Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—E.D. Pa.: Tying, monopolization claims based on youth basketball tournament’s ‘Stay to Play’ policy fail, (Aug 27, 2026)

By Jeffrey H. Brochin, J.D.

The policy required participants to book hotel rooms only with select hotel brands or lodging providers.

The federal district court in Philadelphia has granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by U.S. Junior Nationals, Inc. (USJN or Defendant) in an antitrust lawsuit brought by the parent of a tournament participant who claimed that USJN’s “Stay to Play” policy violated the Sherman antitrust Act as well as the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). However, in order to survive the Motion to Dismiss, the parent (Plaintiff) needed to properly plead the elements of a tying claim, which, for the reasons stated below, the Plaintiff failed to satisfy (Martinez v. U.S. Junior Nationals, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-00851-MKC (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2026)).

“Stay to Play” policy. USJN hosts and organizes elite-level tournaments for girls’ youth basketball club teams. Club teams are private teams that participants pay to join. The athletes are typically “among the best players on a school team.” The Plaintiff is the parent of a child whose club team has participated in Defendant’s basketball tournaments. The elite-level tournaments are distinguished from other youth basketball tournaments because of the high caliber of the attending athletes, the attendance of college coaches and scouts, and the reputation of the tournaments as a pathway for collegiate athletic scholarships.

Athletes and their families travel from across the country to participate in Defendant’s tournaments, which take place in various states. As to lodging for the tournaments, the Defendant maintained a policy known as “Stay to Play.” Under that policy, Defendant’s tournament participants must book hotel rooms with select hotel brands or lodging providers, and participants cannot pick different lodging, and cannot book directly with the selected lodging provider or use loyalty points or corporate discounts to obtain lower rates, rather, they must take whatever room is provided and pay whatever price is offered, often at supracompetitive prices or with restrictions not found in the open market. If a participant does not comply with Stay to Play, their team forfeits the tournament. Occasionally, the Defendant permits a family to stay elsewhere, but only after the team pays a penalty ranging from $250 to $1,000.

Antitrust allegations. The Plaintiff filed the instant antitrust lawsuit against USJN alleging Sherman Act violations and UTPCPL violations by USJN based on the Stay to Play policy, claiming that if not for Stay to Play, the Plaintiff would have chosen different accommodations or applied her corporate discounts for a lower price. At times, the Plaintiff has opted her child out of Defendant’s tournaments due to inadequate lodging choices, and as a result of Stay to Play, the Plaintiff claimed to have ‘been deprived of the opportunity to secure lodging that meets her needs’ and had overpaid for lodging so her child and her team could participate in the tournaments. Presently before the court was the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss based on a failure to state a claim.

Restraint of trade. As an initial matter, the court found that the Plaintiff’s allegations as to an agreement between the Defendant and their lodging partners whereby the lodging provider identified hotels and negotiated hotel blocks, with the Defendant requiring tournament participants to stay at those hotels (generating commissions shared by the Defendant and its lodging partners), were likely sufficient to plead parallel conduct.

However, the Plaintiff also had to plausibly allege an unreasonable restraint on trade. The Plaintiff alleged that Stay to Play unduly restrained trade through (1) a tying arrangement between the Defendant’s tournaments and ‘lodging services;’ and (2) ‘more generally’ by limiting consumer choice with no significant justification or benefit. Here the alleged tying product was the Defendant’s elite youth exposure tournaments, and the tied product was the hotel accommodations provided by the Defendant’s lodging partners. To succeed on a tying claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act, the Plaintiff needed to show (1) the Defendant has sufficient market power over the tying product; (2) the tie has affected ‘a substantial amount of interstate commerce;’ and (3) the Plaintiff has suffered antitrust injury.

Identifying the tying market. The court noted that the first inquiry in a tying case, whether the Defendant has sufficient market power, requires a finding that two separate product markets exist and a determination of precisely what they are. Here, the Plaintiff defined the geographic market as “national” because athletes travel across the country to play in the Defendant’s tournaments, seeking maximum exposure to scouting and elite competition. The court found that the FAC pleaded the “commercial reality” that multiple states could serve as potential tournament venues; therefore, the Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that teams and athletes would “rationally look” for tournaments nationally, and at the current stage, the Plaintiff sufficiently defined the tying market.

Possessing market power. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff’s tying claim should be dismissed because, inter alia, the FAC failed to allege that the Defendant possessed market power. The Plaintiff countered that the court need not inquire into the Defendant’s market power, or alternatively, that she had in fact sufficiently alleged market power. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant had “significant market power” based on its status as “one of the oldest and largest providers of youth basketball tournaments in the United States;” its “long-standing presence and brand recognition;” its “scale, history, and established relationships with college coaching networks;” and “significant barriers to entry.” The Plaintiff did not estimate the percent of the market the Defendant controlled nor the number of potential competitors in the market; instead, she alleged that the Defendant controlled a “substantial share” of the market without further explanation. However, the court found that this conclusory statement failed to sufficiently allege the Defendant’s market share.

Ultimately, the court held that the Plaintiff failed to explain why consumers could not simply avoid the tie by choosing a different elite youth exposure tournament. Thus, because Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege that Defendant possesses market power, the tying claim was dismissed.

Further, the Plaintiff failed to adequately plead actual detrimental effects to support a “more general” restraint of trade claim under the “rule of reason.” Thus, the restraint of trade claim was dismissed.

Monopolization. Monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) a seller’s monopoly power in the relevant market; and (2) willful acquisition or maintenance of that power. Monopoly power under § 2 requires “something greater” than market power under § 1, the court noted. Because she did not plausibly allege that Defendant possessed market power, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for monopolization, which requires “something greater” than market power under § 1.

The attempt to assert a claim for attempted monopolization under § 2 failed because it fell short of alleging “specific intent to monopolize.” Plaintiff offered only the conclusory allegation that the penalties for opting out of Stay to Play serve “no legitimate or justifiable business purpose.” Th complaint also fell short on the “dangerous probability” element of attempted monopolization. Thus, the court dismissed Plaintiff’s § 2 claims.

UTCPL claim. The UTPCPL prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” 73 P.S. § 201-3. The logical inconsistency of the complaint defeated the plausibility of her justifiable reliance allegations, the court held. Plaintiff simultaneously alleges both that she was “forced” to book lodging through Defendant’s lodging providers in violation of antitrust laws and that she chose to use Defendant’s lodging partners because of Defendant’s omissions in violation of the UTPCPL. If Plaintiff was forced to book lodging through Stay to Play, then Defendant could not have plausibly induced her to choose Defendant’s partner hotels.

Unjust enrichment. Because the Sherman Act and UTPCPL claims were dismissed, the court said it must also dismiss Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim. However, even if the court was not compelled to do so, it would dismiss the unjust enrichment claim because Plaintiff has not alleged facts that would render Defendant’s retention of her lodging payments inequitable.

The Case is No. 2:25-cv-00851-MKC.

Judge: Costello, M.

Attorneys: James J. Rosemergy (Carey Danis & Lowe) for Patricia Martinez. Michael E. Hamburger (FBT Gibbons LLP) for U.S. Junior Nationals, Inc.

Companies: U.S. Junior Nationals, Inc.

Cases: Antitrust StateUnfairTradePractices PennsylvaniaNews