ADA Decisions, Ricardo Hernandez, Plaintiff v Wilsonart International, Inc, Defendant., U.S. District Court, S.D. Florida, 8 ADD ¶8-195, (Nov. 22, 2000)

[Statement of Case]

Lenard, District Judge: THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 25), filed October 19, 2000 by Defendant Wilsonart International, Inc. No response was filed. Having reviewed the Motion and the record, the Court finds as follows.

I. Introduction

Defendant seeks summary judgment in this ADA employment action because Defendant argues that Plaintiff Ricardo J. Hernandez is not a “qualified individual” under the ADA. In this Order, the Court explains why summary judgment is granted by default and examines Defendant's Motion on the merits.

II. Summary Judgment Is Granted by Default

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides in pertinent part that

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.

Fed. R.Civ. P. 56(e). Finding that Plaintiff Ricardo J. Hernandez has failed to meet this burden under Rule 56(e), the Court awards summary judgment to Defendant by default.

III. Analysis of Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Summary Judgment Standard of Review

On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142, 90 S. Ct. 1598 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Supreme Court explained the summary judgment standard as follows:

The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). The trial court's function at this juncture is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986) (citations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir. 1989). The party asking for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of file, together with affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In meeting this burden the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is a metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. An action is void of a material issue for trial “where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

B. Statement of Facts

Plaintiff Ricardo J. Hernandez was employed by Defendant Wilsonart International, Inc. where he worked in Defendant's Miami warehouse facility as a “warehouseman,” until he was fired from that job on November 23, 1998. (Van Katwyk Aff. P 3; Hernandez Dep. Ex. 22 at 1.) As a warehouseman, his physical duties included: driving forklifts, cutting down over sized laminates to fill orders, turning tables with supervisors, loading tables into metro trucks, receiving and storing materials from manufacturing facilities, placing plastic in correct bin or tree rack, separating and identifying materials for special orders, organizing the empty skids area, moving furniture, using the cleaning machine, emptying the trash, and ensuring that no skids or debris are on the floor. (See Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 3 at 1-2; Hernandez Dep. at 44-45.)

Having been diagnosed with diabetes in his youth, Plaintiff began working at Defendant's Miami warehouse without problem in February 1993. (Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 1 at 1.) In August 1998, however, two doctors confirmed that Plaintiff was often dizzy and nauseous, that he could neither stand nor lift, and that he could no longer drive a forklift, all due to the deterioration of his physical condition. (Carman Aff. Ex. A(vi) at 3; Hernandez Dep. Ex. 17 at 1.) Both Plaintiff and his doctor recognized that driving a forklift in his deteriorated condition was not safe for either Plaintiff or his co-workers. (Hernandez Dep. at 44-45 & Ex. 17 at 1). Plaintiff testified that he could not stand for more than three hours without “making too much pressure” on his kidneys. (Id. at 113 & 116.) He also testified that he could lift a maximum of twenty-five pounds with each hand and fifty pounds with both hands, and that he could not roll the laminate material in the warehouse. (Id. at 7 & 112.)

Plaintiff's legs swelled, and he underwent hemodialysis treatments requiring that he be absent from work three hours a day for three days per week. (Carman Aff. Ex. A(vi) at 2.) Alina Van Katwyk, who was Plaintiff's operations manager at the time, testified that Plaintiff's health condition “deteriorated to the point that he was unable to perform most if not all of his job duties as a warehouseman.” (Van Katwyk Aff. P 4.) Van Katwyk added,

We could not leave [Plaintiff] alone to perform any of his warehouseman job duties, such as cutting laminate. He could not pull out sheets of laminate by himself because of the weight of the product. [Plaintiff] himself told us that he could not drive the forklift… . I tried to assign him to work at the customer service pick-up area of the warehouse, but [Plaintiff] complained that the assignment required too much standing and that he could not roll the laminate because it hurt his kidneys and that it was not an assignment he could handle.

(Id. P 7.)

By the time Defendant terminated Plaintiff, he had exhausted the totality of the time-off allowed under the Family and Medical Leave Act and the company policy, and had exhausted all wage replacement entitlements under the company's group short term disability coverage. (See id. P 8; Carman Aff. Ex. B at 1.) “Nonetheless,” testified Van Katwyk, “he did not return to work and continued to require time off and was unable to perform his job on those few days when he appeared at work. He was terminated from the company payrolls at the end of 1998.” (Van Katwyk P 8.)

C. Analysis

Summary judgment in this matter turns on the Court's determination of whether Plaintiff is a “qualified individual with a disability” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. 12102 et seq.

The ADA precludes employers from discriminating against “‘a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.’” Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., [6 ADD ¶6-255] 181 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §12112(a)). “To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) she is disabled; (2) she is a qualified individual; and (3) she was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of her disability.” Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., [7 ADD ¶7-271] 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., [5 ADD ¶5-160] 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir.1998)).

The central issue in Earl was also whether the plaintiff was “qualified” under the statute. Earl, 207 F.3d at 1365. The Earl court found that “an individual is ‘qualified’ if she, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions and job requirements of the position the individual holds.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §12111(8)). The pertinent regulations define “essential functions” as “the fundamental job duties of a position that an individual with a disability is actually required to perform.” Earl, 207 F.3d at 1365 (citing 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(n)(2)(1)). These regulations also provide that a “job function … may be essential if there are a limited number of employees among whom performance of the job can be distributed.” Earl, 207 F.3d at 1365 (citing 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(n)(2)(ii)). “In determining what functions are deemed essential, the ADA states ‘consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment … and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.’” Earl, 207 F.3d at 1365 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §12111(8)).

Thus, Plaintiff “must show either that he can perform the essential functions of his job without accommodation, or, failing that, show that he can perform the essential functions of his job with a reasonable accommodation.” Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co., [7 ADD ¶7-241] 205 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, [4 ADD ¶4-038] 112 F.3d 1522, 1526 (11th Cir.1997)). Therefore, if Plaintiff “is unable to perform an essential function of his … job, even with an accommodation, he is, by definition, not a “qualified individual” and, therefore, not covered under the ADA.” Davis, 205 F.3d at 1305 (citing Cramer v. Florida, [4 ADD ¶4-099] 117 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir.1997)).

In the case sub judice, the Court finds that Plaintiff was not able to “perform most if not all of his job duties as a warehouseman” with or without reasonable accommodation. (Van Katwyck Aff. P 4.) Finding no genuine issue of material fact, the Court thus concludes that Plaintiff is not a “qualified individual with a disability” under the ADA and therefore fails to establish a prima facie case under the Act. See Davis, 25 F.3d at 1305. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

1. The Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 25), filed October 19, 2000 by Defendant Wilsonart International, Inc., is GRANTED by default.

2. This case is CLOSED.

3. All pending motions not otherwise ruled upon by separate order are DENIED as moot.