Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—M.D.N.C.: FTC, states, survive Syngenta motion for summary judgment in crop chemical rebates antitrust dispute, (Oct 23, 2026)

By Justin Marcus Smith, J.D.

The court rejected the price-cost test in favor of the rule of reason because the evidence suggested price was not the predominant exclusion mechanism.

The FTC and state attorneys general survived a motion for summary judgment in their ongoing antitrust dispute with multiple Syngenta entities in connection with the Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC crop pesticides rebate loyalty program, known as the Key Active Ingredients or “Key AI” program. The federal district court in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, held the government presented enough evidence to support sending multiple questions to a jury. First, the court declined Syngenta’s call to apply the price-cost test to the government’s claim that Key AI was unlawful exclusive dealing because the evidence tended to show price was not the predominant exclusion mechanism. Turning to the rule-of-reason, the court found the evidence suggested proper market categorization by single AI markets, that is, markets each involving a specific active ingredient, not, as Syngenta argued, based on control purpose, function, or effectiveness. After finding the government’s market definition by AI sufficiently sound to survive summary judgment, the court also found sufficient evidence of anticompetitive conduct and harm to proceed to trial on the federal antitrust claims. The most closely contested question of fact appeared to be whether Key AI caused substantial market foreclosure. To the extent the federal antitrust claims survived, the court denied Syngenta’s motion for summary judgment on the state law claims. The court also denied Syngenta’s motion for summary judgment with respect to two Syngenta corporate entities because a jury could also find that they encouraged the alleged anticompetitive behavior of Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC (FTC v. Syngenta Crop Protection AG, No. 1:22-cv-00828-TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C. Oct. 22, 2026)).

Background. On September 25, 2026, in this same matter, the FTC and a coalition of state attorneys general (collectively, the government) announced finalization of a “significant” settlement with co-defendant pesticide manufacturer Corteva Inc. (Corteva). The settlement addressed the Corteva aspects of the FTC and states’ 2022 lawsuit against crop protection chemical manufacturers Syngenta and Corteva.

Corteva, without admitting to any wrongdoing, agreed to “dismantle” an existing pesticides loyalty program that limited generic competition in pesticides distribution. Corteva also agreed to pay $35 million into a fund for the discretionary purposes of the states’ attorneys general. The parties filed a joint motion for entry of their stipulated order for injunctive and other relief as the Corteva Consent Decree. The parties stipulated that neither the FTC nor the plaintiff states would challenge or contest the validity of the settlement agreement reached in the multidistrict litigation, In re Crop Protection Products, 1:23-MD-3062-TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C.) (see Antitrust Law Daily, Sep 28, 2026)).

With court approval of the Corteva settlement still pending, the court turned its attention to the remaining defendants, Syngenta Crop Protection AG, Syngenta Corporation, and Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC (collectively, Syngenta), and their motion for summary judgment.

The government’s amended complaint alleged that Syngenta’s Key AI loyalty rebate program violated federal and state antitrust laws as exclusive dealing. The government sought recovery on the following grounds: (1) unfair competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act; (2) unlawful conditioning of payments under Section 3 of the Clayton Act; (3) unreasonable restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act; (4) unlawful monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act; and (5) violations of the consumer protection laws of a dozen states.

Syngenta argued the court should grant summary judgment for three principal reasons: (1) the government claims failed under the price-cost test; (2) even if the court were to apply the rule of reason instead of the price-cost test, the government did not carry its burden of showing the existence of single-AI markets; (3) there was insufficient evidence of market foreclosure and harm to competition to establish liability under the rule of reason. Syngenta also asked for summary judgment on all state law claims on the ground their disposition would follow that of the federal claims.

Exclusive dealing. The court denied Syngenta’s motion for summary judgment as tied to application of the price-cost test because price was not the predominant exclusion mechanism. The court found evidence supporting the government’s assertion that Syngenta retaliated against distributors who did not participate. For example, evidence suggested that Syngenta terminated a distributor contract after the distributor failed to meet Key AI thresholds for two years. There was also evidence that multiple distributors took notice that Syngenta might cut them off.

Syngenta internal documents also showed that it designed Key AI to exclude generics and prevent a vicious cycle of downward price pressure on its branded AIs. There was also evidence that Syngenta used Key AI to erect barriers to entry out of concern that generic competition would devalue the market for Syngenta’s branded AIs, like mesotrione. As in Duke Energy, the court found the structure and purpose of Key AI was anticompetitive. See Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. NTE Carolinas II, LLC, 111 F.4th 337, 358 (4th Cir. 2024).

Syngenta countered that Key AI rebates benefited growers with lower prices; that barriers to entry were low; that Key AI had not stopped robust generic entry and expansion; and that one of the distributor terminations was mutual. Syngenta also offered its own evidence that access to products did not require compliance with Key AI.

The court found the evidence, if believed, supported the claim that Syngenta’s Key AI program employed sufficient mechanisms to suppress competition in the limited distributor market most available to retailers. There was evidence that the purpose of Key AI was to foreclose competition in the most efficient channel of five key participants who controlled a majority of the distribution channel. Moreover, there was evidence that not all distributors passed their rebates on to retailers, whether due to program structure or otherwise. The evidence suggested distributors participated in Key AI because they understood it as a requirement for buying Syngenta products. However, the court concluded that whether a jury would agree on those points “must remain for trial.”

Market definition. The court denied Syngenta’s motion for summary judgment as to market definition. Syngenta argued that even if the price-cost test did not apply, the government’s federal antitrust claims must fail under the rule of reason. That called for the court to determine first whether reasonably interchangeable products were included in the relevant product market. The government’s evidence suggested Syngenta viewed the market the way the government defined it, by reference to relevant AIs.

Syngenta attacked the government’s single-AI markets as too narrow as a matter of law. Specifically, Syngenta argued the government failed to include crop protection products that contain different AIs. Syngenta provided grower testimony. Growers testified they evaluate products for a number of factors, including purpose, function, and effectiveness. Syngenta asserted the government did not produce any testimony that growers preferred the AIs at issue.

At the dismissal stage, the court found the government offered sufficient evidence to avoid dismissal as to conduct and the Brown Shoe factors. Now, at summary judgment, the government introduced evidence showing that Syngenta tracks crop protection product sales and market share based on AI. It also focused marketing at the AI level and in the Key AI program by setting certain AI thresholds to receive rebates. This created an incentive for distributors to buy crop protection products categorized by AI, not, as Syngenta argued, based on control purpose, function, or effectiveness. Syngenta, a sophisticated actor, may have proceeded this way to maintain the status quo and dominate particular AI markets. The bottom line was that the government had evidence for trial that Syngenta viewed the market defined by AIs, and even if a broader market existed, as Syngenta contended, it would vitiate the existence of a narrower market.

Turning to the Brown Shoe factors, the government also offered evidence, including distributor testimony, that the AIs have peculiar characteristics and uses. This supported the existence of a single-AI product market. The government also presented evidence that Syngenta itself recognized the existence of, and encouraged, if not created, markets for each AI. There was also evidence that distributors and generic competitors recognized an AI-market definition. Distinct pricing pointed to the same conclusion.

The court concluded it would remain for a jury to decide whether to credit Syngenta’s assertion that its AIs competed in a function-focused marketplace rather than a market that participants recognized as AI-specific.

Anticompetitive conduct. Syngenta also argued that that the government’s allegations failed under the rule of reason because there was insufficient evidence to go to trial about anticompetitive conduct with anticompetitive effects, but the court disagreed. The government had to show substantial market foreclosure of at least 40%, and Syngenta acknowledged that its Key AI distributors controlled at least 60% of the crop protection product sales market. The court concluded the facts could support a jury finding of substantial foreclosure of generic entry. Syngenta’s assertion that generic AIs captured up to 36% of the market was probative, not dispositive. The evidence suggested generic manufacturers would have had more opportunity to compete without Key AI acting as a barrier and that it continued to restrain competition.

The court acknowledged that Syngenta was correct that this case appeared to involve more generic penetration than in the cases the government relied on, but even so, Syngenta overstated the government’s burden for surviving Syngenta’s motion for summary judgment.

Harm. As for harm to generic entry, the court had already discussed the evidence available for trial at length in connection with inapplicability of the price-cost test. Syngenta’s contention that there was no evidence of higher prices for growers was selective. The court found the government provided evidence that tended to show: (1) Syngenta purposely constructed Key AI to prevent or slow generics from capturing a significant portion of the market; (2) key distributors refused to purchase generic versions of the AIs at issue; (3) generic manufacturers faced significant and sometimes prohibitive difficulties in introducing generic AIs to the market; and (4) Key AI kept prices higher for growers than they would have been in a competitive market. The court concluded a jury might find for the government on the question of harm.

State law claims. The court denied Syngenta’s motion for summary judgment on the California Unfair Competition Law, Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, and Iowa Consumer Fraud Act claims insofar as the federal antitrust claims survived summary judgment.

Syngenta entities. The court said a reasonable jury could find that the government presented sufficient evidence to suggest “independent but coordinated activity” to hold Syngenta Crop Protection AG and Syngenta Corporation liable for recovery. Syngenta Crop Protection AG wholly owns Syngenta Corporation, which in turn owns the core defendant in this matter, Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC. A jury could also find that Syngenta Crop Protection AG and Syngenta Corporation encouraged Syngenta’s alleged anticompetitive behavior. The court denied summary judgment on the claims against these two entities accordingly.

The Case is No. 1:22-cv-00828-TDS-JEP.

Judge: Schroeder, T.

Attorneys: Edward Takashima for the FTC. Jesse Solomon (Wharton & Garrison LLP) for Syngenta Crop Protection AG.

Companies: Syngenta Crop Protection AG

MainStory: TopStory Antitrust NorthCarolinaNews FederalTradeCommissionNews GCNNews