Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—D.D.C.: Google must face Sensory’s antitrust claims over Android wake-word, voice-assistant technology, (Jul 14, 2026)

By Martin A. Steinberg, J.D.

Sensory, Inc.’s claims that Google’s Android distribution agreements unlawfully foreclosed competition in wake-word, voice assistant, and voice-recognition technologies will proceed.

The federal district court in the District of Columbia narrowed Sensory, Inc.’s antitrust suit against Google but allowed it to proceed on claims involving Android voice technologies. Sensory alleged that Google used its Android distribution agreements to require Google wake words and Google Assistant, restrict competing voice assistants, and block concurrent voice-assistant technologies on Android smartphones and tablets. The court dismissed Sensory’s broader theories based on general search, search advertising, search access points, wake words themselves, and voice assistants themselves, finding inadequate allegations of antitrust standing or market definition. But the court held that Sensory plausibly alleged injury in the markets for wake-word technology, voice-assistant technology, voice-recognition software, and voice-recognition software used for search on Android devices, allowing its Sherman Act monopolization and tying claims, along with parallel D.C. antitrust claims, to proceed in those technology markets (Sensory, Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 1:24-cv-02788-APM (D.D.C. Jul. 13, 2026)).

Background. Wake words are verbal commands, such as “Hey Siri” or “Hey Google,” that activate voice-controlled devices. On smartphones and tablets, wake words often activate voice assistants, which can respond to voice commands, perform tasks, and conduct internet searches. When a user makes a spoken search request, the voice assistant transcribes the query and sends it to a search engine, making voice assistants potential access points to general search services.

Sensory is described as a Silicon Valley software company that develops wake word and voice-recognition technology. Its products include TrulyHandsfree, which covers wake words and commands; TrulyNatural, which supports larger vocabularies and speech-to-text functions; and TrulySecure, which supports speaker verification, Face ID, and sound ID. Sensory alleged that its technology solved problems involving false wake-word activation, missed activations, privacy, battery usage, and “concurrency,” meaning the ability to run more than one voice assistant on the same device using different wake words. Sensory licensed its technology to major companies, including Microsoft, Apple, Samsung, Motorola, Lenovo, and Google.

Google initially licensed Sensory’s TrulyHandsfree technology for Google Glass and later explored acquiring Sensory, but no acquisition occurred. Google then developed its own wake word and voice-assistant technologies. Sensory alleged that Google modified its Mobile Device Distribution Agreement and used revenue-share agreements with Android device manufacturers to require Google wake words and Google Assistant, often exclusively, and to make competing assistants difficult or impossible to enable out of the box.

According to Sensory, those agreements produced several anticompetitive effects. First, they allegedly shut out competing wake words and voice assistants by requiring Google Assistant as the default or exclusive assistant. Second, because Google Assistant directed spoken search queries to Google Search, the restrictions allegedly helped protect Google’s search dominance. Third, by preventing voice-assistant concurrency, Google allegedly blocked Android users from using different voice assistants and search engines on the same device. Sensory claimed that this conduct caused it to lose revenue from companies that used Android and that its TrulyHandsfree product had eventually disappeared from smartphones and tablets by 2022.

Claims. Sensory’s complaint asserted Sherman Act Section 2 monopolization claims across 11 alleged markets, including general search, search advertising, access points to search, wake words, voice assistants, wake-word technologies, voice-assistant technologies, and voice-recognition software. It also asserted a Section 1 Sherman Act tying claim, alleging that Google conditioned the distribution of Android, Google Cloud, Google Search services, and Google Play on the use of Google wake words and Google Assistant, and the exclusion of competing technologies. Sensory also brought parallel claims under the D.C. antitrust laws.

General search markets. The court dismissed Sensory’s claims to the extent they were based on the markets for general search services, general search text advertising, and general search advertising. The court explained that a private antitrust plaintiff must plead antitrust standing, meaning an injury of the type the antitrust laws are intended to prevent and one that flows from the alleged anticompetitive conduct. It is not enough that the plaintiff was harmed in some general way by conduct that may be anticompetitive. The plaintiff ordinarily must participate in the market where competition was restrained, such as a competitor, customer, or closely related market participant.

Applying that standard, the court held that Sensory lacked antitrust standing in the general search markets. Sensory admitted that it did not compete in general search services or search-based advertising. Its alleged business involved wake words, voice assistants, and voice-recognition technologies, not search engines or search advertising. Sensory argued that Google’s restrictions on wake words and voice assistants also reduced competition in general search because voice assistants can function as search access points. But the court rejected that theory, reasoning that an injury in one market does not become an antitrust injury in another market simply because both alleged injuries trace back to the same conduct.

The court also rejected Sensory’s attempt to rely on the “inextricably intertwined” doctrine. Sensory argued that harm to its technology business was part of Google’s broader scheme to protect its search monopoly. The court found that Sensory had not plausibly alleged that Google used Sensory as a necessary conduit to harm competitors in the general search market. At most, Sensory’s injury was incidental or secondary to any alleged harm in the search markets.

The court distinguished Sensory’s allegations from the narrow cases where nonparticipants can show antitrust injury because their harm was an indispensable means of restraining competition in the relevant market. Sensory alleged that voice searches were meaningful and that its products could have supported competition in search, but the court found those allegations conclusory and insufficient to show that Sensory’s injury was necessary to Google’s alleged search-market scheme.

Access points markets. The court dismissed Sensory’s claims based on the alleged markets for access points to general search services on Android phones and tablets and access points to general search services and voice searching on Android phones and tablets. The court held that these claims failed because Sensory did not plausibly define either access-point market. To plead an antitrust market, the plaintiff must identify a market based on concepts such as reasonable interchangeability of use or cross-elasticity of demand. Sensory did not do that. The complaint did not explain what products were included in the access-point markets, what substitutes existed, or why those products formed a coherent antitrust market.

The court also found a more basic problem: search access points are not themselves a product market. Rather, they are a functionality or channel through which users reach a search engine, such as a browser search bar, widget, application, bookmark, or direct web search. The court noted that a market including all possible search access points would be too broad to be plausible because different access points, such as a desktop browser search bar and a mobile widget, are not necessarily interchangeable.

Wake words, voice assistants, and related technologies. The court dismissed Sensory’s wake-word and voice-assistant market theories, but allowed its claims to proceed as to four Android technology markets: wake-word technology, voice-assistant technology, voice-recognition software, and voice-recognition software used for search on Android smartphones and tablets. The court first noted that Sensory’s complaint was unclear because it sometimes described its products as underlying technologies and other times as wake words or voice assistants themselves.

The court dismissed the claims based on markets for wake words and voice assistants themselves. Sensory did not plausibly allege that its products competed with Google Assistant, which performs broader functions, including internet search. In contrast, Sensory alleged only limited command functions such as calling or taking photos. The court also found the alleged wake-word market inadequately pleaded because Sensory did not identify its own wake words or explain how unique phrases such as “Hey Google” and “Hey Siri” could be interchangeable products.

But the court allowed the claims based on the underlying technology markets to proceed. Construing the complaint in Sensory’s favor, the court found it plausible that Sensory competed in markets for wake-word technology, voice-assistant technology, and voice-recognition software on Android devices, and that Google’s Android distribution agreements injured Sensory by requiring exclusivity for Google Assistant, Google wake words, and related functionality. The court rejected Google’s arguments that those technology markets were facially overbroad or too narrow, finding that market definition was too fact-intensive to resolve at the pleading stage.

Tying and D.C. Code claims. The court dismissed the tying claim to the extent it depended on tied-product markets that the court had already rejected, including wake words, voice assistants, and search access points. But the court allowed the tying theory to proceed with respect to the surviving technology markets: wake-word technology, voice assistant technology, and voice-recognition software. Sensory alleged that Google unlawfully conditioned the distribution of Android, Google Cloud, Google Search services, Google mobile applications, Chrome, and Google Play on OEMs’ use of Google wake words and Google Assistant, and required them to exclude competing wake words, voice assistants, voice-recognition software, and voice-search access points.

The court rejected Google’s argument that Sensory failed to define the tying-product markets, reasoning that Sensory identified discrete products and applications, such as Android, Google Search services, Chrome, and Google Play, with enough clarity at the pleading stage. The court also found it plausible that Google had market power in the tying products and that, absent the challenged agreements, OEMs would have purchased voice technologies from Sensory or other competitors.

Finally, the court held that Sensory’s claims under the D.C. antitrust statutes could proceed to the same extent as the surviving Sherman Act monopolization and tying claims, because D.C. antitrust law is construed consistently with comparable federal antitrust law.

Surreply. The court denied Sensory’s motion for leave to file a surreply. The court found that Sensory’s proposed surreply merely repeated trial exhibits and transcripts from the remedies phase of the prior Google Search case under the label of “new evidence.” Because a surreply is meant to respond to new arguments or facts raised in a reply, not to introduce or repackage additional material, the court denied leave to file.

The Case is No. 1:24-cv-02788-APM.

Judge: Mehta, A.

Attorneys: David Berten (Global IP Law Group, LLC) for Sensory, Inc. Benjamin M. Greenblum (Williams & Connolly LLP) for Google LLC.

Companies: Sensory, Inc.; Google LLC

Cases: Antitrust DistrictofColumbiaNews