Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ADVERTISING—N.D. Cal.: Class certified in Smucker pet food labeling, PFAS case, (Jan 23, 2026)
Law Firms Mentioned:Bursor & Fisher P.A. | Tucker Ellis LLP
Organizations Mentioned:Consumer Brands, LLC | J.M. Smucker Co. | Post Consumer Brands LLC | The J.M. Smucker Co. | Tucker Ellis, LLP
By Christopher M. Longo, J.D.
The consumers allege that The J.M. Smucker Company misleads consumers by labeling their pet food products as “healthful despite containing titanium dioxide,” and that the products’ packaging contains PFAS.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California has granted class certification in a consumer lawsuit against The J.M. Smucker Company alleging violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and California’s False Advertising Law (FAL), over its pet food products 9Lives, Kibbles ‘n Bits, and Meow Mix. The consumers allege that the company misleads consumers by labeling their pet food products as healthful despite their containing titanium dioxide, and that the products’ packaging contains per-and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). The court found that common issues—especially whether undisclosed PFAS in packaging made the products’ health claims misleading—predominate over individual issues; that the class representatives have Article III and statutory standing; and that requirements for numerosity, typicality, and adequacy were met (Jeruchim v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 3:22-cv-06913-WHO (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2026)).
The two class representatives allege that they purchased the 9Lives, Kibbles ‘n Bits, and Meow Mix products because the packages touted claims such as “100% Complete & Balanced Nutrition,” “balanced nourishment in every bite,” “all essential vitamins & minerals,” and similar claims that conveyed healthfulness. They later learned the products allegedly contained titanium dioxide and that the packaging allegedly contained PFAS, which they say pose health risks to animals. They assert they would not have purchased the products had they known these facts. The consumers filed suit under the UCL, CLRA, FAL, and allege common law fraud and unjust enrichment, and seek damages for economic injuries “stemming from Smucker’s omissions and misrepresentations.”
Article III Standing. Smucker argued there was no injury-in-fact because the representatives “‘did not rely on any statements on Smucker’s packaging,’ and thus cannot establish an ‘actual or imminent’ injury.” Smucker also argued that the consumers could not show that their injury was “actual or imminent” or “concrete and particularized.”
The consumers alleged that they suffered concrete economic injury by paying money for products they would not have purchased had they known of Smucker’s “material misrepresentations and omissions.” Additionally, they allege that Smucker failed to disclose that the products “contained PFAS in its packaging, resulting in [the consumers] ‘overpaying’ for Smucker products.”
The court noted that the class representatives asserted an “economic theory of liability, with the undisclosed presence of PFAS in the product being the vehicle causing [their] injuries,” and that Smucker’s failure to disclose the PFAS in the products’ packaging resulted “in their ‘overpaying’ for Smucker products. The court found that this established injury-in-fact.
Statutory standing (CLRA, FAL, UCL). Smucker argued that the class representatives’ “lack of reliance... disqualifies them from statutory standing under the CLRA, FAL, and UCL,” and that the statutes require actual reliance on the “allegedly deceptive or misleading statements.” Smucker also argued that the representatives’ initial deposition testimony showed they did not read the labels.
The court noted that the representatives “later clarified that they did, in fact, read the Smucker product labels and relied on its omission of any PFAS warnings in deciding to purchase the products.” The court held that the reliance factor was met, and that the complaint “establishe[d] an economic injury.” The court also found that the class representatives established causation in contending that “Smucker knew their products contained PFAS as early as 2017 yet made no changes to their product packaging or labeling.” The court held that the class representatives established standing under the CLRA, FAL, and UCL.
Rule 23(a) numerosity, typicality, and adequacy. The numerosity threshold was met, given the millions of units sold in California during the class period. Regarding typicality and adequacy, Smucker contended that the representatives were “atypical because they were sought out by [the representatives’] counsel.” On adequacy, Smucker argued that the class representatives “demonstrate a ‘lack of involvement, interest, or understanding of what this case was, or is, about,’” and thus neither “are adequate to serve as class representatives.” The court rejected the arguments, finding that the record shows the representatives “understand the basic elements of their claims and what their responsibilities as named plaintiffs entail.”
Rule 23(b)(3) predominance. Plaintiffs argued that they raised adequate claims under the CLRA, UCL, and FAL, and that the misrepresentations alleged were “‘common to all California class members,’ and thus commonality can be shown.” Additionally, they argued that their evidence shows that “exposure to PFAS in any quantity is damaging to pet’s long-term health and must be avoided.”
Smucker contended common issues do not predominate. It argued (1) no omission exists because the packaging never said “PFAS free”; (2) duty-to-disclose cannot be shown classwide since safety turns on whether PFAS can migrate through multilayer bags into food and on pet-specific factors; and (3) even if PFAS migration occurs, the class representatives would have to show that “Smucker’s omission was ‘central to the product’s function,’ which is an individualized inquiry.” The court found that the class representatives “satisfied the ‘unreasonable safety hazard’ element” and that “predominance [was] met under Rule 23(b)(3).”
Rule 23(b)(3) superiority. Plaintiffs argued the small dollar amounts for the products “do not provide an incentive for consumers to bring individual claims.” The court agreed. The company did address superiority.
The court certified a Rule 23(b)(3) class of all California purchasers of the identified products “from November 4, 2018, to and through December 31, 2022,” and appointed the two representatives and their counsel.
The Case is No. 3:22-cv-06913-WHO.
Judge: Orrick, W.
Attorneys: Jonathan Wolloch (Bursor & Fisher P.A.) for Sandra Jeruchim and Melissa Vargas. Anna-Sophie Tirre (Tucker Ellis LLP) for The J.M. Smucker Co. and Post Consumer Brands LLC.
Companies: The J.M. Smucker Co.; Post Consumer Brands LLC
Cases: Advertising StateUnfairTradePractices CaliforniaNews