Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—D. Ariz.: No standing in NAIA player’s bid for injunction to reinstate eligibility, (Oct 22, 2025)

By Martin A. Steinberg, J.D.

The former Park University basketball player’s dispute with the NAIA over “season-splitting” rules concerned past harm, not an ongoing injury warranting an injunction.

The federal district court in Phoenix, Arizona denied former Park University basketball player Ryan Pate’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction seeking reinstatement of his athletic eligibility for the 2025–26 season. Plaintiff alleged that the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics’ (NAIA) attendance-based “season-splitting” rule and its negligent misrepresentation of his remaining terms of eligibility wrongfully barred him from completing his final season, violating federal antitrust law and state tort principles. The court, however, held that the basketball player lacked Article III standing to pursue injunctive relief because his alleged injury, the loss of his final semester of competition in Spring 2025, was a past harm not capable of repetition, and he faced no imminent or ongoing injury that a court order could redress. While acknowledging that the player might seek damages for past harm, the court concluded that an injunction restoring his eligibility would not remedy a completed injury and therefore denied the motion in full, directing the NAIA to respond to the complaint within 14 days (Pate v. National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics, No. 2:25-cv-03173-SHD (D. Ariz. Oct. 20, 2025)).

Background. A graduate college athlete attending Park University’s Gilbert, Arizona campus sought to extend his collegiate basketball career for one final season. The National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA), a private governing body for more than 230 colleges, enforces a “Termination of Eligibility” bylaw limiting student-athletes to 12 terms of attendance. The player had competed at multiple institutions since 2018, completing two terms at Mesa Community College, two at Central Arizona College, two during the pandemic-shortened 2020–21 season, two at Southwestern Assemblies of God–American Indian College, two at the University of Arizona, and 1.33 terms at Northwest Indian College. By the time he committed to Park for the 2024–25 academic year, he had accumulated 11.33 terms, leaving 0.67 semesters of remaining eligibility.

In June 2024, the NAIA’s eligibility portal listed the player as eligible for the Fall 2024 term but displayed “0.00 semesters remaining.” The player alleged this was a negligent misrepresentation, arguing that the NAIA should have clarified that he retained two-thirds of a term—enough to complete one whole semester of play. Believing he could compete in both the Fall and Spring semesters, the player joined Park’s team, only to be informed midseason in January 2025 that his eligibility had expired at the end of the Fall term. Park’s internal appeal was denied, and in February 2025, the NAIA confirmed its decision as final.

After exhausting administrative remedies, the player filed suit on August 29, 2025, along with a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction, asserting claims under the Sherman Act and for state-law negligent misrepresentation. He contended that the NAIA’s calculation method and “season-splitting” rule unlawfully forced athletes to choose between participating in the fall or spring portions of a two-semester season, depriving him of his final opportunity to compete. He sought to enjoin enforcement of the bylaw, restore his eligibility for the 2025–26 season, and recover damages.

Standing. The court held that the player lacked Article III standing to seek injunctive relief because his alleged harm was entirely in the past and not likely to recur. Before reaching the merits of any TRO or preliminary-injunction motion, the court emphasized, a plaintiff must demonstrate standing, specifically injury in fact, causation, and redressability for each form of relief sought, and the burden of proof lies with the party invoking federal jurisdiction.

The court defined the injury-in-fact element as a concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent injury, not a speculative or hypothetical one. Because the player sought forward-looking relief, he was required to show a “real and immediate threat of repeated injury” similar to the one previously suffered. The court stressed that a plaintiff alleging only past harm cannot obtain an injunction, as such relief serves to prevent future injury, not remedy completed wrongs. Even a proven statutory violation, the court added, does not substitute for a concrete future injury.

The court found that Plaintiff’s alleged harm, being the loss of his Spring 2025 eligibility under the NAIA’s season-splitting rule and the misrepresentation of his remaining terms, was fully realized before suit was filed. At oral argument, Plaintiff clarified that he did not challenge the NAIA’s general authority to impose eligibility limits, but only the way the “Terms of Attendance” and “season-splitting” rules combined to force him to choose between semesters. The court deemed this a one-time, completed injury, not a continuing or recurring threat. His argument for a compensatory season of competition was rejected because injunctive relief cannot retroactively cure past harm.

The court further noted that the player faced no imminent threat of similar injury. He acknowledged that his eligibility had fully expired, totaling 13.33 semesters—1.33 semesters beyond the NAIA limit—leaving no realistic prospect of renewed enforcement or future misrepresentation. Accordingly, even if the NAIA’s conduct violated the Sherman Act or state law, no forward-looking harm remained to be prevented. Therefore, the player could not satisfy the constitutional requirements for standing.

The court noted that the player might have had standing had he sued in Spring 2025, when the Spring season’s harm was imminent and unresolved. By filing in August 2025, however, after the season concluded, he sought only to redress a past injury, which supports claims for damages but not for injunctive or declaratory relief. His request for reinstatement of eligibility thus amounted to a retroactive remedy, not a preventive one. The court also rejected the contention that other “similarly situated athletes” justified broader relief, emphasizing that this was not a class action and that he could not seek injunctions on behalf of non-parties.

Conclusion. While expressing sympathy for the player’s circumstances, the court ruled that injunctive relief cannot remedy a completed injury. The player may still pursue damages if he can establish negligent misrepresentation or antitrust harm, but his request for a court-ordered extension of eligibility fails for lack of standing. The court therefore denied the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and directed the NAIA to respond to the complaint within 14 days, but granted leave to amend to add additional parties.

The Case is No. 2:25-cv-03173-SHD.

Judge: Desai, S.

Attorneys: Ryan Pate, pro se. Jill J. Ormond (Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP) for National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics.

Companies: National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics

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