Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—D. Ariz.: Athlete fails to show likelihood of success in renewed TRO against NAIA, (Dec 11, 2025)

By Martin A. Steinberg, J.D.

The NAIA’s attendance and eligibility limits allegedly prevent plaintiff-athlete from playing in his final season in violation of the Sherman Act.

The federal district court in Phoenix, Arizona denied Ryan Pate’s second motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction seeking to play a final season of basketball at Park University, holding that although his new claims created standing, he failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. The court concluded that the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics’ (NAIA) Term Limits and the NAIA’s Junior College (JUCO) Eligibility Limitation Bylaws function as non-commercial “true eligibility rules,” not restraints of trade governed by the Sherman Act, because Pate presented no evidence that these rules restrict access to any cognizable commercial or NIL marketplace. The court also rejected his contract theory, finding that he failed to identify a contract between Park and the NAIA that showed an intent to confer third-party beneficiary rights. Having already dismissed his earlier season-splitting and misrepresentation theories for lack of standing, the court again declined to grant mandatory injunctive relief. It denied the motion in full (Pate v. National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics, No. 2:25-cv-03173-SHD (D. Ariz. Dec. 9, 2025)).

Background. Pate is a graduate student-athlete at Park University’s Gilbert, Arizona campus, and the NAIA governs eligibility rules for Park and other member schools. The dispute centers on two sets of NAIA regulations: (1) the Term Limits, which cap the number of academic terms and seasons of competition an athlete may use, and (2) the JUCO Eligibility Limitation Bylaws, which count junior-college years toward the four allowed seasons of NAIA competition. Under these rules, a student becomes ineligible after completing 12 semesters (subject to limited exceptions) and may compete in no more than four seasons.

Between 2018 and 2024, Pate played at multiple institutions, accruing three Seasons of Competition and 11.33 Terms of Attendance. Although the NAIA portal incorrectly showed zero terms remaining, the parties agreed he actually had 0.67 terms left, which qualified him for Fall 2024 eligibility. Because of an injury, he played only limited minutes that fall. At the start of Spring 2025, the NAIA determined that his final term had been exhausted at the end of Fall 2024, rendering him ineligible for the spring portion of the 2024–25 season. Park appealed and repeatedly sought exemptions, but the NAIA denied all requests, issuing a final decision in February 2025.

After negotiations failed, Pate filed suit in August 2025 along with a first TRO, arguing that the NAIA’s attendance-based rules create a “season-splitting dilemma” for athletes whose sports span both semesters, forcing them to choose between fall and spring participation. On October 20, 2025, the court denied that motion, holding Pate lacked standing because the claimed harm, his inability to play in Spring 2025, was past and not remediable by injunctive relief.

In November 2025, Pate filed an Amended Complaint adding Park as a defendant, reasserting his prior claims, and adding new ones: (1) a broader Section 1 Sherman Act challenge to the Term Limit rule itself; (2) a Sherman Act challenge to the JUCO Eligibility Limitation Bylaws; and (3) a breach-of-contract claim alleging he is a third-party beneficiary of the NAIA–Park agreement. Although he conceded that he has exhausted all Terms of Attendance, he argued that he still has one Season of Competition remaining and sought an injunction compelling the NAIA to allow him to play in the 2025–26 season.

Article III standing. The court concluded that because the alleged restrictions operate now and injunctive relief could remove that barrier, Pate has Article III standing to pursue injunctive relief on these new theories. The court first noted that two of Pate’s theories, the Sherman Act challenge to the season-splitting dilemma and the negligent-misrepresentation claim, are materially identical to those raised in his first TRO. In its October 20, 2025, order, the court held Pate lacked standing because those theories alleged only past harm, namely his inability to play in Spring 2025, and did not present any imminent, ongoing injury that a court could prevent. Since Pate’s renewed motion identified no new facts or changes in law affecting that analysis, the court again found that he lacks standing to seek injunctive relief on those claims.

However, the court reached a different conclusion regarding Pate’s newly added claims. His fresh Sherman Act challenges to the NAIA’s Term Limits and JUCO Eligibility Limitation Bylaws, as well as his breach-of-contract theory, now identify a present and concrete injury: these rules currently bar him from participating in the 2025–26 basketball season.

Likelihood of success. Because Pate failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on either his Sherman Act theories or his breach-of-contract claim, he cannot satisfy the threshold Winter factor. The most crucial factor stated in Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008), is the likelihood of success on the merits. The court concluded that Pate failed to satisfy it on any of his theories.

The court began by explaining that before it can apply antitrust scrutiny under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Pate must first show that the NAIA’s Term Limits and JUCO Eligibility Limitation Bylaws regulate a commercial activity. The Sherman Act applies only to restraints on trade that operate in a commercial marketplace, and courts must conduct a fact-specific inquiry to determine whether an eligibility rule is commercial in nature. Although recent cases interpreting the NCAA’s rules suggest that specific eligibility rules may be commercial when they limit access to a developed NIL marketplace, those cases involved robust factual records, including expert testimony on sports labor markets and concrete evidence that athletes lost substantial NIL compensation due to challenged rules.

By contrast, Pate offered no such evidence regarding the NAIA. He has not shown that NAIA athletes participate in a meaningful NIL marketplace, nor has he identified any NIL offers, negotiations, inquiries, or deals he has lost. He did not engage in NIL activities while competing, and he did not present any examples of NAIA athletes signing NIL agreements or any data suggesting that NIL opportunities exist within the NAIA. The court emphasized that without such proof, traditional eligibility rules remain “true eligibility rules,” noncommercial limitations on participation that fall outside the Sherman Act.

Although Pate argued that the rules affect his professional exposure and athletic development, the court found that such consequences do not convert eligibility standards into commercial restraints of trade. Because Pate provided no competent evidence tying the NAIA’s rules to any cognizable economic market, he cannot show that the rules fall within the Sherman Act’s scope. Therefore, he cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on his antitrust claims.

The court next turned to Pate’s breach-of-contract theory, which is premised on his assertion that he is an intended third-party beneficiary of a contract between Park University and the NAIA. Under Arizona law, a third-party beneficiary may enforce a contract only if the contract reflects a clear intent to benefit the claimant directly and intentionally, and if the contracting parties intended the claimant to be a primary party in interest. Pate offered no evidence meeting these requirements. He did not identify any specific contract between the NAIA and Park, cited no contractual language demonstrating an intent to benefit him, and presented no basis to conclude that he is a primary party in interest under any such agreement. Without establishing the existence of a contract conferring such rights, he was unable to show that he is likely to succeed on his contract claim. The court therefore concluded that injunctive relief is unavailable and denied the TRO, without reaching the remaining factors.

The Case is No. 2:25-cv-03173-SHD.

Judge: Desai, S.

Attorneys: Ryan Pate, pro se. Jill J. Ormond (Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP) for National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics.

Companies: National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics

Cases: Antitrust ArizonaNews