Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—S.D.N.Y.: Implausible market definitions doomed eyewear antitrust suits, (Sep 29, 2025)

By Martin A. Steinberg, J.D.

EssilorLuxottica and its affiliates allegedly engaged in a scheme to monopolize the “premium eyewear” and custom lens markets through acquisitions, exclusive licenses, retail consolidation, price-fixing agreements, and steering practices that artificially inflated prices and suppressed competition.

The federal district court in New York City granted EssilorLuxottica’s motion to dismiss two overlapping class actions alleging monopolization of “premium eyewear” and custom lens markets. Both sets of plaintiffs lumped all of the defendants together under the name “EssilorLuxottica.” The court found the plaintiffs’ pleadings, filed separately despite an order requiring a single consolidated complaint, to be procedurally improper and substantively deficient. Both direct and indirect purchaser groups advanced conflicting and implausible market definitions, grouping non-interchangeable products such as spectacle frames, sunglasses, and lenses into a single market, while excluding comparably priced rivals like Warby Parker without economic justification. The court held that such market definitions contravened Second Circuit precedent and failed the consumer-interchangeability test. It also ruled that the Direct Purchasers’ separate “Custom Lens Market” theory was inadequately supported, noting that a 52% market share alone could not establish monopoly power. Additional deficiencies included impermissible group pleading, reliance on stale acquisitions that fell beyond the statute of limitations, and allegations of foreign conduct outside the U.S. jurisdiction. The court dismissed all claims without prejudice, granting plaintiffs one final opportunity to replead in a single, coherent complaint (In Re Eyewear Antitrust Litigation, No. 1:24-cv-04826-MKV (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2025)).

Background. There were two distinct sets of plaintiffs, Direct Purchasers and Indirect Purchasers, each representing overlapping nationwide classes but advancing separate pleadings with differing defendants and market theories. The Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs, comprising eleven individuals from six states (Minnesota, New York, Illinois, California, Arizona, and Pennsylvania), alleged that they purchased eyewear directly from retail outlets owned or operated by EssilorLuxottica. They name ten defendants, including EssilorLuxottica S.A. (the French parent), Luxottica Group S.p.A., Luxottica of America Inc. (which operates LensCrafters, Pearle Vision, Target Optical, Sunglass Hut, Oakley, and Ray-Ban stores), Essilor International SAS, Essilor of America Inc., Essilor Laboratories of America, EyeMed Vision Care, Vision Source, GrandVision B.V., and For Eyes Optical Company. They allege these entities act as a “single unit” under centralized control by EssilorLuxottica S.A.

The Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs, Pamela Ringgold of New York, Anthony Persuitti of Minnesota, and Antoine Acosta of Delaware, claimed they purchased premium frames, lenses, or sunglasses from unaffiliated third parties. Their complaint named a different mix of ten entities, overlapping with but distinct from the list of Direct Purchasers. In addition to EssilorLuxottica S.A., Luxottica Group S.p.A., Luxottica of America, Essilor International SAS, Essilor of America, and Essilor Laboratories of America, the list included EssilorLuxottica America SAS, EssilorLuxottica USA Inc., EOA Holding Co., and Essilor Doctor Alliances Corporation. However, it excluded GrandVision and For Eyes. Both groups alleged these entities are controlled by and serve as alter egos of the French parent company.

Alleged markets. The two plaintiff groups advanced competing and conflicting market definitions. The Direct Purchasers allege that EssilorLuxottica monopolized two distinct “Relevant Markets”: (1) a Premium Eyewear Market, subdivided into premium spectacle frames and premium sunglasses, including both prescription and non-prescription models, and (2) a separate Custom Lens Market covering the retail sale of vision-correcting optical lenses that can be fitted into any frame. They claimed the Premium Eyewear Market encompasses multiple brand tiers: “lifestyle” (Ray-Ban), “sport/performance” (Oakley, Costa, Native), “high-end” (Persol, Alain Mikli), “streetstyle” (Arnette), and “luxury/fashion-house” lines, while expressly excluding only EssilorLuxottica’s value label, Foster Grant. Yet, they also exclude other “well-known” competitors such as Warby Parker, despite acknowledging that its products retail at similar price points, reasoning that EssilorLuxottica and its rivals classify Warby Parker as non-luxury. This selective inclusion, the court later noted, created a self-serving market definition inconsistent with economic interchangeability.

The Indirect Purchasers, by contrast, proposed a single Premium Eyewear Market that combined premium prescription lenses, spectacle frames, and sunglasses into one overarching market. They asserted that premium eyewear is not interchangeable with “value” products and lacks cross-price elasticity with non-premium goods, citing EssilorLuxottica’s higher retail range ($200–$1,000+) versus low-cost chains offering “two pairs for $79.95.” Like the Direct Purchasers, they excluded Warby Parker as “value-priced,” despite overlapping prices, and similarly omitted rival brands owned by Safilo, Marcolin, Kering, or LVMH unless those competitors labeled them “luxury.”

Collectively, both groups alleged that EssilorLuxottica’s dominance stems from its control over roughly 80 percent of brands or sales revenue in their defined markets. However, their inconsistent and economically incoherent definitions, which mixed non-interchangeable products and arbitrarily excluded comparably priced competitors, undermined the plausibility of any single coherent market.

Alleged anticompetitive conduct. The plaintiffs alleged that EssilorLuxottica engaged in a decades-long scheme to monopolize eyewear and lens markets through vertical integration, acquisitions, and restrictive trade practices. Relying on differing definitions of the “Premium Eyewear Market,” both plaintiff groups allege that EssilorLuxottica wields dominant market power, approximately 80% of U.S. premium eyewear brands or retail revenue, and uses that dominance to impose supracompetitive prices. The Direct Purchasers, citing Statista data, claimed that the company captured 80% of retail premium eyewear sales, while the Indirect Purchasers asserted that it controls 80% of the brands within the market. In addition, the Direct Purchasers alleged that EssilorLuxottica holds roughly 52% of the custom lens market, although the court later found this to be insufficient to infer monopoly power.

Both groups described a common pattern of conduct spanning over four decades:

1. acquisitions of proprietary eyewear brands such as Ray-Ban, Oakley, Alain Mikli, Oliver Peoples, and Vogue, and exclusive licensing of fashion-house brands like Chanel, Prada, Versace, Ralph Lauren, Coach, and Michael Kors;

2. retail consolidation, including purchases of LensCrafters, Pearle Vision, Target Optical, Sunglass Hut, and online sellers like Glasses.com;

3. exclusive distribution and pricing agreements with competitors (e.g., Kering, Marcolin, LVMH, Safilo) allowing EssilorLuxottica to set retail price floors across outlets;

4. acquisitions of vision-benefits and optical-network firms, notably EyeMed Vision Care and Vision Source, allegedly used to “steer” patients toward EssilorLuxottica-owned brands, labs, or affiliated optometrists;

5. minimum Advertised Price (MAP) policies, characterized by plaintiffs as de facto price-fixing arrangements enforced through retailer authorization withdrawal; and

6. loyalty and stocking requirements for independent providers and network members, further entrenching its market position.

Plaintiffs contended that these combined strategies created the illusion of consumer choice, while centralizing control over design, manufacturing, retail, insurance, and pricing. However, their pleadings differed in scope and structure, with Direct Purchasers focusing on vertical control and Indirect Purchasers emphasizing cross-brand dominance and resale restraints.

Procedural history. The court recounted the convoluted procedural path that led to dismissal. The litigation began as multiple separate actions filed in different jurisdictions, which the plaintiffs later coordinated to avoid multidistrict transfer proceedings before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. After the defendants successfully sought transfer from the District of Minnesota to the Southern District of New York, the Minnesota court remarked that the plaintiffs’ forum maneuvering came “just shy of outright forum shopping.” Once transferred, Judge Vyskocil directed all plaintiffs to file a single, consolidated amended complaint; however, they filed two separate amended pleadings—one by the Direct Purchasers and one by the Indirect Purchasers—each naming different defendants, asserting inconsistent market definitions, and alleging conflicting factual theories.

The Direct Purchasers advanced nine federal claims, including monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, as well as claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act (restraint of trade) and Section 3 of the Clayton Act (related to exclusive dealing and minimum resale price maintenance). They also asserted monopolization of a distinct Custom Lens Market. The Indirect Purchasers, by contrast, sought injunctive relief under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, invoking Section 16 of the Clayton Act, and added 54 state antitrust and consumer protection claims spanning 33 states and the District of Columbia.

The defendants moved to dismiss both pleadings, arguing procedural noncompliance, group pleading, and implausible market definitions. Plaintiffs filed a joint opposition, and oral argument followed. The court ultimately found that the dual complaints violated its consolidation order, introduced mutually inconsistent allegations, and failed to plead plausible antitrust markets, setting the stage for dismissal with leave to replead in a single, unified complaint.

Separate complaints. The court faulted the plaintiffs for violating a court order requiring a single, consolidated complaint, as they had instead filed two conflicting pleadings with different defendants and inconsistent market allegations. While alternative legal theories are permissible, the court held that contradictory factual claims cannot coexist across separate filings. Citing Rule 8 and Second Circuit precedent, the court refused to accept allegations undermined by competing facts, warning that allowing such dual pleadings would enable plaintiffs to benefit from mutually inconsistent narratives in defiance of judicial instructions.

Group pleading. The court found that both plaintiff groups engaged in impermissible group pleading by lumping ten separate corporate defendants together under the collective label “EssilorLuxottica.” Although each complaint named a different mix of entities, the plaintiffs treated them as a single monolithic actor, asserting on “information and belief” that all are controlled by or alter egos of EssilorLuxottica S.A. The court noted that these allegations were conclusory and insufficient to disregard corporate separateness or establish alter-ego liability. Instead, distinct entities must be individually linked to specific conduct. Because the plaintiffs failed to do so, dismissal under Rule 8 was warranted for failure to provide a clear notice of which defendant did what, thus rendering the pleadings procedurally defective.

Premium eyewear market. The court dismissed the Indirect Purchasers’ complaint in full for failing to allege a plausible market and likewise dismissed all Premium Eyewear Market claims in the Direct Purchasers’ complaint. It also declined jurisdiction over 54 state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), granting the plaintiffs one final chance to replead with a coherent market definition.

The court held that both plaintiff groups failed to define a plausible relevant market, as antitrust law requires products to be “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes.” Their competing definitions were facially implausible, acknowledging that eyeglasses, sunglasses, and lenses serve distinct functions and cannot be considered part of the same market. Even the Direct Purchasers’ attempt to combine prescription and non-prescription sunglasses contradicted their own admissions.

The court rejected the claim that market definition required discovery, citing Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 200 (2d Cir. 2001), to confirm dismissal is proper where definitions are inherently implausible. The plaintiffs’ own pleadings showed that frames, sunglasses, and lenses are non-interchangeable consumer goods. Their fallback theory of “submarkets” also failed. Citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962), the court noted that markets must be narrowly defined to include only substitutable goods; plaintiffs instead aggregated unrelated products merely because EssilorLuxottica sold them.

Finally, the “premium” label was artificial and self-serving, excluding similarly priced competitors like Warby Parker and Under Armour while counting nearly all EssilorLuxottica brands. The Court deemed this circular market construction implausible under Twombly and Iqbal, finding it economically incoherent and legally insufficient. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

Custom lens market. The court dismissed the Direct Purchasers’ Custom Lens Market claims for failing to allege monopoly power in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiffs’ assertion that EssilorLuxottica controls 52% of custom lens sales was deemed insufficient, as PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 109 (2d Cir. 2002), holds that even a 64% share does not establish monopoly power without proof of price control or exclusion. Their allegations of supracompetitive pricing and “markups” above cost are deemed conclusory, with no facts demonstrating that EssilorLuxottica can set prices or exclude rivals. The court noted that ownership of popular lens brands alone does not demonstrate dominance, and that “steering” allegations suggest intent but not a high probability of monopolization, particularly given Warby Parker’s $16 million lab investment, which evidences ongoing competition. Accordingly, all Custom Lens Market monopolization and attempted monopolization claims were dismissed.

Stale and foreign conduct. Many of the plaintiffs’ allegations relied on decades-old acquisitions and foreign conduct, which cannot sustain federal antitrust claims. Most of the challenged mergers and integrations occurred well beyond the four-year statute of limitations under 15 U.S.C. § 15b, rendering them time-barred. The plaintiffs attempted to invoke the continuing-violations doctrine, arguing that subsequent acts, such as the acquisition of GrandVision B.V. and periodic license renewals, revived earlier claims. The court rejected this argument, explaining that the doctrine is “heavily disfavored” in the Second Circuit and applies only to new and independent acts inflicting fresh injury, not mere reaffirmations of past conduct. There were no plausible allegations of a new U.S. injury tied to GrandVision, a Dutch company with minimal domestic presence, and the court concluded that license renewals reaffirm prior agreements rather than restart the limitations clock.

The court also faulted the plaintiffs for grounding parts of their case in foreign market activity and European regulatory actions, despite defining their relevant market as the U.S. eyewear market. Citing In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 2007), the court held that foreign investigations and global market share claims have no bearing on U.S. antitrust liability, particularly where U.S. regulators approved several transactions. Because the pleadings mixed stale, extraterritorial, and immaterial allegations, the court deemed them legally deficient, reinforcing its decision to dismiss the complaints in full, with leave to replead.

The plaintiffs were permitted to file a second amended complaint by October 17, 2025. They were also put on notice that this is their final opportunity to amend their pleading in this action to cure the deficiencies in their claims.

The Case is No. 1:24-cv-04826-MKV.

Judge: Vyskocil, M.

Attorneys: Carl Malmstrom (Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLC) for Michelle Morgan. Anthony Stauber (Gustafson Gluek PLLC) for Monet Jonas and Brad Hoag. Alicia R. Jovais (Latham & Watkins LLP) for EssilorLuxottica SA, Luxottica Group S.p.A., Essilor International SAS, EssilorLuxottica USA Inc. and Luxottica U.S. Holdings Corp.

Companies: EssilorLuxottica SA; Luxottica Group S.p.A.; Essilor International SAS; EssilorLuxottica USA Inc.; Luxottica U.S. Holdings Corp.

Cases: Antitrust NewYorkNews