Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—W.D.N.C.: NASCAR’s admissions seal loss in dispute with race team, (Nov 6, 2025)

By Martin A. Steinberg, J.D.

NASCAR allegedly suppressed market compensation and restricted competitive alternatives through its exclusive control of the Cup Series.

In this antitrust action brought by 2311 Racing LLC and Front Row Motorsports, the federal district court in Charlotte, North Carolina denied National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing, LLC’s (NASCAR) motion for summary judgment and granted partial summary judgment on two core Sherman Act elements: the definition of the relevant market and NASCAR’s possession of monopsony power. The court held that the relevant market is the input market for premier stock car racing team services in the U.S., and found that NASCAR exercises 100% buyer power in that market with high barriers to entry, rejecting NASCAR’s attempt to redefine the market after having previously admitted the same market in its own counterclaim. The court further declined to dispose of the claims based on statute of limitations, standing, or damages challenges, concluding that factual disputes remain for trial regarding whether NASCAR used its monopsony power to suppress compensation and impose exclusionary contractual terms. Therefore, the case will proceed to trial (2311 Racing LLC v. National Association For Stock Car Auto Racing, LLC, No. 3:24-CV-00886-KDB-SCR (W.D.N.C. Nov. 4, 2025)).

Background. NASCAR, which sanctions and operates the nationally prominent NASCAR Cup Series (NCS), implemented a charter system in 2016 that fundamentally altered the structure and economics of premier stock car racing. Under that system, only teams holding a charter agreement are guaranteed starting positions in NCS events. Although the system provided some competitive stability, it also imposed substantial ongoing costs on teams, including vehicle construction, maintenance, and operational expenditures that typically exceed $3 million per car per season. NCS prize purses do not fully offset these expenditures, leaving teams highly dependent on outside sponsorships to remain competitive and financially viable.

In 2018, NASCAR introduced the Next Gen program, which standardized key components of NCS vehicles and required teams to purchase those components from NASCAR-designated, single-source vendors. The program also provided that NASCAR retained ownership of the standardized parts and that any vehicle containing such parts could not be entered in non–NCS competition. This further entrenched teams’ dependence on NASCAR’s regulatory and commercial structure, limiting both cost-control discretion and alternative competitive outlets.

In September 2024, NASCAR presented teams with proposed 2025 charter terms that, among other revisions, would reduce the share of revenues distributed to teams and expand restrictions on participation in competing or alternative racing events. All chartered teams ultimately signed these agreements except two: 23XI Racing (formerly 2311 Racing) and Front Row Motorsports (FRM) (collectively, “the Teams”). Both parties objected to what they characterized as overly restrictive non-compete provisions and a diminished revenue allocation, and they declined to accept the revised charter terms.

The Teams sought judicial relief, obtaining a limited preliminary injunction that temporarily permitted them to enter NCS events without the contested provision while the case proceeded. However, on appeal, the injunction was vacated, with the appellate court concluding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits to justify the issuance of injunctive relief. The Teams later renewed their request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Still, the district court denied that request in September 2025, relying on NASCAR’s representations that the plaintiffs would be permitted to continue competing in NCS events while litigation proceeded and that monetary remedies could adequately address any harm.

During the course of these proceedings, NASCAR filed a Sherman Act § 1 counterclaim, alleging that 23XI, FRM, and 23XI’s co-owner Polk had engaged in a collective conspiracy to obtain more favorable charter terms. NASCAR asserted that these parties attempted to coordinate a boycott of qualifying events and interfere with negotiations over NASCAR’s media-rights agreements as leverage. The Counterclaim Defendants moved for summary judgment on that claim.

The district court granted summary judgment to the Counterclaim Defendants. On the restraint-of-trade element, the court concluded that the alleged conduct—attempting to negotiate charter terms separately—did not constitute an unreasonable restraint on trade. NASCAR had asserted that separate bargaining by 23XI and FRM undermined the collective negotiation process. Yet the court noted that NASCAR itself both could and did negotiate individually with other teams that ultimately accepted the 2025 charters. The record, therefore, established that individualized negotiation was a realistic and available option. With no genuine dispute of material fact on that point, summary judgment was warranted.

On the antitrust injury element, the court held that NASCAR failed to demonstrate harm to competition, as opposed to harm to itself. NASCAR’s theory was that the alleged conspiracy could force NASCAR to pay higher compensation to the plaintiffs. But antitrust injury requires harm to the competitive process, not merely increased costs to a single market participant. Because NASCAR failed to establish any market-wide competitive injury, summary judgment was also granted on that independent ground.

After resolving the counterclaim, the court then addressed the cross-motions for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ affirmative antitrust claims. NASCAR argued that the claims were time-barred, that the plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing, and that their damages theories were legally insufficient. The Teams moved for partial summary judgment on two foundational Sherman Act elements: (1) definition of the relevant market, and (2) NASCAR’s possession of monopsony power within that market.

Summary judgment. The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion on both issues. First, it held that the relevant market is the input market for premier stock car racing team services in the U.S. NASCAR argued for a broader market, including other motorsports such as IndyCar or Formula 1. Still, the court rejected that position, emphasizing that NASCAR had already judicially admitted the same market definition in its own Sherman Act counterclaim. Having asserted that the Cup Series market is distinct when pursuing its own antitrust theory, NASCAR could not now recharacterize the market to avoid liability. The court found the admission “deliberate, clear, and unambiguous,” and therefore binding.

Second, the court held that NASCAR possesses monopsony power in that market. NASCAR is the sole purchaser of premier stock car racing team services, has maintained a 100% market share for decades, and the market is protected by high barriers to entry, including the need for elite racing infrastructure, technical expertise, substantial capital investment, and the historical difficulty of launching competing premier stock car circuits.

NASCAR argued that its payments to the plaintiffs had increased over time, thereby demonstrating a lack of monopsony power. The court rejected this argument, emphasizing that the relevant inquiry is whether NASCAR has the power to suppress compensation below competitive levels, not whether payments have risen nominally. Evidence of higher payments is meaningless without showing that those payments reflect competitive market rates, and NASCAR’s own experts conceded that they had not evaluated what a competitive market would yield. Accordingly, there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to monopsony power.

The court denied NASCAR’s motion in full. Regarding the statute of limitations, the court held that the plaintiffs identified overt anticompetitive acts within the limitations period and that NASCAR’s conduct must be evaluated as a continuing exclusionary scheme, rather than as isolated incidents. NASCAR’s damages challenge did not warrant summary judgment because disputes over methodology pertain to weight and trial presentation, rather than legal sufficiency. NASCAR’s standing argument failed because the plaintiffs plausibly alleged suppressed compensation, which constitutes cognizable antitrust injury under a monopsony theory. Finally, because the court had already determined that NASCAR possesses market and monopsony power, and because the plaintiffs presented evidence of exclusionary restraints with potential anticompetitive effects, the Section 1 claim was properly reserved for trial.

The Case is No. 3:24-CV-00886-KDB-SCR.

Judge: Bell, K.

Attorneys: Benjamin S. Gordon (Winston & Strawn LLP) for 2311 Racing LLC. Ashley M. Bauer (Latham & Watkins LLP) for National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing, LLC.

Companies: 2311 Racing LLC; National Association Stock Car Auto Racing, LLC

Cases: Antitrust NorthCarolinaNews GCNNews