Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—M.D. Tenn.: Student athlete denied preliminary injunction in NCAA eligibility dispute, (Aug 26, 2025)

By Kenneth H. Ryesky, M.B.A., J.D.

Court notes that the asserted harm was mostly "monetary harm that can be redressed at a later stage" of litigation.

The federal district court judge in Nashville, Tennessee has denied a preliminary injunction to a student-athlete in a dispute over the NCAA's eligibility rules. Derrin Boyd sought an injunction to allow him to continue playing college basketball (and receive NIL emoluments) as he continues to pursue higher academic credentials beyond the undergraduate degree and MBA degree he has already attained. Boyd's waiver application was denied by the NCAA. The court weighed the preliminary injunction factors and found that collectively, they did not favor a preliminary injunction. Boyd has not provided any logical argument or evidence to suggest that the Bylaw allowing waiver of the time-limits on eligibility has a substantial anticompetitive effect on the labor market or anything else (Boyd v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, No. 3:25-cv-00729 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 22, 2025)).

The National College Athletic Association (NCAA) promotes and regulates college athletics in the United States. Performance as student athletes in the NCAA Division I has overwhelmingly become the most common route to a career in top level professional sports, including the National Basketball Association league (NBA). Ever since a 2021 U.S. Supreme Court decision [NCAA v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69 (2021)], the NCAA has permitted student-athletes to receive compensation from others for the use of their names, images, and likenesses (NIL).

The NCAA has promulgated rules that limit student-athlete's participation eligibility for intercollegiate athletic contests, whereby two eligibility "clocks" operate in conjunction with one another: (1) the "competition seasons clock" which allows the athlete to compete during up to four seasons of the sport; and (2) the "participation eligibility clock" which limits competition to a five-year period starting when the student begins full-time enrollment at the collegiate institution, regardless of whether the student-athlete actually competes. NCAA-affiliated schools run the risk of severe sanctions if they field a student-athlete in violation of the NCAA's eligibility rules.

Many student athletes begin their higher education at junior colleges and other institutions that are not NCAA Division I; their attendance at such schools triggers their participation eligibility clocks. In response to a district court ruling [Pavia v. NCAA, 760 F. Supp. 3d 527 (M.D. Tenn. 2024)], the NCAA issued a blanket waiver (the Pavia waiver) that relieves student-athletes who have played sports at non-NCAA institutions from the "competition seasons clock" restrictions, but not from the five-year "participation eligibility clock" restrictions.

Derrin Boyd is a student-athlete having both athletic and academic accomplishments. Boyd wishes to continue playing college basketball (and receive NIL emoluments) as he continues to pursue higher academic credentials beyond the undergraduate degree and MBA degree he has already attained. The Pavia waiver did not apply to Boyd because his "participation eligibility clock" had already run. Boyd has received offers from several NCAA Division I schools, contingent upon the NCAA granting him a waiver from the "participation eligibility clock" restrictions. Boyd's waiver application was denied by the NCAA.

On June 30, 2025, Boyd filed a lawsuit against the NCAA in the same federal district court that decided the Pavia case, alleging violations of the Sherman Act and the Tennessee Trade Practices Act (TTPA). The complaint sought a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction to prevent the NCAA from enforcing its five-year "participation eligibility clock" restrictions as against Boyd. On July 3, 2025, a federal magistrate judge denied the TRO, but reserved judgment on the preliminary injunction pending further briefing. A federal district judge ruled on the preliminary injunction on August 22, 2025.

Success on the merits. The judge found that Boyd had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits to warrant the imposition of a preliminary injunction. Here, the parties all agreed that the Rule of Reason analysis burden-shifting framework was appropriate. Although Boyd's arguments followed those asserted by Pavia in his case against the NCAA, the court noted the differences between the two cases, most notably, Pavia challenged the NCAA's "competition seasons clock" rule while Boyd's challenge is to the NCAA's "participation eligibility clock" restrictions. Boyd's briefs emphasized the harm to Boyd himself, but were weak on the harm to the identified relevant labor market.

Notwithstanding such deficiencies in Boyd's arguments, the judge went forward with the Rule of Reason process by analyzing the NCAA's procompetitive rationale for its rules. Here, the NCAA asserted that (1) limiting eligibility time ensures that roster space will open up each season for the incoming contingent of high school graduates, thereby preserving and sustaining the labor market; (2) the rules keep the market for Division I athletics distinct from the professional athletics labor market; and (3) the rules "foster better alignment between Division I athletics and academics."

Boyd proposed as less restrictive alternative that the NCAA institute rules to include "an individualized waiver process" or "clear and consistent policies for athletes affected by injuries or natural disasters." These proposals, the court found, would potentially give an opening for "an additional four years of NCAA Division I eligibility" to student-athletes who sought more than the one year of additional eligibility sought by Boyd.

Irreparable harm. The judge found that Boyd had shown that he will incur irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction is not issued. The irreparable harm would entail "lost opportunities to form lasting relationships with teammates, for personal growth, exposure, building a personal brand, and potentially creating additional career avenues." The court, however, found that "this showing is tempered by the delay in seeking relief."

Balance of the equities and public interest. The court found that the balance of equities and public interest did not favor a preliminary injunction at this stage of litigation. In addition to the infirmities in the other preliminary injunction factors, the court agreed with the NCAA that granting the injunction at this time would open up the floodgates for hundreds if not thousands of other student athletes to demand waivers from the NCAA (and petition the courts if such waivers would be denied).

The Case is No. 3:25-cv-00729.

Judge: Campbell, W.

Attorneys: Amanda Kusick (Baker Botts LLP) for Derrin Boyd. Taylor J. Askew (Holland & Knight LLP) for National Collegiate Athletic Association.

Companies: National Collegiate Athletic Association

Cases: Antitrust TennesseeNews GCNNews