Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—D. Del.: Purported Golden Dome missile shield inventor’s antitrust claims against Lockheed Martin shot down in boost phase, (Sep 15, 2026)

By Justin Marcus Smith, J.D.

The inventor’s complaint suffered from basic jurisdictional and antitrust pleading deficiencies at the pleading stage, but it might be made flightworthy with proper amendments.

A self-described inventor could not rely on Section 12 of the Clayton Act to establish personal jurisdiction over certain Lockheed Martin Corporation (LockMart) defense contractor defendants because the complaint failed to plead a Section 1 conspiracy under the Sherman Act, held the federal district court in Wilmington, Delaware. To the extent the complaint more fundamentally erred in pleading that LockMart was incorporated in Delaware, rather than Maryland, the court declined to address the defendants’ alternative arguments for dismissal. Without expressing an opinion on whether Maryland would be the proper forum, the court declined the plaintiff’s request to transfer the action to the federal district court of Maryland. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice and denied other pending motions as moot (Jones v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 26-388-GBW (D. Del. Sep. 10, 2026)).

Background. A self-described “sole inventor, designer, and engineer of the Golden Dome Missile Shield [(GDMS)] system” and six other defense technologies (together, the IP), sued defense prime contractor Lockheed Martin Corp., its CEO, and its COO (collectively, LockMart).

The inventor alleged he made an unsolicited offer to the defendants for the purchase of his IP. The purported offer included “all seven” of his inventions; master licensing patent assignment agreements for each; and a non-disclosure agreement (NDA). The inventor further alleged the defendants did not accept his offer, but about a week later, the CEO and COO announced that LockMart was leading the GDMS effort across the defense industry. He said all GDMS-related activity across the entire defense sector halted after he sent cease and desist communications asserting his ownership of the IP with proof of ownership.

The inventor alleged LockMart used the materials he sent them to coordinate a hub-and-spoke arrangement directed exclusively by LockMart. More specifically, the inventor’s complaint alleged that the defendants coordinated with unnamed “competing defense contractors” to establish an arrangement for submitting work to Lockheed Martin in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The inventor’s complaint asserted five claims: (1) breach of the alleged self-executing nondisclosure agreement; (2) misappropriation of trade secrets; (3) tortious interference with business expectancy; (4) unjust enrichment; and (5) violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The inventor sought declaratory and permanent injunctive relief.

LockMart moved to dismiss the entire complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2); improper venue; failure to serve two of the three defendants properly; and failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction as to any of the defendants as alleged in the complaint. LockMart’s sole argument was that the complaint was factually incorrect that LockMart is a Delaware corporation. The inventor conceded the error and that LockMart was in fact incorporated in Maryland.

The plaintiff’s arguments against dismissal were not persuasive. First, the court declined to find waiver of the personal jurisdiction defense. The plaintiff was generally correct that personal jurisdiction is a right that is subject to waiver if a party fails to assert the defense in its answer or its initial Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 motion. However, the defendants raised lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense in their first response to the complaint.

Second, the court found the defendants did not, as the inventor had argued, conflate subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff was otherwise correct that these are generally separate issues.

Last, because the complaint failed to state a viable antitrust claim, the court would not have been able to exercise personal jurisdiction through 15 U.S.C. § 22. The complaint did not cite 15 U.S.C. § 22 as a basis for personal jurisdiction, and the plaintiff could not amend the complaint in an opposition brief.

R. 12(b)(6). The complaint failed to meet the elements for the claimed violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The court held, as a preliminary matter, that the allegation that Lockheed Martin conspired with the individual defendants was not plausible because the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine precludes conspiracy claims involving only agents and their principals.

The complaint also did not allege “direct evidence” of a conspiracy. Moreover, the complaint alleged that the defendants did not disclose the existence of the plaintiff’s offer, which tended to contradict the plaintiff’s claim of concerted action supporting a conspiracy claim.

The Case is No. 26-388-GBW.

Judge: Williams, G.

Attorneys: Brent Lamar Jones, pro se. Rodger Dallery Smith, II (Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP) for Lockheed Martin Corp.

Companies: Lockheed Martin Corp.

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