Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—2d Cir.: Dismissal of suit alleging Port Authority shuttle bus favoritism upheld, (Sep 15, 2025)

By Justin Marcus Smith, J.D.

Claims against the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey lacked allegations of a defined market under the antitrust laws, detrimental effects, and market power.

Amigo Shuttle, Inc. (Amigo) failed to plead an antitrust violation in connection with an insufficiently defined market for flight-crew shuttle bus services at John F. Kennedy International Airport, held the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in affirming the district court dismissal for failure to state a claim. The court re-characterized the district court finding that the Amigo plaintiffs failed to allege antitrust injury as a finding that the plaintiffs did not allege a substantive antitrust violation. The Amigo plaintiffs failed to allege enough about an agreement for a Section 1 claim, not even inferentially. Mere motive was not enough. Even if the Amigo plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded the existence of an agreement, they still did not plead an antitrust violation under the rule of reason where they failed to allege a defined product market under the antitrust laws, detrimental effects on competition, or KTF market power. The absence of allegations about interchangeability was fatal to the Section 2 claim. The district court also correctly denied amendment because amendment would have been futile. The proposed amendment for refusal to deal would not have cured baseline deficiencies like failure to define a relevant market. Amigo’s remaining arguments were without merit (Amigo Shuttle Inc. v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, No. 25-83 (2d Cir. Sept. 11, 2025)).

Background. Airport flight-crew shuttle bus operator Amigo Shuttle, Inc. (Amigo) brought an antitrust complaint alleging that the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) played favorites among shuttle bus operators serving John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK). Among the allegations, Amigo said it had reason to believe that Kew T. Flyer Inc. (KTF), founded by a JetBlue flight attendant, operated its shuttle services at JFK without official permits. Amigo alleged PANYNJ overlooked that while dealing with Amigo more stringently. More broadly, Amigo alleged the PANYNJ defendants entered into an unlawful agreement with KTF and its founder to afford KTF a monopoly in flight-crew shuttle bus services between JFK terminals 4 and 5 and destinations in New York and New Jersey.

The federal district court in New York City dismissed all Amigo claims. The district court found the complaint described a “narrow vendetta” rather than injury to competition in the market for flight-crew shuttle services. Amigo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

On appeal, the Amigo plaintiffs challenged only the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of their claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and New York’s Donnelly Act, as well as the district court’s denial of their request for leave to amend. The Amigo plaintiffs argued the district court erred in concluding the PANYNJ defendants were entitled to state-action immunity. They said the district court also erred by failing to find a plausible allegation of antitrust injury and declining to grant leave to amend.

Dismissal affirmed. Applying de novo review, the Second Circuit held the district court properly dismissed the Amigo plaintiffs’ antitrust claims for failure to allege a plausible antitrust violation.

The Second Circuit said it agreed with the district court’s reasoning, but suggested it would have been more accurate to say the plaintiffs failed to allege a substantive antitrust violation instead of saying there was a failure to allege antitrust injury. The court cautioned that some courts conflate “antitrust injury” with injury-in-fact.

The first issue with the Amigo plaintiffs’ Section 1 claim was that they did not adequately allege the existence of an agreement either directly or inferentially. The Amigo plaintiffs alleged there was an agreement on an “information and belief” basis, but they failed to allege any facts permitting an inference that an agreement existed or that the defendants had such facts peculiarly within their possession and control. The allegation of an agreement was facially nothing more than conjecture.

Even accepting the plaintiffs’ allegation of a pre-existing relationship, it still fell short of supporting an inference of an agreement among the defendants. At most, the relationship would provide a motive for Port Authority officials to intercede on behalf of KTF’s founder as part of a quid pro quo, but a motive alone was just not enough to infer an agreement. The plaintiffs did not plausibly set forth a Sherman Act Section 1 claim.

Even if the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged the existence of an agreement, they still failed to allege an antitrust violation per se or under the rule of reason. The district court correctly assessed that the plaintiffs did not allege a horizontal agreement making their claim subject to the rule of reason. The PANYNJ defendants and KTF were at different levels of the market structure, they did not compete, there was only a permitting relationship, so there was no per se antitrust violation.

From there, the plaintiffs failed at the first step of the rule of reason. Aside from the fact that the complaint did not attempt to show how flight-crew shuttle bus companies are a defined product market under the antitrust laws, the plaintiffs failed to allege any detrimental effects on competition or KTF market power.

Nor did the plaintiffs successfully plead a Section 2 claim. Again, the complaint did not attempt to show a defined product market under the antitrust laws. It also was not clear how the services were not interchangeable with other forms of private transportation. That alone was fatal to the Section 2 claim, but even if that were not so, the plaintiffs failed to allege specific monopolizing conduct in a hypothetical market for shuttle transportation services.

The Donnelly Act claim failed for essentially the same reasons because the Sherman Act and Donnelly Act track each other on the elements of monopolization and attempted monopolization. In conclusion here, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the federal and state antitrust claims because the plaintiffs failed to plead an antitrust violation.

Amendment. The Second Circuit also correctly denied leave to amend because the proposed amendment was futile. The plaintiffs sought amendment to clarify that the defendants conspired to provide KTF with an unlawful monopoly by locking out all other competitors, not just Amigo, through permit denial and demanding terms making competition impossible, essentially, refusal to deal. The plaintiffs offered a cite for the proposition that a “refusal to deal” is unlawful if done to monopolize, but the more basic deficiency remained that the plaintiffs did not allege an agreement, a relevant market, or harm to competition. As such, the proposed claim would still fail a motion to dismiss.

Other arguments. The Second Circuit concluded that it considered the plaintiffs’ remaining arguments, but found them to be without merit. The court affirmed with instructions on submitting a bill of costs.

The Case is No. 25-83.

Judge: Livingston, D.

Attorneys: Rachel Schulman (Rachel Schulman, Esq. PLLC) for Amigo Shuttle Inc. Scott Hall (Dughi, Hewit & Domalewski, PC) for Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

Companies: Amigo Shuttle Inc.

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