Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—N.D. Ind.: Plea to extend NCAA career derailed over thin record and binding precedent, (Mar 25, 2026)

By Martin A. Steinberg, J.D.

NCAA’s enforcement of eligibility rules allegedly violated federal and Indiana antitrust law and improperly blocked football player’s ability to compete and earn compensation.

The federal district court in Hammond, Indiana, denied a college football player’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction seeking to block enforcement of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) eligibility rules and permit him to compete for an additional season, concluding he failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on his antitrust claims. The court held that the player offered virtually no economic evidence to define a relevant market or to show anticompetitive effects, and that binding Seventh Circuit precedent addressing similar eligibility challenges weighed heavily against injunctive relief. Although the court acknowledged that the plaintiff’s theories of harm were plausible and could potentially succeed on a fuller evidentiary record, it determined that the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction was unwarranted on the present record and therefore denied the requested relief. The court emphasized that a preliminary injunction requires a developed evidentiary record, not merely allegations (Coly v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, No. 4:26-cv-00008-PPS-APR (N.D. Ind. Mar. 23, 2026)).

Background. The NCAA is a self-governing organization of colleges and universities that regulates intercollegiate athletics, including eligibility requirements for student-athletes competing at the Division I level. The organization oversees a large, financially significant enterprise that generates more than $1 billion annually and operates in an environment increasingly shaped by name, image, and likeness (NIL) compensation opportunities for athletes. The eligibility rules at issue are rooted in NCAA bylaws that establish the structure for participation in college sports and define the limits on student-athlete eligibility.

Central to the dispute are three NCAA bylaws. First, the “Five-Year Rule” requires student-athletes to complete their four permitted seasons of competition within five calendar years of their first enrollment as full-time students at any collegiate institution, including non-NCAA schools such as those affiliated with the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA). Second, the “Intercollegiate Competition Rule” defines what constitutes participation in competition and works in tandem with the Five-Year Rule to establish the familiar “four-in-five” eligibility framework. Third, the “Rule of Restitution” authorizes the NCAA to impose significant sanctions, including vacating wins, disqualifying teams from championships, and requiring repayment of revenues, if an athlete competes under a court order that is later reversed or found unjustified.

The plaintiff, an offensive lineman who began his college football career at an NAIA institution in 2021, transferred to Purdue University after two seasons, redshirted in 2023, and then played full seasons in 2024 and 2025. Because his initial enrollment at the non-NCAA institution counted toward the five-year eligibility period, he exhausted his eligibility under the NCAA’s four-in-five framework after the 2025 season. Purdue sought a waiver on his behalf based on disruptions to his first season caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, but the NCAA denied the request in January 2026.

Following the waiver denial, the plaintiff filed suit asserting claims under the Sherman Act, Indiana antitrust law, and state tort law, and sought emergency relief to prevent the NCAA from enforcing its eligibility rules. The court held hearings on the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in late February and early March 2026, but no evidence was offered; the hearings consisted solely of oral argument based on the parties’ written submissions. The court ultimately evaluated the request under the established preliminary injunction framework, focusing primarily on whether the plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.

Antitrust framework. Plaintiff’s claims arose under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits agreements that unreasonably restrain trade. Courts generally apply the rule-of-reason framework to evaluate such claims. Under that framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the challenged restraint produces substantial anticompetitive effects in a properly defined relevant market. If the plaintiff satisfies that burden, the defendant must then show a procompetitive justification, after which the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that those efficiencies could be achieved through less restrictive means. The court stressed that defining the relevant market is a prerequisite to assessing competitive harm because, without a defined market, it is impossible to measure whether the defendant possesses market power or has restrained competition.

Survey of prior NCAA eligibility cases. The court next reviewed recent district and appellate decisions addressing challenges to NCAA eligibility rules. From these cases, the court distilled several guiding principles: plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctive relief in antitrust challenges must (1) define the relevant market through detailed factual and economic analysis, (2) present a clearly articulated and evidence-supported theory of competitive harm, and (3) courts should proceed cautiously when asked to regulate complex markets such as collegiate athletics.

District courts had reached mixed results, with some granting preliminary injunctions and others denying them. However, the court emphasized that binding Seventh Circuit precedent, particularly Fourqurean v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 143 F.4th 859 (7th Cir. 2025), controlled the outcome. In that case, a college football player sought an additional season of eligibility after competing at both Division II and Division I levels. Although a district court granted an injunction, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff’s conclusory allegations and lack of economic evidence were insufficient to justify preliminary relief. The appellate court also rejected the argument that exclusion from competition alone constituted anticompetitive harm, explaining that antitrust injury requires evidence of harm to the competitive process, not merely harm to an individual participant.

The court also discussed the Third Circuit’s decision in Elad v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 160 F.4th 407 (3d Cir. 2025), which vacated a preliminary injunction because the district court failed to conduct a fact-specific market analysis. The Third Circuit criticized reliance on unsupported expert conclusions and emphasized the need for detailed economic evidence reflecting current market conditions, particularly in the evolving landscape of college athletics following the Supreme Court’s decision in NCAA v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69 (2021).

Additionally, the court addressed concurring opinions in Pavia v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 154 F.4th 407 (6th Cir. 2025), which highlighted the evidentiary complexity of NCAA eligibility challenges. Those concurrences underscored the need for substantial economic data and warned against judicial intervention without a well-developed record.

Relevant market analysis. Turning to the plaintiff’s allegations, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s market definition was inadequately supported on the present record. While the allegations might ultimately suffice with additional evidence, particularly expert testimony, the existing record did not establish a relevant market for purposes of a preliminary injunction.

The court considered his proposed relevant market: the nationwide labor market for Division I football player services. However, the plaintiff relied primarily on general assertions about the concentration of resources, training opportunities, and compensation at the Division I level, including the disproportionate share of NIL compensation paid to Division I athletes. The court acknowledged that this evidence suggested Division II, Division III, and non-NCAA programs were unlikely substitutes for Division I football. However, it found the plaintiff failed to address whether professional leagues, such as the NFL, Canadian Football League, or United Football League, could serve as alternative employment opportunities.

Anticompetitive Effects. Even assuming the proposed market definition were accepted, the court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate anticompetitive effects, despite advancing theories that the NCAA’s eligibility rules (1) artificially restricted the labor supply of Division I football players, (2) suppressed competition among programs for athlete services, (3) distorted recruiting and player mobility, and (4) harmed consumers of Division I football.

The court characterized these theories as plausible but unsupported by evidence. It emphasized that antitrust law requires proof of harm to competition, such as reduced output, increased prices, or diminished quality, rather than harm to an individual participant. For example, the court noted that reducing the supply of eligible players could plausibly increase competition among schools for the remaining athletes, potentially raising rather than suppressing compensation. Without economic data linking the eligibility rules to measurable market harm, the plaintiff could not establish the likelihood of success required for injunctive relief.

The court also rejected the plaintiff’s theory that counting years spent at non-NCAA institutions discouraged athletes from enrolling at those schools. The plaintiff presented no enrollment statistics, transfer data, or economic analysis demonstrating that the eligibility rules produced such effects.

NCAA eligibility policies. Although the court denied relief, it acknowledged perceived inconsistencies in NCAA eligibility decisions. The court cited examples of athletes who received additional eligibility through special waivers, including players granted extra years following COVID-related disruptions or individualized exceptions in other circumstances. These examples illustrated the evolving and sometimes uneven application of NCAA rules. Nevertheless, the court emphasized that its role was limited to applying antitrust law based on the evidentiary record, not evaluating the fairness or wisdom of NCAA policy choices.

Final determination. The court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits because he presented virtually no economic evidence supporting his antitrust theories. The absence of expert testimony or empirical analysis was particularly significant given the demanding standard for preliminary injunctions. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction without reaching the NCAA’s alternative arguments, including arguments related to waiver provisions in prior litigation settlements.

The Case is No. 4:26-cv-00008-PPS-APR.

Judge: Simon, P.

Attorneys: Andrew J. Rudowitz (Duane Morris LLP) for Atium Coly. David J. Zeitlin PHV (Holland & Knight LLP) for National Collegiate Athletic Association.

Companies: National Collegiate Athletic Association

Cases: Antitrust IndianaNews