Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—E.D. Pa.: Failure to properly allege relevant markets dooms law school applications platform suit, (Apr 30, 2026)

By Jeffrey H. Brochin, J.D.

Although Plaintiff had standing to sue and he plausibly alleged concerted action, his Complaint fell short where, under the rule of reason, he failed to define the relevant market.

A federal District Court in Pennsylvania has granted the motion to dismiss filed by the Law School Admissions Council (LSAC) in a lawsuit brought by a law school applicant, Linvel Risner, who alleged that the organization violated the Sherman Act by fixing application-services prices and maintaining a monopoly in the applications platform market. He further alleged a horizontal restraint of trade in the J.D. education market. However, despite the court’s finding that the LSAC engaged in concerted action by setting fees at the same price for each of its member schools (which created and controlled the organization), the rule of reason applied—and not the per se rule---resulting in the purported relevant markets being implausibly alleged. The dismissal was granted without prejudice and with leave to amend (Risner v. Law School Admission Council, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-04461-JFM (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2026)).

Created by law schools. The LSAC was created by law school deans to make education accessible and equitable, while serving to “construct, administer, and report” test scores for admission to law school, “conduct educational research,” and “provide services to law schools and the educational community.” All 197 American Bar Association-approved law schools are LSAC members, and the LSAC’s Board of Trustees is elected by the member law schools, and consists entirely of member law school employees.

The LSAC developed software (to process electronic applications), which comprises both applicant-facing and Member Law School-facing elements. On the applicant side is the LSAC’s “Credential Assembly Service,” (CAS) through which applicants submit transcripts, letters of recommendation, and other application documents to the LSAC all at once, with the LSAC acting as middleman to transmit those materials to an applicant’s chosen law schools. On the law school-facing side of the LSAC’s software, schools can review applications and manage enrollment through its “LSAC Unite” product. Although the service is free to the law schools, applicants pay an initial fee of $215 plus $45 for each application submitted via LSAC. According to the Complaint, over the last three years, the LSAC has collected $93 million in fees, and, has expended part of that as grants to law schools (ranging from $50,000 to over $100,000) which the Complaint characterized as ‘kickbacks.’

Sherman Act violation allegations. One applicant, Mr. Risner (Risner or Applicant) filed a three-count nationwide class action lawsuit against LSAC alleging: (Count I) a horizontal restraint of trade in the J.D. education market in violation of Sherman Act Section 1; (Count II) a horizontal restraint of trade in the law school application platform market, and (Count III), that the LSAC has monopolized the law school application platform market.

Although the court found that he had standing to sue (having paid fees to the LSAC) and that he plausibly pleaded a concerted action (the conduct of the LSAC and the law schools evinced a “unity of purpose or a common design and understanding or a meeting of minds or a conscious commitment to a common scheme,” they further found that the purported economic markets were implausible, the alleged antitrust harms were nearsighted, and there were insufficient allegations of the LSAC’s monopoly power.

Which rule to apply. Courts apply one of three tests to assess the reasonableness of an alleged restraint of trade: the rule of reason, the per se rule, or the quick look analysis. The three tests can be appropriately understood as falling along a spectrum: on one end is the rule of reason, which requires “careful scrutiny,” and on the other is the per se rule, under which courts will forego an assessment of one or more (and in some instances all) factors related to a restraint’s reasonableness. Somewhere in between lies the quick look analysis, which the court characterized as a test of “I know it when I see it.”

The Applicant argued that the proper test to apply was the per se rule as to the requisite factors, but the court disagreed, finding that the analysis was to be governed by the rule of reason. Under the rule of reason, the Applicant bore the heavy initial burden of proving that the LSAC’s alleged restraint ‘had a substantial anticompetitive effect that harmed consumers in the relevant market.’ However, courts usually cannot properly apply the rule of reason without an accurate definition of the relevant market.

Defining the relevant market. A relevant market is the area of effective competition, the outer boundaries of which are illustrated by significant substitution in consumption or production. Furthermore, a relevant market’s boundaries are also clarified by a consideration of the cross-elasticity of demand between two products that are usually substitutes for one another, in which a price change for one product affects the price of the other. Therefore, the relevant market must both correspond to the commercial realities of the industry and be economically significant, and the Applicant was required to show the interchangeability and cross-elasticity of demand for products in his markets.

The LSAC argued that both markets—the J.D. education market and the law school application platform market—were insufficiently pleaded in the Complaint, and the court agreed, finding that neither market could sustain the claims. While the Applicant defined the J.D. education market as “the 197 Member Law Schools and other law schools in the United States,” who are “direct competitors for applicants to law school,” the LSAC countered that this market was implausible because there were no facts suggesting that all law schools are reasonably interchangeable with one another.

Count 1. Count I alleges a horizontal restraint of trade in the J.D. education market in violation of Sherman Act Section 1. Although the court entirely agreed with courts that have cautioned against dismissing based on an ill-defined relevant market, the alleged market in the instant case was said to comprise well over 200 law schools. Accordingly, the value of a precisely defined market is highest in such cases, and although the Complaint need only allow for identification of the ‘outer boundaries’ of a market (rather than a precise definition), the court was at a loss to do so without speculating. Absent clarity from the Complaint, the court granted the motion to dismiss---albeit with leave to amend.

Count II. Count II, also brought under Section 1, alleges a horizontal restraint of trade in the law school application platform market. Risner defined the market as “the market for a platform to handle applications to U.S. law schools,” which comprises “the LSAC Law School Application Platform and the other application platforms used by the small number of U.S. law schools (less than 15%) that do not use the LSAC Law School Application Platform.” Here, Risner’s inconsistent pleading warranted dismissal.

Count III. Count III alleges that the LSAC has monopolized the law school application platform market in violation of Sherman Act Section 2. The court dismissed this claim because the law school application platform market is implausible as alleged. However, even if it was plausibly pleaded, Risner did not plausibly allege monopoly power, either by direct or indirect evidence.

Antitrust standing. Having dismissed the claims, the court held that Risner has antitrust standing because he was a direct customer of the LSAC. Specifically, he says that he paid a supracompetitive price for its product as a result of the LSAC’s unlawful conduct. Further, The causal connection between the allegedly anticompetitive prices and Mr. Risner’s having to pay those prices to apply to law school was clear. Because Risner has standing to sue, dismissal of his claims was without prejudice.

The Case is No. 2:25-cv-04461-JFM.

Judge: Murphy, J.

Attorneys: Bennett Rawicki (Hilgers PLLC) for Linvel James Risner. Alan E. Schoenfeld (Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP) for Law School Admission Council, Inc.

Companies: Law School Admission Council, Inc.

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