Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—N.D. Cal.: Coretronic fails to plead Sherman Act claim against Maxell in connection with projector patent, (Oct 13, 2026)

By Justin Marcus Smith, J.D.

A belief that a legal conclusion about Maxell’s patent was true did not make it so, and Maxell was otherwise entitled to a presumption of patent enforceability.

Coretronic Corporation failed to plead a Section 2 Sherman Act claim against Maxell, Ltd in connection with a presumptively valid Maxell projector patent, held the federal district court in San Jose, California. First, Coretronic did not establish a Walker Process exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity because it did not make a facial showing that Maxell obtained its patent by knowing and willful fraud on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and then maintained and enforced that patent with knowledge of fraudulent procurement. Second, Coretronic’s failure to allege any geographic market was sufficient ground for dismissal of its Sherman Act claim, but the complaint also failed to describe a relevant product market inclusive of all economic substitutes. Coretronic’s various state law claims all failed for essentially the same failure to establish a Walker Process exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity. However, the court denied dismissal as to Coretronic’s request for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement because Coretronic plausibly stated a claim for non-infringement of Maxell’s patent (Coretronic Corp. v. Maxell, Ltd., No. 5:26-cv-00697-EKL (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2026)).

Background. Coretronic and its wholly-owned subsidiary Optoma Technology, Inc. sought declaratory judgments of non-infringement, invalidity, and unenforceability as to a Maxell, Ltd projector patent. The focus of this multi-year dispute was U.S. Patent No. 8,075,142 (‘142 Patent), a patent for an “image display apparatus for projecting an image on a screen.” The parties all design and sell projectors.

Coretronic asserted a total of six claims. Coretronic’s fourth claim was Walker Process fraud under the Sherman Act. The other five claims were declaratory judgment of non-infringement; declaratory judgment of invalidity; patent misuse; tortious interference with prospective economic advantage under California common law; and unfair business practices and bad faith patent assertion under Washington law.

Maxell moved to dismiss all claims, arguing that dismissal was warranted because Coretronic failed to plead facts showing any problem with the ‘142 Patent or that there was any anticompetitive or unfair business conduct in connection with the patent.

Antitrust claim. The court held Coretronic failed to allege that Maxell’s conduct plausibly fell within the Walker Process exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity that it amounted to a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

Maxell’s conduct presumptively fell within the scope of Noerr-Pennington immunity. Coretronic based its Sherman Act and state law claims on the same set of allegations underpinning their declaratory judgment claims. The crux of their argument was that Maxell’s decision to report Coretronic’s projectors as “infringing” to Amazon amounted to a baseless and improper “pre-suit assertion of patent infringement.” The court had to presume that the ‘142 Patent was valid and that Maxell’s efforts to enforce it were in good faith.

Coretronic bore the burden of pleading facts that plausibly alleged an applicable exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity. Coretronic contended first that Maxell’s conduct fell within the Walker Process exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity and was thus actionable under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. They had to establish Maxell obtained its patent by knowing and willful fraud on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and maintained and enforced that patent with knowledge of fraudulent procurement. Then they had to plead a Sherman Act claim.

The court found Coretronic fell short on “several grounds.” First, it failed to allege plausible fraud on the USPTO. Coretronic did not plausibly allege that Maxell’s alleged failure to disclose certain Hitachi projectors during prosecution of the ‘142 Patent was a material omission. Nor did Coretronic identify who allegedly defrauded the USPTO or their specific intent to deceive. The court discussed the circumstances of the patent at length.

Second, the court found Coretronic failed to allege the elements of a Sherman Act claim. The court did not even find it clear whether Coretronic was asserting a claim for monopolization or attempted monopolization, but it failed in any event because Coretronic did not sufficiently identify a relevant market either in terms of product or geography. The failure to allege any geographic market whatsoever was, by itself, an omission that warranted dismissal. As for the relevant product market, Coretronic alleged only that it was “the market for projectors” without discussing whether it included all economic substitutes. The pleading was conclusory and unsustainable.

The court found Coretronic also failed to allege that Maxell had monopoly power or a dangerous probability of achieving it. Coretronic only offered that Maxell’s patent rights gave it “significant power” in the “market for projectors,” but again, these were facially deficient, conclusory assertions. The complaint did not include facts that speak to restricted output or supracompetitive prices in the projector market, nor did it address entry or expansion barriers for competitors. The court could not plausibly infer that Maxell has a high share of the relevant market because it was unclear whether it had patent rights over a significant share of the projectors or projector-related components available for sale. In light of all of the above, the court granted Maxell’s motion to dismiss with respect to the plaintiffs’ Walker Process claim.

Other claims. Coretronic’s failure to allege a plausible Noerr-Pennington exception precluded its state law claims. The court reasoned that the complaint did not support a plausible inference that Maxell’s efforts to assert the ‘142 Patent were objectively baseless and in bad faith. Maxell was otherwise entitled to a presumption of good faith, and another district court had already issued a magistrate report and recommendation finding that the ‘142 Patent was not invalid.

To the extent Coretronic intended to apply its Walker Process fraud allegations to the state law context, the complaint fell short for the reasons already discussed. Even if the court had assumed Coretronic meant to invoke the sham litigation exception, the complaint was still insufficient.

The court likewise held Coretronic failed to plead a tortious interference claim. Again, Coretronic did not allege an exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity, but it also failed to identify a specific economic relationship and to describe harm to that relationship.

The Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claim again turned on ‘142 Patent “bad faith.” At the threshold, Coretronic did not allege that Maxell had significant contact with the State of Washington. Coretronic did not allege that Maxell was a Washington corporation or was otherwise based there when it initiated a certain court proceeding. Nor did Coretronic plead it was harmed in Washington. It was also not clear that Washington law permits a non-resident plaintiff to pursue a CPA claim against a non-resident defendant. The court appeared to signal skepticism that Coretronic might cure the noted pleading deficiencies, but it gave Coretronic the benefit of doubt for now.

Coretronic’s Patent Troll Protection Act (PTPA) claim turned on its stated belief that the ‘142 Patent was invalid, unenforceable, and not infringed by its own projectors, but a belief alone did not make it so. The court dismissed the PTPA claim because Maxell was entitled to a presumption that it could enforce its patent. For essentially the same reasons, the Coretronic CPA claim was also insufficient.

As for the declaratory judgment requests, the court found Coretronic plausibly alleged invalidity based on anticipation and obviousness and denied Maxell’s motion to dismiss to that extent. By contrast, Coretronic’s claim for invalidity on indefiniteness grounds was insufficient.

Amendment. The court granted leave to amend, but it appeared to underscore that Coretronic must cure the noted pleading deficiencies if it expects to avoid a future dismissal with prejudice.

The Case is No. 5:26-cv-00697-EKL.

Judge: Lee, E.

Attorneys: Morgan E. Pietz (Merchant & Gould LLP) for Coretronic Corporation. Bryan Nese (Mayer Brown LLP) for Maxell, Ltd.

Companies: Coretronic Corporation.; Maxell, Ltd.

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