Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—N.D. Tex.: X suit against advertisers dismissed, (Mar 27, 2026)

By Steven Melendez

After dismissing a few parties for lack of jurisdiction, a federal judge found Elon Musk’s former Twitter failed to allege antitrust injury.

The federal district court in Dallas, Texas dismissed claims filed by X Corp. alleging that foreign and domestic advertisers and advertiser organizations conspired to boycott X by recommending that advertisers refrain from purchasing advertising on Twitter, now X. The advertisers allegedly acted through an initiative called the Global Alliance for Responsible Media (GARM), which was concerned that Twitter might deviate from certain brand safety standards for advertising on social media platforms and allegedly acted to enforce Twitter’s adherence to those standards through the boycott. The court held that X failed to show an antitrust injury. X did not allege that the alleged boycott allowed those competitors to corner the supply against consumer interests or that the advertisers sought to enter the social media app market. Also, X had not alleged that the boycott restrained X from selling to its downstream customers. Further, the court noted that it lacked jurisdiction over several foreign defendants, and denied a motion to transfer the case to New York City (X Corp v. World Federation of Advertisers, No. 7:24-cv-00114-B (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2026)).

Background. X alleged that the World Federation of Advertisers (WFA), Unilever PLC; Unilever United States, Inc.; Mars, Incorporated; CVS Health Corporation; and Ørsted A/S conspired with dozens of non-defendant co-conspirators to collectively withhold billions of dollars in advertising revenue from the platform. Amid concerns that after the 2022 purchase by Elon Musk the social media platform might deviate from brand safety standards set through a WFA initiative called the Global Alliance for Responsible Media (GARM), the parties allegedly imposed a boycott to force adherence to the standards.

GARM allegedly conveyed its concerns about compliance with the group’s standards, triggering the alleged boycott that followed. X alleged that the boycott was ongoing, leading to a loss of revenue and profit, reducing the ad rates X could charge, and thus making it harder for X to invest in the platform, harming consumers who use it.

X alleged the group boycott violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act and that the parties’ conduct constitutes an unlawful agreement to exchange competitively sensitive information among competing advertisers in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, with companies allegedly exchanging non-public and competitively sensitive information relating to competing advertisers with respect to the purchase of advertising from X.

Jurisdictional issues. The court concluded that it had personal jurisdiction over WFA, but lacked jurisdiction over Shell International, Lego A/S, Nestlé S.A., and Ørsted Services. To determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) comports with Fifth Amendment due process, the court determined whether the conduct giving rise to this case or controversy closely connected with the United States. Exercising jurisdiction over conduct closely connected to the United States can comport with the Fifth Amendment regardless of whether the conduct occurred here, in another country, on the open sea, in outer space, or completely on the Internet.

The court found that it had personal jurisdiction over WFA. Even if the alleged activities occurred entirely on the Internet and not physically on U.S. territory, the conduct was closely connected with the United States and had an impact on U.S. commerce. Requiring WFA to respond to this lawsuit did not risk haling it into U.S. courts for “myriad civil liability reasons.” Exercising personal jurisdiction over WFA also satisfied the reasonableness inquiry. On the inquiry’s first part, the burden placed on WFA to litigate in this country is minimal because it is a sophisticated organization with international and U.S. presence, as opposed to an entity or individual that only operates outside of this country with localized impact. The other two parts of the reasonableness inquiry—the forum’s and plaintiff’s interests—also supported exercising jurisdiction.

With regard to Shell International, Lego A/s, and Nestlé S.A., the court found the case arose under federal law and the companies had not conceded being subject to any state jurisdiction. X failed to show how the companies participated in the alleged boycott or how they were responsible for conduct of affiliated entities that may have done so. X also hadn’t alleged sufficient facts to allow for jurisdictional discovery over those parties, the court found. “At bottom, X’s jurisdictional discovery requests are difficult to perceive as anything other than a fishing expedition,” according to the ruling.

Ørsted Services conceded personal jurisdiction in New York, and X attempted to assert personal jurisdiction by the Texas federal court under Rule 4(k)(1)(C) and the Clayton Act. But the court found language in the Clayton Act itself doesn’t establish personal jurisdiction and that X hadn’t “made any effort to establish that Ørsted Services had case-related minimum contacts with Texas that would give rise to personal jurisdiction.”

The court dismissed the claims against Shell International, Lego A/s, Nestlé S.A., and Ørsted Services without prejudice.

Antitrust injury. Illegal group boycotts “must involve a competitor at some level who seeks to restrain competition against an outsider to the agreement.” X argued it might not need to satisfy the traditional antitrust injury requirement because the boycott was a “‘per se illegal collusion’ that necessarily states antitrust injury.” However, even that sort of claim must involve efforts to “disadvantage competitors” either directly or indirectly by pressuring others, the court found. “If the claim does not directly or indirectly involve the plaintiff’s competitor, it does not state an antitrust injury.”

If the conspiracy was meant to benefit rival social media companies, the court found, X had not alleged the activities in question allowed competitors to corner supply and harm consumer interests. A group of competitors can, in fact, cause antitrust injury by refusing to buy from an upstream supplier to allow another supplier to corner the market, the court noted, pointing to a precedent involving a healthcare preferred provider network. But here, X hasn’t alleged the boycott lets a competing social media company corner the ad market, or that the companies chose to boycott X at a competitor’s behest.

“Instead, X alleges a conspiracy driven by advertisers not to further X-competitor social media companies’ interests but to pursue their own collective interests as to where they place their advertisements,” according to the ruling.

Nor has X alleged that the boycott restricted X from selling ads to other downstream customers. The advertisers did not try to force X only to work with GARM members; they simply decided not to buy ads from X themselves, regardless of who else did buy ad space there, according to the ruling. Also, GARM did not tell X not to sell directly to customers of GARM, but rather reflected them collectively deciding not to purchase advertising from X. “The only harm X has asserted is that its customers collectively chose X’s competitors over X.”

Because X failed to show the advertisers and advertising groups acted to restrain competition, it failed to state a claim under the Sherman Act, according to the ruling. The court thus dismissed its claims against defendants other than those separately dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and denied X’s request for an opportunity to replead, dismissing the claims with prejudice.

“The 165-paragraph Second Amended Complaint contains no dearth of detail: if facts existed that GARM operated at an X competitor’s behest to put X out of business or that GARM advertisers sought to unfairly exclude competing advertisers from doing business, X would have pleaded those facts,” according to the ruling. “The very nature of the alleged conspiracy does not state an antitrust claim, and the Court therefore has no qualm dismissing with prejudice.”

The Case is No. 7:24-cv-00114-B.

Judge: Boyle, J.

Attorneys: John Clay Sullivan (S|L Law PLLC) for X Corp. David C. Miller (Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP) for World Federation of Advertisers.

Companies: X Corp.

Cases: Antitrust TexasNews