Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ANTITRUST—10th Cir.: Dismissal of horse trainer and bridle maker’s two suits affirmed, (Mar 6, 2015)

By Peter Reap, J.D., LL.M.

The federal district court in Salt Lake City’s dismissals of two suits filed by horse trainer and bridle producer Edward Buck, one against the American Quarter Horse Association (AQHA) alleging violation of the Sherman act, and the other, against the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission and its members alleging deceptive trade practices, were affirmed, the U.S. Court of Appeals in Denver has ruled (Buck v. American Quarter Horse Association, March 6, 2015, per curiam).

Background. In No. 14-4063, Buck sued AQHA, alleging that the association violated the Sherman Act and various provisions of Texas law. The district court granted AQHA’s motion to dismiss Buck’s amended complaint.

In No. 14-4113, Buck sued the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission and the members of the Commission’s Board in their official and individual capacities, alleging that they prohibited the use of bitless bridles—which Buck produces—without due process. The district court dismissed Buck’s case after concluding (1) that it lacked subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, (2) Buck failed to state a claim, and (3) the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibited suit against the Commission and its board members in their official capacities.

Buck appealed, contending that the district court erred in dismissing his lawsuits.

No. 14-4113. Buck asserted that, in 2002, the executive director of the Commission permitted the use of Buck’s bitless bridle in horse racing in Kentucky. But in 2012, Buck learned that Kentucky racing regulations expressly prohibited bitless bridles from racing. Buck tried to get the Commission to change the regulations, but his efforts failed.

He asserted that the Commission and the defendants: (1) violated his due process rights by failing to hold hearings before prohibiting the use of bitless bridles in racing; (2) engaged in deceptive trade practices in violation of Kentucky law; (3) unlawfully misrepresented the approval of Buck’s bitless bridle to the public; and (4) interfered with Buck’s prospective economic advantage. Buck contended that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337, which provides jurisdiction for any civil action proceeding under any Congressional act that regulates commerce or protects trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies.

The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, who recommended that the court dismiss Buck’s complaint in its entirety for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The magistrate concluded that § 1337 did not provide subject-matter jurisdiction, because Buck’s complaint did not concern an “Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies.” The magistrate also recommended dismissal of claims against the Commission and the defendants in their official capacities because sovereign immunity barred Buck’s lawsuit, and recommended dismissal for the defendants in their individual capacities because there was no personal jurisdiction and because Buck failed to state a claim against them upon which relief could be granted. The district court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation to dismiss because of a lack of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction.

On appeal, Buck contended that 15 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq. is the Congressional act required for jurisdiction under § 1337. In § 3001, Congress passed a law “to regulate interstate commerce with respect to wagering on horseracing.” Buck also invoked Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 45 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as bases for subject-matter jurisdiction. Buck did not raise these bases before the district court, thus waiving them on appeal, the appellate court explained. Because Buck failed to establish subject-matter jurisdiction, the dismissal was affirmed.

No. 14-4063. In Buck’s amended complaint, he alleged that the AQHA permitted animal abuse by its judges’ failure to enforce AQHA’s rules and regulations. Buck alleged that AQHA’s actions violated (1) Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act; (2) an intentional tort where AQHA breached its duty to comply with its rules; and (3) Texas law prohibiting deceptive trade practices. Buck also alleged that AQHA’s actions constituted fraud and intentional interference with his prospective economic advantage.

The district court’s order did not state the basis for its decision to grant AQHA’s motion to dismiss, the appellate court noted.

Reviewing de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, Buck failed to state any claims in his amended complaint upon which relief may be granted, the Tenth Circuit held.

Although a plaintiff does not have to set forth a prima facie case for each element of each claim, he must set forth plausible claims that animate the elements of his causes of action, the court observed. Even after giving Buck wide latitude for his pleadings, Buck’s amended complaint came nowhere close to meeting this standard, according to the court.

Except for bare, conclusory allegations, Buck’s amended complaint did not sufficiently allege a claim upon which relief may be granted. He did not address why the district court erred in granting AQHA’s motion to dismiss. After reviewing the record and Buck’s briefing, there was no error in the district court’s dismissal.

The case is Nos. 14-4063 and 14-4113.

Attorneys: Edward Allan Buck, pro se. William Wade Arnold (Underwood Law Firm) for American Quarter Horse Association. Joshua D. Chandler (Durham Jones & Pinegar) for Kentucky Horse Racing Commission.

Companies: American Quarter Horse Association; Kentucky Horse Racing Commission

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