Products Liability Law Daily Wrap Up, SUPPLY CHAIN LIABILITY ISSUES—ASBESTOS—E.D. La.: Shipyard worker’s asbestos case proceeds as court leaves claims against manufacturers for the jury, (May 7, 2026)

By Molly Platnick

The court denied the manufacturers’ motions for summary judgment, finding a dispute as to whether the former employee used their asbestos products.

The federal district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied two manufacturers’ motions for summary judgment in an asbestos exposure action. A shipyard worker brought this case against his former employer and manufacturers of asbestos-containing products, alleging he had been exposed to asbestos fibers that caused his wife to develop fatal mesothelioma. The shipyard filed a crossclaim against two manufacturers, arguing they were strictly liable for the employee’s injuries. The manufacturers filed the instant motions for summary judgment, claiming the shipyard’s circumstantial evidence did not establish the employee had come in contact with their products. The court found the shipyard’s evidence was enough to at least create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the employee had been exposed to the manufacturers’ products and whether the exposure contributed to his wife’s illness (Steib v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc, No. 24-2486 (E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2026)).

Background & procedural history. The plaintiff worked for the shipyard as a tack welder, pipefitter, and foreman from 1968 to 2011. He alleged his work caused him to use and be in proximity to asbestos and that there were “dangerously high levels of asbestos fibers…[in] the ambient air of the work place (sic).” The employee’s wife died from mesothelioma, which he claimed was because she was exposed to asbestos fibers on his clothing and vehicle.

The former employee brought this suit against the shipyard in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans on August 1, 2024. The employee accused the shipyard of “negligently [failing] to provide…a safe place to work free from the hazards of asbestos, [failing] to warn…of the dangers of asbestos exposure, and [failing] to implement adequate safety measures to prevent the transportation of asbestos fibers.” The complaint also named “seller/supplier/product/manufacturers” that purportedly sold products containing asbestos with “defective conditions.”

The shipyard removed the case to the Eastern District of Louisiana based on federal officer jurisdiction. The court denied the employee’s motion to remand. The shipyard filed crossclaims against two manufacturers, arguing they were strictly liable and liable for negligence because they knew or should have known “asbestos would cause injury” and “did not provide proper instructions and/or warnings.” The manufacturers filed separate motions for summary judgment.

Manufacturer 1’s motion for summary judgment. Manufacturer 1 moved for summary judgment based on lack of evidence that (a) the employee encountered any of its asbestos-containing products while he was employed at the shipyard and (b) any of its products contributed to his wife’s fatal mesothelioma. Manufacturer 1 stated the “presence of asbestos cloth from multiple manufacturers” at the shipyard undercut the shipyard’s claim “it is more probable than not” the employee was exposed to and brought home asbestos from their products.

According to the shipyard, “circumstantial evidence” established the employee came in contact with Manufacturer 1’s asbestos-containing cloths. Witnesses who worked in ship engine rooms alongside the employee testified Manufacturer 1’s cloth was “extensively used” and “generated substantial amounts of airborne dust.”

The shipyard also introduced “historical testimony” from suppliers who identified the asbestos cloths used at the shipyards in 1960s and 1970s as produced by Manufacturer 1. The shipyard claimed scientific testimony from industrial hygiene experts and medical experts suggested Manufacturer 1’s asbestos cloths were “a substantial contributing factor to [the employee’s wife’s] development of mesothelioma.” Manufacturer 1 responded that this circumstantial evidence did not connect its products to the employee. It emphasized the employee did not identify its products and the “historical witnesses” did not work directly with the employee.

Manufacturer 2’s motion for summary judgment. Manufacturer 2 argued there was no evidence the employee’s wife came in contact with its products. The employee did not identify Manufacturer 2’s products and did not work with any of the witnesses who gave historical testimony. Even if the wife had been exposed, Manufacturer 2 contended, it would not have caused mesothelioma because “neither the application nor use of the products could cause respirable asbestos fiber to be released in sufficient quantities to cause a health hazard.”

The shipyard countered with the same circumstantial evidence it introduced against Manufacturer 1’s motion. The shipyard introduced historical testimony that Manufacturer 2’s products were “generally used…aboard all of the ships” and pointed to expert testimony that the products “substantially contributed” to the employee’s wife’s illness.

Manufacturer 2 did not submit a reply in support of its motion.

Summary judgment denied on both motions. The court found that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the shipyard presented a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the employee encountered the manufacturers’ asbestos products and whether the exposure contributed to his wife’s illness.

Under Louisiana law, a party raising an asbestos claim must show (1) the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos from the defendant’s product and (2) that exposure was a substantial factor in causing the alleged injury. The burden of proof is a preponderance of evidence and can be satisfied through direct or circumstantial evidence. The court clarified this requires more than “the mere presence” of asbestos-containing products. The shipyard’s burden was to allege “facts sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to infer, more probably than not, [the employee] encountered asbestos from the movants’ products.” At the summary judgment stage, the court reviews all facts in the light most favorable to the opposing party.

The court found a reasonable factfinder could infer the employee was exposed to asbestos from the manufacturers’ products because they were used extensively on the ships where he worked. It rejected the manufacturers’ argument the shipyard’s circumstantial evidence was too weak to support its case. Citing a Fifth Circuit holding, the court concluded the historical testimony was reasonably certain enough to create a genuine issue of material fact and “need not disprove all other possible causes.” It found the manufacturers’ argument the employee did not identify their products by name “inconsequential,” because case law establishes that a “plaintiff need not identify the product by name, but rather, can simply show that they were likely in proximity to the product.”

The case is No. 24-2486.

Judge: Guidry, G.

Attorneys: Christopher C. Colley (Baron & Budd, P.C.) for Joseph Raymond Steib, Sr. Gustave A. Fritchie, III (Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, LLC) for Huntington Ingalls Inc.

Companies: Huntington Ingalls Inc.

Cases: CourtDecisions SCLIssuesNews AsbestosNews LouisianaNews