Employment Practices Decisions Archive: 1937 - 1995, EMPLOYMENT-PRACTICES 13 EPD ¶11,586, Randy Harberson, Plaintiff v. Monsanto Textiles Company, Defendant., (Dec. 21, 1976), (Dec. 21, 1976)

Randy Harberson, Plaintiff v. Monsanto Textiles Company, Defendant.

United States District Court, District of South Carolina, Greenwood Division.Civil Action No. 75-1626, December 21, 1976

Title VII--Civil Rights Act of 1964

Business Practices--Employee Discipline--Termination--Racial Discrimination Claim.

--A white employee failed to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination with respect to his termination for making racially derogatory remarks to a co-worker in the company cafeteria, and his discrimination claims must be dismissed. An employer may terminate an employee who fails to obey reasonable regulations and is insubordinate. Termination for membership in the Ku Klux Klan, for violation of the employer’s policy of preserving a non-racist work environment, or for other reasons did not violate the Act absent a showing of disparate treatment based on race. The burden is on a claimant to prove by a preponderance of evidence a claim of racial discrimination. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e .

Back reference.-- ¶618.15 .

Theo Walker Mitchell (Mitchell & Joe), Greenville, South Carolina, for Plaintiff.

Lawrence Ashe, Jr. (Kilpatrick, Cody, Rogers, McClatchey & Regenstein), Atlanta, Georgia, and Judson F. Ayers, Jr. (Watson & Ayers), Greenwood, South Carolina, for Defendant.

HAMPHILL, D.J.: The above-captioned Title VII (42 U.S.C. §2000e et. seq.) action came on specially for trial before this court without a jury on Monday, December 6, 1976. When Plaintiff had completed the presentation of his evidence, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff’s action pursuant to the provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b) on the ground that upon the facts and the law plaintiff had shown no right to relief. After review of the record and applicable law and hearing argument of both plaintiff’s and defendant’s counsel, the court granted defendant’s motion, indicated the nature of its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and directed defendant’s counsel to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the court, with a copy to plaintiff’s counsel and an opportunity for plaintiff’s counsel to comment. The foregoing has been accomplished, duly considered and amended by the court, which now enters the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment set forth hereinbelow, in accordance with the provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b) and 52(a):

I. Findings of Fact

1.--Plaintiff Randy Harberson (“plaintiff”) is a white (Caucasian) citizen of the Greenwood, South Carolina area who was employed by Monsanto Textiles Company (“Monsanto”) at its Greenwood plant from June 5, 1961 until his employment was involuntarily terminated by Monsanto on September 22, 1972.

2.--At all times relevant to this action Monsanto has employed more than twenty-five persons and has been engaged in a business at its Greenwood plant affecting interstate commerce.

3.--Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination because or Race (Caucasian) against Monsanto with the Atlanta District Office of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on or about October 10, 1972.

4.--Plaintiff received his statutory notice of right-to-sue from the EEOC and timely filed this Title VII [1] action against Monsanto on September 16, 1975.

5.--Plaintiff became a member of the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”) in the Greenwood, South Carolina area in 1969. He was later elected by his fellow Greenwood KKK members as the highest officer of the KKK’s Greenwood chapter. He was know among at least some of Monsanto’s wage roll employees as a KKK member and elected official. Plaintiff had occasion as a KKK member and official to refer to black persons publicly by extremely derogatory racial epithets. The KKK reputedly advocates and supports the supremacy of white persons over black persons, and it also advocates and supports the segregation of white and black persons. During this association, however, plaintiff was an informant for the F.B.I. His actions were apparently designed to fully disguise this fact.

6.--Plaintiff made public racially derogatory and segregationist remarks to a black fellow employee of Monsanto and co-worker of plaintiff in the employees’ cafeteria on September 16, 1972. Said remarks had the effect of publicly humiliating and embarrassing plaintiff’s black co-worker. This conduct was contrary to published Monsanto policy.

7.--The incident was reported to and investigated by Monsanto management, who interviewed plaintiff, the black employee involved, and other employees who heard plaintiff’s remarks in question.

8.--Plaintiff was insubordinate and made further racist remarks when he was interviewed by Monsanto management during its investigation.

9.--Prior to this occurrence plaintiff had been a poorly performing employee of Monsanto.

10.--Preservation of a non-racist work environment for its black and white employees was and is a lawful and indeed laudable policy for Monsanto to adopt and enforce. Without regard to racism, it was and is lawful and laudable for Monsanto to have and enforce a policy of non-harassment of fellow employees, and to encourage compatability among all employees regardless of race.

11.--Plaintiff presented no evidence of a black employee of Monsanto’s receiving lesser discipline than plaintiff under similar circumstances. There is no evidence in the record that defendant has terminated or disciplined white employees at a proportionately higher rate than black employees.

12.--Plaintiff offered no statistical or other evidence to support plaintiff’s claims of racial discrimination by defendant against plaintiff as a white employee of defendant.

13.--Plaintiff filed an unfair labor practice charge against defendant with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) based upon the same employment termination and operative facts which form the basis of this action. In the NLRB charge plaintiff claimed that defendant had terminated him because of his efforts on behalf of unsussessful unionization efforts at defendant’s Greenwood, South Carolina plant.

14.--The NLRB investigated plaintiff’s unfair labor practice charge against defendant and refused to issue a complaint against defendant because its investigation found plaintiff’s claim to be without merit. Plaintiff’s appeal of this NLRB determination was rejected.

15.--Plaintiff demonstrated a virtual paranoia in his perceptions of the events relevant to this action. Based upon the court’s observation of his demeanor, the testimony of other more credible and less interested witnesses, the recurrent and substantial conflicts in his testimony at trial and between such testimony and his deposition earlier this year, as well as that of many of plaintiff’s witnesses, and the documentary evidence, the court discounts and discredits plaintiff’s highly subjective, self-serving and wholly uncorroborated testimony that Monsanto discriminated against him because of his race (Caucasian). The courts finds rather that plaintiff was a mediocre and difficult employee whose conduct which precipitated his termination was grossly inappropriate, a violation of published and important Monsanto policy and federal law, and insubordinate.

16.--The court further finds that Monsanto made a full, fair and reasonable investigation of plaintiff’s uncontroverted conduct, acted rationally and in good faith upon the basis of the facts reasonably disclosed by such investigation, did not treat plaintiff in a racially disparate manner.

17.--Plaintiff’s claims against Monsanto are clearly without merit.

II. Conclusions of Law

A.--This court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties.

B.--Discharge of an employee may be “for good reason, bad reason, or no reason, absent discrimination.” Tims v. Board of Education of McNeil, Arkansas, 452 F.2d 551, 552 (8th Cir. 1971).

C.--(a) An employer may certainly terminate an employee who fails to obey reasonable regulations and is insubordinate. Garrett v. Mobil Oil Corp., [11 EPD ¶10,744 ] 531 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, [12 EPD ¶11,207]--U.S.--, 13 FEP 963 (1976); Swint v. Pullman Standard, 12 EPD ¶11,177 ,--F.2d--(5th Cir. 1976), affirming in relevant part and reversing on other grounds, 8 EPD ¶9720 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (see especially fn. #57: “The court need not decide whether they [the discharged plaintiffs] in fact were guilty of insubordination; it is sufficient for the company’s defense if management with good reason thought they were so guilty and discharged them for that reason....”)

(b) “Insubordination towards supervisors, uncooperative attitude with fellow employees and failure to comply with reasonable regulations of the employer are all valid reasons for the release of employees. Martin v. Thompson Tractor Co., [6 EPD ¶8864 ] 487 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1973); Jack v. American Linen Supply Co., [8 EPD ¶9583 ] 498 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 1972); Barnes v. Lerner Shop of Texas, Inc., [3 EPD ¶8158 ] 323 F.Supp. 617 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Christian v. General Motors Corporation, [4 EPD ¶7939 ] 341 F.Supp. 1207 (E,D. Mo. 1972).” Thomas v. J.C. Penney Co., 9 EPD ¶10,130 (E.D. Tex. 1975), affirmed on appeal, award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiff reversed on cross-appeal [11 EPD ¶10,914 ] 531 F.2d 270, 271, (5th Cir. 1976). Some evidence does not equal a preponderance thereof. Id. Even an employee with adequate work skills may be terminated because of a disruptive and discourteous manner. Boyd v. Benton & Bowles, Inc., 10 EPD ¶10,482 (S.D. N.Y. 1972); Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation, 12 EPD ¶11,220 ,--F.2d--(1st Cir. 1976).

D.--Termination of employment due to membership in the Ku Klux Klan would not create a cause of action under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. Bellamy v. Mason’s Stores, Inc. (Richmond), [8 EPD ¶9852 ] 508 F.2d 504, 505 (4th Cir. 1974).

E.--Harshness which is not shown to be racially disparate is not discrimination. Gilliam v. City of Omaha, [10 EPD ¶10,466 ] 524 F.2d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 1975), directed [9 EPD ¶10,174 ] 388 F.Supp. 842, 854 (D. Neb. 1975) [Title VI case applying Title VII standards].

F.-- “In an individual discharge case such as this, [plaintiff] ...cannot prevail without proving either directly or indirectly that ...[he] was the victim of some racial discrimination directed at... [him].” Thomas v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., [11 EPD ¶10,914 ] 531 F.2d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 1976).

G.--In order to establish a prima facie showing of discrimination, plaintiff was required to establish that his employment terms varied from those which defendant accorded to similarly situated black workers and that intentional racial prejudice entered into his treatment. Thomas v. J.C. Penney Co., supra, citing McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, [5 EPD ¶8607 ] 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Long v. Ford Motor Company, [7 EPD ¶9290 ] 496 F.2d 500, 505-506 (6th Cir. 1974). The burden is on plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence a claim of racial discrimination. Thomas, supra, citing Humphrey v. Southwestern Cement Co., [7 EPD ¶9075 ] 488 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1972). Plaintiff Harberson has failed to meet these burdens.

H.--Plaintiff has not offered evidence demonstrating that the presumptively valid and indeed commendable reasons given be defendant for discharge were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision. Thomas, supra. The evidence indicates that there was no illegal discrimination with respect to Mr. Harberson’s employment termination by defendant or his prior terms, conditions or privileges of employment with defendant. Id.

I.--All costs of court are taxed against plaintiff. No determination is made at this time on defendant’s claims for reasonable attorney’s fees as a part of its costs under §706(k) of Title VII [42 U.S.C. §2000e -(5)(k)]. Defendant shall have seventy-five days from the date of this ruling to file a proper motion for the award of such fees as a part of its costs. However, judgment shall be entered without delay.

III. Judgment

This cause came on for trial before the court, and in accordance with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed, it is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the plaintiff Randy Harberson, be denied recovery of and from the defendant, Monsanto Textiles Company, of all damages, back pay, attorneys’ fees, reinstatement and other relief sought, and that judgment be entered for defendant, Monsanto Textiles Company.

All costs in this case are adjudged against the plaintiff. Defendant’s claim for attorneys’ fees as part of its costs are reserved for future determination as set forth in paragraph II(I), above.

And it is so Ordered.