IP Law Daily, TRADEMARK—9th Cir.: Domain name 'cybersquatting' controversy resolved in favor of Airbnb, (Jul 10, 2026)

By Steven D. Cole, J.D.

The registrant failed to show that his domain name airbnbseo.com was not confusingly similar to Airbnb’s famous mark, or that he acted without a bad faith intent to profit from that mark.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of claims brought under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) and Arizona common law. After Airbnb successfully obtained a transfer of the disputed domain name airbnbseo.com, its registrant sued to block the transfer. The registrant’s second amended complaint (SAC) did not establish that this domain name was not confusingly similar to AIRBNB, nor that he lacked a bad faith intent to profit from the use of Airbnb’s mark (Smith v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 25-571 (9th Cir. Jul. 8, 2026)).

Background. The registrant provides search engine optimization (SEO) services for people in the travel industry, including those who list accommodations on online travel portals such as Airbnb and its competitors. He registered the domain name airbnbseo.com with the Internet registrar GoDaddy. After Airbnb successfully sought a transfer of airbnbseo.com under GoDaddy’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, the registrant filed an action in federal district court, proceeding pro se, to block the transfer. The district court dismissed the SAC, without leave to amend, for failure to state a claim under the ACPA. The registrant appealed.

Applicable law. The ACPA and the Lanham Act generally prohibit the practice known as “cybersquatting,” which involves registering or using a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to another person’s distinctive or famous mark, with a bad faith intent to profit therefrom. (See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1).

Confusingly similar. The registrant did not successfully plead that airbnbseo.com was not “confusingly similar” to the AIRBNB mark. The appeals court’s de novo analysis centered on the potential for confusion arising from the domain name’s linguistic similarity to the distinctive mark in terms of visual appearance, sound, and meaning. SeeYuga Labs, Inc. v. Ripps, 144 F.4th 1137 (9th Cir. 2025). The court first determined to treat the AIRBNB mark as “famous,” given its widespread fame among U.S. consumers and the registrant’s own pleadings acknowledging the mark as such. Then, considering the domain name airbnbseo.com, the court found that it was evident that the acronym SEO was “merely descriptive” because it simply conveyed information about the nature of the registrant’s business. See Lahoti v. VeriCheck, Inc., 586 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2009). Given these two findings, the court concluded that, “[a]bsent factual allegations supporting a contrary inference, a domain name that merely adds a purely descriptive term to a famous mark is confusingly similar to that mark.”

Bad faith. The registrant did not show that he lacked a bad faith intent to profit from the use of Airbnb’s mark. The registrant alleged in his SAC that he “strategically” chose the disputed domain name in order to leverage Airbnb’s brand for commercial purposes. “Absent allegations that would plausibly support a contrary inference,” this communicated to the court that the registrant’s “intentional parasitic use of a famous mark for commercial purposes constitutes a ‘bad faith intent to profit from that mark.’ 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).” Accordingly, the district court properly rejected the registrant’s arguments as to why the SAC nonetheless plausibly alleged a lack of bad faith. Namely: (1) the nominative fair use doctrine, if it applied to ACPA claims at all, was inapposite because the registrant’s use of Airbnb’s famous mark implicated the source-identification function that is the purpose of trademark; (2) the registrant’s reliance on statutory fair use failed because his use of the AIRBNB mark was not in good faith; and (3) the ACPA’s safe harbor provision was unavailing since the registrant did not plead that his use of the AIRBNB mark was for parody and comment, or that he was ignorant of Airbnb’s superior use of that mark.

Other findings. Because the registrant’s claims under the ACPA warranted dismissal, his remaining state-law claims alleging unjust enrichment and those seeking injunctive relief necessarily failed as well. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the registrant’s leave to amend his SAC because the registrant’s petition relied on vague generalities and offered no additional facts that would bear on the issues of confusing similarity and bad faith.

Dissent. Judge Miller dissented on the basis that the case should not have been resolved at the motion-to-dismiss stage, but should have proceeded to discovery. He highlighted that the Ninth Circuit had “never adopted the categorical proposition that any domain name that combines a descriptive term with a mark—even a famous mark—is, as a matter of law, confusingly similar.” To the contrary, he pointed out that the Yuga Labs decision itself cautioned against this approach. There, the appeals court reversed the district court’s determination at summary judgment that the domain name rrbayc.com was confusingly similar to the mark “BAYC,” reasoning that “[t]he addition of ‘rr’ creates … visual and auditory difference and changes the meaning of the domain name … by referring to Ripps’s name.” Yuga, 144 F.4th at 1175.

The Case is No. 25-571.

Judge: Collins, D.

Attorneys: Alex Smith, pro se. Christopher Varas (Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton, LLP) for Airbnb, Inc.

Companies: Airbnb, Inc.

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