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    Employment Practices Decisions Archive: 1937 - 1995, EMPLOYMENT-PRACTICES 60 EPD ¶42,068, Thomas O. Blackerby, Plaintiff v. John Sexton & Company and Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., Defendant., (July 30, 1990), (Jul. 30, 1990)

    Thomas O. Blackerby, Plaintiff v. John Sexton & Company and Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., Defendant.

    United States District Court, Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division. No. CV89-PT-1313-S, July 30, 1990

    Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

    Remedies, Age Discrimination Act--Reinstatement--Relocation Required.--

    Although an age discrimination victim was entitled to reinstatement to a former position as an account executive, he was required to be located in a city that the employer chose rather than where the employee desired. The city chosen by the employer was where the employee was located at the time of the complained of adverse action, and the employer consistently assigned account executives to such locations. However, if the employer required the employee to relocate to the city of its choice, it would be required to pay the employee’s relocation expenses.

    Back reference.--¶2650.13 .

    Remedies, Age Discrimination Act--Lost Earnings--Pay Differential Calculation.--

    An age discrimination victim’s pay differential between the time of verdict and the time of payment was calculated on average increases, rather than on the maximum raise percentage of similar employees. While evidence suggested that the employee might have received minimum increases, no evidence indicated that he would have received maximum increases so calculating the differential on an average increase gave the employee the benefit of the doubt.

    Back reference.--¶2650.305 .

    Remedies, Age Discrimination Act--Liquidated Damages--Effect of Reinstatement.--

    Damages for a pay differential that were calculated from the date of a jury verdict until the date of reinstatement were not subject to doubling because of a finding of willfulness in an employer’s age-biased conduct. For pay purposes, the employee did not suffer any lapse in time between the adverse employment action and his reinstatement. Furthermore, there was no need for punitive damages nor was there an equitable reason to double compensation because of a delay in ordering an award.

    Back reference.--¶2650.505 .

    Remedies, Age Discrimination Act--Injunctions--Relief Denied.--

    An employee who was an alleged victim of age discrimination was not entitled to injunctive relief to enjoin the employer from engaging in future discrimination where there was no evidence of pervasive discrimination.

    Back reference.--¶2650.11 .

    Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., Ann K. Norton (Gordon, Silberman, Wiggins & Childs), Birmingham, Alabama, for Plaintiff.

    Jonathan H. Waller (Haskell, Slaughter, Young & Johnston), Lisa Huggins, Birmingham, Alabama, for Defendant.

    Propst, D.J.: This cause comes on to be heard on July 30, 1990, on the issue of equitable and other post verdict relief.

    The issues in this regard are the following:

    (1) Should the plaintiff be reinstated to his former position, and, if so, should he be required to be located in the Atlanta offices. There is no evidence which would suggest that plaintiff should not be reinstated to his former position. Thus, defendant will be directed to reinstate him. The court further concludes that there are substantial business reasons for the defendant to require the plaintiff’s location in Atlanta. That was where he was located at the time of the complained of adverse action. It is consistent with defendant’s assignments that national account executives be located at branch or above offices. The business reasons given for such required locations are credible. The court perceives no reason for allowing the plaintiff to locate at some place other than is reasonably required by the defendant.

    (2) The next issue is whether the plaintiff’s pay differential between the time of verdict and the time of payment should be increased based on the average or maximum raise percentage of similar employees. [1] The court concludes that the differential should be calculated based on average increases. While evidence presented at the trial might suggest that the plaintiff might have received minimum raises, there is no substantial indication that he would have received the maximum. Average is giving him a significant benefit of the doubt. The court is reasonably certain that any raise would not have been above average.

    (3) The plaintiff argues that the damages for pay differential calculated since May 4, 1990 (the date of the jury verdict), should be doubled because of the finding of willfulness. The court disagrees. The court’s reasons are as follows:

    (a) The plaintiff will, effectively for pay purposes, be reinstated effective May 5, 1990. There is no equitable reason to double the award of pay based upon an effective reinstatement.

    (b) If the court is being called upon to award what is effectively punitive damages, the court sees no reason for further punishment.

    (c) The court could have immediately ordered reinstatement, in which case there would have been no doubling of increased pay. There is no equitable reason to double the compensation merely because of court delay.

    There may be other reasons related to the specific language of the statute. The court does not address these.

    (4) The plaintiff claims that he should be reimbursed for expenses attendant to relocating to Atlanta (if the defendant insists that he so relocate). The court concludes that this entitlement should be based upon, not the practice of the defendant, but the called for make whole remedies. The court will direct that if the defendant persists and insists that plaintiff be relocated to Atlanta, that he be reimbursed as will be provided for in the court order.

    (5) Plaintiff argues that he should be granted injunctive relief enjoining the defendant from engaging in future discrimination. The court disagrees. There is no evidence of pervasive discrimination. The case involves a discrete action based upon a miscalculated business judgment. There is “no abundant evidence of consistent past discrimination.” There is no indication of a continuing “compensation scheme” which could remain in effect if not enjoined.

    The court does not agree that plaintiff was made an unequivocal, unconditional offer of reinstatement by letter dated July 12, 1990, which has the effect of reducing pay differential on and after July 16, 1990. The letter was a general statement of a proposed settlement that did not materialize.

    Footnotes

    1

    Apparently defendant does not contend that it should be at the minimum.

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