Antitrust Law Daily Wrap Up, ADVERTISING—11th Cir.: Eleventh Circuit vacates summary judgment over Atlanta billboard first amendment challenge, (Apr 17, 2026)

By Donielle Tigay Stutland, J.D.

Regulations distinguishing between “on-premises and off-premises signs” are “content neutral” under the First Amendment.

The Eleventh Circuit vacated a district court’s summary judgment in a suit challenging the constitutionality of the City of Atlanta’s sign code brought by the longstanding operators a billboard. The Eleventh Circuit concluded the district court was “wrong to sustain a facial challenge against the entire 1982 sign code” when the billboard operator had standing only to challenge a subsection of the code. The Eleventh Circuit also concluded that the district court erred in determining that the relevant provisions of the code were content based. The Eleventh Circuit remanded the suit to the district court (Multimedia Technologies, Inc. v. City Of Atlanta, Georgia, No. 24-13509 (11th Cir. Apr. 15, 2026)).

Background. The City of Atlanta adopted a sign code in 1982, which required signs be permitted before they could be erected. The code contained certain exemptions for “campaign signs,” “[m]emorial signs,” and “[b]ulletin boards” from the permitting requirement under section 16-28.019(1). Section 16-28.019(7) contained a limitation on construction of “signs near freeways [and] expressways.” However, the limitation only applied to “general advertising sign[s],” which the code defined as “sign[s] which [are] for the purpose of directing attention to a business, profession, product, service, activity, accommodation, attraction or entertainment not principally conducted, sold or offered on the premises. The code also provided that these signs “may also be referred to as off-site signs.”

Multimedia Technologies, Inc. owns and operates two large signs located on a property owned by Peach Hospitality of Georgia, LLC. The signs sit adjacent to and are visible from Interstate 85, just north of downtown Atlanta. These signs were permitted by Atlanta in May 1993 under the 1982 code. The signs were installed in compliance with the permits, and those permits were repeatedly renewed between 2002 and 2008.

In 2015, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, which held a municipal sign code which “imposes content-based restrictions on speech” was subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment, Atlanta adopted a new sign code. The 2015 code allowed a nonconforming sign to remain in use. And it defined a nonconforming sign as one “lawfully erected prior to the adoption” of the 2015 sign code that “does not conform to the requirements of ” the new code.

In 2018, Multimedia sought a permit “to upgrade the sign changing technology” for its signs. Atlanta issued the requested conversion permits. Three private parties challenged the signs, first with the Board of Zoning Adjustment and then with the Superior Court of Fulton County. The superior court ruled that the signs were not lawfully nonconforming. Atlanta then ordered Multimedia to remove the signs altogether. It first sent a Zoning Correction Notice to Multimedia that required it to “remov[e] the unlawful signs... within 30 days.” When Multimedia failed to do so, Atlanta twice issued arrest citations to Geoffrey Anderson, the president of Multimedia, and Harrison Coleman, Peach’s registered agent. Atlanta agreed to stay both citations pending the outcome of this litigation.

Anderson, Multimedia Technologies, and Peach sued Atlanta in the district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1982 sign code is unconstitutional, facially and as applied, under the First Amendment, and a permanent injunction to prevent Atlanta from enforcing the 1982 sign code against them. Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment for the billboard owners. It held that the 1982 code was content-based, that Atlanta had failed to satisfy strict scrutiny, and that the challenge was not moot because the 2015 code still incorporated the prior law to determine nonconforming status.

Discussion. Multimedia, Anderson, and Peach (collectively Multimedia) maintain both facial and as-applied challenges to the 1982 sign code. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court erred as to both theories. The Eleventh Circuit said the district court was “wrong to sustain a facial challenge against the entire 1982 sign code when Multimedia has standing only to challenge section 16-28.019(7). And it was wrong to conclude that the 1982 sign code, as applied to Multimedia, was content-based.”

Standing. The court began its standing analysis by noting that, “A plaintiff challenging a purportedly unconstitutional law must prove that it suffered injury under each provision it seeks to invalidate.” Further, an “injury under one provision” does not “confer standing on a plaintiff to challenge all provisions of an allegedly unconstitutional ordinance.” On review, the Eleventh Circuit found that Multimedia established standing only as to one provision of the 1982 sign code, subsection (7) related to “off-site signs.” The Eleventh Circuit detailed that the superior court relied only on that subsection in ruling that Multimedia’s signs were not lawfully non-conforming. Multimedia provided no evidence that it suffered injury from other provisions of the 1982 sign code. So the court found it lacked standing to bring a facial challenge against any provision other than subsection (7).

Content Neutral. The Eleventh Circuit also concluded that the district court erred in accepting the parties’ stipulation that the provisions of the 1982 sign code applied to Multimedia were content-based. Subsection (7) restricts only the use of “off-site signs,” or signs advertising a business “not principally conducted... on the premises” on which the sign is located. Regulations distinguishing between “on-premises and off-premises signs” are “content neutral” under the First Amendment.

Here, the Eleventh Circuit noted that: (a) the arrest citations did not invoke the entire code, only subsection (7); (b) subsection (7) operates independently of the earlier content-based permitting exceptions in the code; and (c) the on-/off-premises distinction does not require impermissible content-based inquiry into the sign’s message. The court detailed that subsection (7) is content-neutral because it “do[es] not single out any topic or subject matter for differential treatment.” The court also stressed that enforcement of subsection (7) “requires only that Atlanta determine that a sign is a general advertising sign, which turns on the sign’s ‘location,’ not its content.”

Remand. Because subsection (7) is content-neutral, the Eleventh Circuit found it is subject to intermediate scrutiny and it must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” The Eleventh Circuit remanded for the district court to consider the constitutionality of subsection (7) in the first instance.

The Case is No. 24-13509.

Judge: Pryor, W.

Attorneys: Craig Grayson Kunkes (Robbins Alloy Belinfante Littlefield LLC) for Multimedia Technologies, Inc. Meredith W. Germain (Turner Ross Germain, LLC) for City of Atlanta.

Companies: Multimedia Technologies, Inc.

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