Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—M.D.N.C.: Remaining state claims may proceed against RealPage in rental price-fixing case, (Oct 1, 2026)

By Steven Melendez

The court rejected arguments that state claims were mooted by a federal settlement or that claims were insufficiently pled.

The federal district court in Greensboro, North Carolina denied motions by RealPage, Inc., and a set of landlords to dismiss remaining claims in an antitrust lawsuit brought by the Justice Department and several states alleging algorithmic coordination, information sharing, and related anticompetitive activities in rental housing markets. The court rejected arguments that RealPage’s settlement with the federal government moots state Sherman Act claims and found antitrust claims to be sufficiently pleaded to proceed (U.S. v. RealPage, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-00710-WO-JGM (M.D.N.C. Sep. 28, 2026)).

Background. After a nearly two-year investigation, the Department of Justice and eight states in 2024 filed an antitrust lawsuit against property management software company RealPage, alleging an unlawful information-sharing scheme and the illegal monopolization or attempted monopolization of the market for commercial revenue management software. The case, filed in the federal district court in Durham, North Carolina, centers on RealPage’s software products, which help property owners set rental prices. The government alleged these tools enabled anticompetitive coordination among landlords and helped RealPage monopolize the market for revenue management software. The suit was brought together with the Attorneys General of California, Colorado, Connecticut, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington.

The Justice Department and RealPage agreed to a settlement late last year, and the court entered a final judgment resolving those claims on May 19, 2026. Among other things, RealPage agreed to cease having its software use competitors’ nonpublic and competitively sensitive information to determine rental prices in runtime operation, cease using active lease data for training its models, cease conducting market surveys to collect competitively sensitive information, and remove or redesign features that limited price decreases or aligned pricing between competing users of its software. The company also agreed to cooperate in the United States’ lawsuit against property management companies that used its software.

Some settlements have also been reached between the Department of Justice, state attorneys general, and some of the landlords involved in the case. State claims against RealPage and Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC, remain pending, as do state and United States claims against Camden Property Trust and Willow Bridge Property Company, LLC.

Mootness. RealPage argued the settlement with the Department of Justice moots the states’ Sherman Act claims and state-law requests for injunctive relief. Camden and Pinnacle made similar arguments, and the court found their arguments extend to Willow Bridge as well.

But voluntary cessation of conduct, even under a judicially enforceable consent decree, does not deprive a court of the ability to determine if the conduct was legal, and a party claiming cessation bears the burden of making it “absolutely clear” the conduct “could not reasonably be expected to recur,” according to the ruling. The settlement’s consent decree expires after seven years, and the United States may move to terminate it after four, and it does not reach all of the alleged conduct, preserving RealPage’s data collection, allowing model training on year-old data, and restraining RealPage at user group meetings but not landlords who attend them, the court found. Additionally, the settlement does not require RealPage to divest itself of the data trove that it allegedly uses to monopolize the industry or require it to be shared with rivals.

The court also found, the plaintiff states do not have the power to enforce the consent decree, and it does not enjoin the remaining landlords in the case, ruling that the remaining claims are not moot.

Agreement to share information. The landlords argue the complaint does not allege they concerted action since it does not show they agreed with one another to license or use the RealPage software. The complaint’s Claim One alleges a hub-spoke-and-rim arrangement with RealPage as the hub and contributing landlords as the spokes, according to the ruling. The landlords do not dispute that they entered into software license agreements with the landlords, and Fourth Circuit precedent treats such agreements as sufficient at the pleading stage to allege concerted action between licensor and licensee.

But they argued that separate agreements with one party do not establish an agreement among the parties. The court found, though, that the complaint alleges RealPage invites each landlord to supply its data to be pooled and shared and that each landlord that accepts does so knowing its data will be used to price rivals’ units and their data will be used to price its own. Therefore, the court found, the complaint alleges a single combination rather than a set of “discrete bilateral conspiracies.”

The complaint also alleges direct communications between landlords, including discussions of their use of the software and whether to accept its recommendations. It also alleges a market structure conducive to such coordination, with housing demand inelastic and local markets essentially concentrated. The specific allegations against each remaining landlord are also sufficient to proceed, the court found.

Restraint of trade. An agreement to share information is not inherently unlawful, the court found, but exchanges of pricing information have consistently been found to violate antitrust law. RealPage also argued that the alleged market share of the parties in the housing market is not sufficient to establish market power, being as low as 30 percent in some alleged markets, but the court found there is no single threshold number, and that the complaint alleges other market features supporting market power, including market concentration, inelastic demand, and the software making housing units more easily comparable.

The complaint also alleges harm to competition through sharing of data, with the software reducing landlords’ willingness to negotiate, recommending increases when competitors raise prices, and in one mode responding to weak demand by limiting the number of units a landlord puts up for lease. The landlords argue no participant receives any other landlord’s individual data, only market range data, but the court found the complaint alleges the software generates that market range, with a minimum number that operates as a floor on recommended prices. “The landlord need not see a competitor's data for that data to shape its specific prices; the algorithm does the work,” according to the ruling, which found Claim One sufficiently states a claim against RealPage and each landlord.

Agreement to align prices. Claim Two alleges each license’s agreement to use certain RealPage software is itself a restraint of trade, aligning pricing processes, strategies, and related responses. The landlords again argued only agreements between each landlord and RealPage are alleged. But the complaint alleges part of why licensees use the software is the understanding their competitors will do so as well, pointing to statements from RealPage and landlords.

The landlords also argue the agreements do not restrain trade because they are free to override the software’s recommendations and on average decline about half. The complaint, however, alleges licensees agree to use the software to set scheduled floor plan rents and unit-level prices and to restructure commissions to leasing agents to reward revenue growth. Higher rents and fewer concessions among landlords who price based on the software are economically plausible results, the court found, finding the claim sufficiently pled.

Monopolization. Claims Three and Four allege monopolization, or attempted monopolization, of a national market for revenue management software under the Sherman Act. The complaint alleges a recognized product category and insensitivity to price with minimal alternatives. RealPage argued the market should include manual and in-house pricing by landlords. The court found that self-supply can be considered part of a market, but the complaint alleges market participants here do not treat them as substitutes.

The complaint alleges RealPage has held at least 80 percent of the market since at least 2019, with barriers to entry due to the scale of its data, which competitors cannot match. The aggregation of that data through the alleged anticompetitive behavior with landlords is alleged to be the source of that advantage, the court found, finding the monopolization and attempted monopolization claims sufficiently pled.

State law claims. RealPage and the landlords argued state-law claims fail with the federal claims, but since the federal claims survived the motions to dismiss, the court additionally declined to dismiss the state-law claims.

RealPage also argued the Tennessee Trade Practices Act applies only to tangible goods. The plaintiffs argued, as amended, it also reaches services, and RealPage did not respond to that point in its reply. The court declined to dismiss that claim.

The Case is No. 1:24-cv-00710-WO-JGM.

Judge: Osteen, Jr., W.

Attorneys: Henry C. Su, U.S. Department of Justice, for the U.S. Caroline H. Reinwald (Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A.) for RealPage, Inc.

Companies: RealPage, Inc.

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