiered on Broadway in 2018. Atticus LLC, Rudinplay’s successor in interest, now controls performance rights to the Sorkin adaptation.

After the Broadway debut, Dramatic initiated arbitration against Lee’s estate, asserting its rights to continue licensing the Sergel Play on an exclusive basis. An arbitrator ruled in Dramatic’s favor, interpreting the derivative works exception in Section 304(c)(6)(A) to permit Dramatic to retain exclusive amateur rights notwithstanding the termination.

Atticus then filed suit in the Southern District of New York, seeking declaratory relief to confirm that its performances of the Sorkin Play did not infringe Dramatic’s rights. The district court agreed, holding that Dramatic’s exclusive rights did not survive termination. Dramatic appealed.

Second Circuit rejects post-termination exclusivity. The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s interpretation of the derivative works exception, concluding that Section 304(c)(6)(A) permits continued exploitation of a previously authorized derivative work, but does not preserve exclusive rights in the underlying copyrighted material.

The panel explained that while Dramatic retains the ability to perform and license the Sergel Play, it cannot prevent the creation or performance of other adaptations after Lee’s termination of the 1969 grant. The exclusive license Dramatic once held was effectively terminated, and the derivative works exception does not revive it.

The court emphasized that the Copyright Act’s termination provisions are designed to allow authors to reclaim previously granted rights, even over the objection of licensees. To accept Dramatic’s reading of Section 304(c) would, the court observed, nullify the statute’s remedial purpose by allowing exclusive control to continue indefinitely under the guise of derivative use.

The panel noted that this interpretation is consistent with longstanding precedent recognizing that derivative works may continue to be exploited post-termination, but only to the extent authorized under the original grant. Any attempt to extend those rights beyond the scope of the terminated license would undermine the balance Congress struck between the interests of authors and licensees, according to the court.

Re-grant timing dispute deemed irrelevant. Dramatic had also argued that Lee’s 2015 agreement with Rudinplay was invalid under Section 304(c)(6)(D), which restricts re-granting of terminated rights before the effective termination date, allowing such grants only to the original grantee. Because Lee’s 2015 contract preceded the April 2016 effective termination date and did not involve Dramatic, the company asserted that Atticus’s rights were void.

The Second Circuit declined to address the validity of the 2015 re-grant, finding it unnecessary to the resolution of Atticus’s declaratory claim. The key question, the court held, was whether Dramatic retained the ability to prevent others from exploiting amateur stage rights after termination. Because it did not, the validity of the subsequent grant was immaterial to the relief Atticus sought.

Preclusion and timeliness defenses rejected. Dramatic also contended that Atticus’s lawsuit was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, pointing to the earlier arbitration between Dramatic and Lee’s estate. The Second Circuit upheld the district court’s conclusion that Atticus was not bound by the arbitration award. Atticus was not a party to the arbitration, did not control or direct the estate’s participation, and lacked the kind of preexisting legal relationship that would justify applying preclusion.

Further, the panel rejected Dramatic’s statute of limitations defense, which was raised only after the district court ruled in Atticus’s favor. Dramatic argued that Atticus’s claim accrued as early as 2019 when Dramatic asserted its rights in the arbitration proceeding. The court disagreed, finding that Atticus’s declaratory action was timely filed and concerned a different legal interest, specifically the non-infringement of the Sorkin Play under copyright law.

Partial fee award vacated and remanded. While affirming Atticus’s entitlement to declaratory relief, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s $200,000 fee award. Although the court agreed that fee-shifting is available under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505, it held that the lower court had not fully accounted for the objective reasonableness of Dramatic’s positions.

The court acknowledged that Dramatic relied on a favorable arbitration award and presented non-frivolous legal arguments, even if ultimately unpersuasive. On remand, the district court must reassess whether fees are appropriate considering the totality of circumstances, including the policy objectives of the Copyright Act.

Ongoing litigation in the Seventh Circuit. The Second Circuit noted that a parallel appeal remains pending before the Seventh Circuit in a case brought by Dramatic to confirm the arbitration award against Lee’s estate. In that proceeding, the United States filed an amicus brief siding with the estate, arguing that the derivative works exception does not extend exclusive rights beyond termination.

The panel expressly declined to address whether its holding would bind the outcome of that appeal but emphasized that its interpretation of Section 304(c) reflects longstanding statutory intent to permit authors to reclaim control over their creative works.

The Case is Nos. 23-1226, 23-7751, and 23-7850.

Judge: Wesley, R.

Attorneys: Wook Hwang (Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP) and Keane Barger (Loeb & Loeb LLP) for Atticus Ltd. Liability Co. William M. Jay (Goodwin Procter LLP) for The Dramatic Publishing Co.

Companies: Atticus Ltd. Liability Co.; The Dramatic Publishing Co.

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