Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST NEWS: iPad consumers bring putative class action against Apple, Amazon, for allegedly restraining third-party sellers, (Oct 15, 2026)

By Justin Marcus Smith, J.D.

The consumers distinguished the relevant online marketplace as a “two-sided” online platform mediating sales transactions between willing sellers and buyers.

Two consumers, one a resident of Texas, the other a resident of the State of Washington, have brought a putative class action against Apple Inc. and Amazon.com, Inc. under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The consumers allege that Apple and Amazon unlawfully agreed to eliminate or at least substantially reduce the competitive threat posed by third-party merchants selling Apple iPads. The complaint alleges that active price competition on the Amazon Marketplace threatened the high prices Apple tries to maintain in its own stores. This was also problem for Amazon insofar as Apple refused to authorize Amazon to sell Apple’s most popular products. According to the complaint, Amazon’s own share of the sale of Apple products on the Amazon Marketplace was therefore “virtually non-existent” until it allegedly reached an unlawful agreement with Apple to restrict third-party sellers from offering Apple iPads on the Amazon Marketplace. The one-count complaint alleged a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act for unreasonable restraint of trade in the form of a concerted refusal to deal or group boycott. Consumers and putative class members allegedly suffered the antitrust injury of having to pay more for iPads than they would have but for the alleged boycott agreement. The complaint defined a relevant antitrust submarket for tablet purchases within an online marketplaces market, and it proposed a class definition of all persons and entities resident in the U.S. who bought any new iPad from the Buy Box on Amazon.com after May 7, 2020. The consumers demand injunctive relief and money damages (Furdek v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:26-cv-03843-SKV (W.D. Wash. Oct. 9, 2026)).

The complaint alleged that the two giants, unable to resolve their pricing conflict independently, did so through a horizontal agreement known as the Global Tenets Agreement (unlawful boycott agreement). That agreement allegedly eliminated nearly all Apple resellers, the defendants’ horizontal competitors, on the Amazon Marketplace.

In putative exchange for Amazon eliminating the Apple resellers that were driving down online prices for Apple products, Apple allegedly agreed to consistently supply Amazon with Apple products at a discount of up to 10%. The complaint said that supply was contingent on Amazon continuing to exclude sellers from the Amazon Marketplace.

The alleged unlawful boycott agreement supposedly transformed Amazon’s near-zero share of Apple iPad sales on Amazon Marketplace to its “current dominant position” as depicted in a chart in the complaint body. The consumers contend this “win for Amazon was a loss to consumers.” The complaint elaborated that Samsung tablet prices, unlike iPad prices, did not spike after Apple and Amazon entered into the unlawful boycott agreement. Merchants allegedly removed from Amazon also suffered harm insofar as the Amazon Marketplace is the only viable channel for many third-party merchants to reach consumers.

The consumers contended there was no procompetitive benefit. They said the defendants’ counterfeiting concern was “pretextual” because Apple does not enter authorized reseller agreements with counterfeiters, and the purported boycott excluded authorized Apple resellers from Amazon’s platform even when their inventory came directly from Apple without the involvement of a wholesaler. The consumers also said other tools were already available to stop counterfeiting.

Relevant market. The complaint endeavors to distinguish the relevant online marketplace as a “two-sided” online “transaction” platform mediating sales transactions between willing sellers and buyers. In providing the sales mediation, Amazon can charge a transaction fee while creating indirect network effects.

According to the complaint, non-platform online stores are not reasonable substitutes. The Apple Store itself and BestBuy were two examples. They do not mediate sales transactions, whereas, on the two-sided platforms, most third-party merchants are too small to establish their own discrete direct sale online store. Consumers, meanwhile, value the ease of a one-stop Online Marketplace.

The complaint continued that brick-and-mortar stores are also not reasonable substitutes for the two-sided platforms because the latter offer significant conveniences to consumers, for example, avoiding travel. As for sellers, brick-and-mortar stores are also not reasonably interchangeable due to the high cost of establishing a physical store and limited geographic reach.

The complaint also described the relevant geographic market as the U.S. because most online marketplaces, including Amazon, operate within national boundaries.

SSNIP test. The plaintiffs alleged their proposed market would pass the test for a small but significant non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP test) in the proposed market, typically 5%. They contend an analysis of Amazon itself shows that it is not constrained by any substitution occurring away from the seller side of its transaction platform. The plaintiffs allege that Amazon managed to increase the average fee it charges sellers from 19% to 30% between 2015 and 2025. That allegedly raised sellers’ costs by 58%, yet the number of third-party merchants on the Amazon platform “tripled over the same period.”

The plaintiffs said a SSNIP test applied to the consumer side would show that the alleged market would pass the hypothetical monopolist test. They contended there is a high degree of consumer inelasticity, whether at the aggregate online marketplace level, or whether the hypothetical controls only relevant product submarkets.

Market power. The complaint alleged that Amazon has substantial market power in the market for U.S. online marketplaces, including the submarket for tablet transactions, insofar as it may control as much as 90% of all U.S. marketplace sales. The eBay and Walmart platforms are thought to have only peripheral shares. The complaint also alleged that Amazon accounted for “about 82%” of total consumer electronics sales in the U.S. in 2021.

The complaint continued that Amazon’s market power is “durable and reinforced” by several online marketplace features, including high barriers to entry; economies of scale; low marginal costs; economies of scope through data and the large installed base of users; network effects; multi-sidedness; and sometimes global reach. In combination, these attributes purportedly lead to high concentration. The complaint said indirect network effects are a “particularly substantial hurdle to entrants” and cement Amazon’s market power.

As for price competition, the complaint alleged that Amazon has an “evident” ability to raise prices to supracompetitive levels insofar as it manages to secure for itself 27% of every dollar spent on Amazon.com. The complaint said the unlawful boycott agreement allegedly led to a substantial increase in Apple iPad prices that consumers simply absorbed.

In the alternative, the complaint also described a relevant one-sided antitrust submarket for the sale of tablets on online marketplaces. Amazon allegedly has market power in that submarket. Again, the complaint contended a SSNIP analysis will show there is not much price increase substitution away from the Amazon Marketplace.

Class definition. The complaint proposed a class definition of all persons and entities resident in the U.S. from May 7, 2020, to the date of class notice, who bought any new iPad from the Buy Box on Amazon.com. The complaint defined the Buy Box as the box at the top righthand side of product listings on Amazon.com containing the “Add to Cart” and “Buy Now” buttons that consumers click to make a purchase.

The complaint said the exact number of members of the proposed class is not known at this time, but it probably consists of many thousands, making individual joinder impractical. Common questions of law and fact would include whether Amazon and Apple had an agreement to restrict third-party merchants capable of selling Apple products on Amazon.com; whether there is an antitrust market for online marketplaces; whether Apple and Amazon unlawfully restrained trade in any relevant antitrust market; and related questions of harm and entitlement to relief.

Antitrust injury. The complaint alleged that Apple and Amazon forced the named plaintiff consumers and putative class members to pay more for purchases than they would have but for the alleged unlawful boycott agreement. Continued exclusion of third-party resellers would lead to overcharges in the future. Both the actual harm alleged and the threat of future harm alleged were the cognizable antitrust injuries.

Claim for relief. The complaint set forth one claim for relief: Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, for unreasonable restraint of trade in the form of a concerted refusal to deal or group boycott.

Requested relief. The consumers respectfully request:

• class action certification with appointment of the named consumers as class representatives and their counsel as class counsel;

• injunctive relief requiring Amazon and Apple to cease their allegedly unlawful competitive practices;

• declaratory relief adjudging the described practices as unlawful;

• monetary relief, whether in the form of restitution or damages, including treble or punitive damages where mandated or otherwise available;

• costs of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees;

• pre- and post-judgment interest;

• any other proper relief.

The consumers demanded a jury trial.

The Case is No. 2:26-cv-03843-SKV.

Judge: Vaughan, S.

Attorneys: Ben M. Harrington (Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP) for Jolene Furdek.

Companies: Amazon.com Inc.; Apple Inc.

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